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Abstract 
 
	  
	  
Based on fieldwork with Somali and Congolese refugees, and with United Nations, NGO 
(non-governmental organization) and government officials in Nairobi, Kenya (22 months) and 
Columbus, Ohio (5 months), the dissertation is an ethnography of refugee resettlement processes.  
Moving between refugee communities and the patchwork of bureaucratic institutions that govern 
and aid them, the dissertation takes as its focal point discourses of fraud and anti-fraud practices 
that illuminate contemporary struggles over rights to mobility.  More centrally, I argue that “the 
family”—as symbol, organizing principle, and network of moral obligations—lies at the heart of 
these contestations. 
In 2008, over 80% of refugees—largely located in Kenya—“failed” DNA tests performed 
by the US government in an initiative designed to assess fraud in its Refugee Family 
Reunification Program.  Subsequently, DNA testing became a permanent component of the 
program.  While the US government has narrowed the definition of “family,” making it testable 
and therefore less vulnerable to so-called fraud, refugees themselves continue to rely on more 
expansive networks of social care.  Such networks emerge from both long-standing practices, but 
also more recent forces of political violence and displacement in postcolonial Africa.  Refugees’ 
obligations to assist members of these social networks, thus, conflict with humanitarian 
programs’ imperatives to aid and resettle the refugees deemed most worthy—a category tied up 
in ideas about the nuclear, biological family.  
Refugee resettlement is structured by competing claims: protecting refugees on one hand, 
and protecting national security and Euro-American humanitarian ideals on the other. “The 
family” constitutes a central locus of these dual claims, treated both as an object of special care 
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and of intense scrutiny. Taking fraud, including “family composition fraud,” as a crucial 
category, I move critical approaches to kinship to the center of the study of humanitarianism and 
securitization, while charting the ways in which global refugee resettlement policies shape the 
borders of transnational communities. In doing so, I argue that contemporary humanitarian 
policies prioritize not only particular kinds of identities, but also particular kinds of social 
relations.   
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Introduction 
 
Securitized Humanitarianism and Social Worlds 
 
 
 
In 2008, over 80% of refugees—largely located in Kenya—“failed” DNA tests performed 
by the US government in a pilot program designed to assess fraud in its Refugee Family 
Reunification Program.  Responding to these results, the US State Department suspended the 
program for nearly four years.  When it was reinstated in 2012, DNA testing became a 
permanent and mandatory component of this initiative that reunifies separated refugee families.  
Intertwined in this event lie two key issues of concern, which lead me to ask two questions:   
First, what do discourses of fraud and anti-fraud practices illuminate about the governance of 
refugees, and the contemporary condition of life outside of citizenship?  Second, what can we 
learn about kinship when we consider “the family” as a locus of contested claims in the 
processes of adjudicating refugees’ access to aid and resettlement? 
In this dissertation, I make two, interrelated arguments that are guided by these questions.  
First, I argue that the emphasis on fraud in refugee resettlement and, increasingly, in public 
discourses about resettlement, highlights the intersection of humanitarianism and securitization 
that structures national and international efforts to govern 24 million people living without 
citizenship (UNHCR 2016:2).  Because opportunities for resettlement to countries in the global 
North accommodate less than a mere 1 percent of refugees worldwide, resettlement is structured 
around creating and applying increasingly narrow criteria for refugees to be deemed eligible.  In 
a context of refugees’ desperation, the seeming impenitrability of resettlement bureaucracy, and 
the perceived arbitrariness of the ways in which resettlement slots are allocated, practices that 
government and NGO officials often term “fraud” are modes by which refugees make sense of 
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and navigate the system.  In other words, practices that officials call “fraud” arise from the very 
structures of the resettlement system itself.  For example, using a paid broker to help navigate the 
process might be labeled “fraud” and used as grounds for rejection.  Refugees often describe 
practices such as presenting a niece or nephew as one’s own biological child, or detailing a story 
in a way that they anticipate will compel officials to compassion, as moral actions that support 
their rights to mobility, and their obligations to kin and social networks that expand beyond the 
genetically testable family unit. 
This leads to my second, related argument, which posits that debates over the meanings 
of kinship and kinship-based obligations are central to the interplay of the conflicting claims that 
animate refugee resettlement systems.  The emphasis on “family composition fraud”—made 
dramatically apparent by the 2008 DNA pilot program and the subsequent implementation of 
DNA testing—draws our attention to the role of kinship within larger questions about fraud and 
humanitarianism, and fraud and refugees, more specifically.  “The family” is a crucial object 
towards which the “moral sentiments” (Fassin 2012:1) of humanitarian work are directed.  It is a 
symbol that elicits compassion, and is a social unit that operates as an organizing principle 
around which humanitarian work is carried out.   
I argue that the organization of refugee resettlement through family units, and the 
humanitarian sentiments directed towards family unity, undergird the tremendous scrutiny placed 
on proving so-called genuine family relations.  This attention to the family within anxieties about 
fraud is further heightened by, and articulated through, the availability of DNA testing, and 
increasing reliance on biological evidence in the politics of immigration (Fassin and d’Halluin 
2005).  If immigration scholarship has attended to “the family” as a social unit that is 
fundamentally linked to experiences of immigration (Manalansan 2003; Olwig 2007; Ong 1999), 
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scholarship on humanitarianism and the War on Terror has not.  Centering critical kinship 
studies in the study of humanitarianism, refugees, and the global War on Terror is one of the 
major contributions of this study.   
Part I of the dissertation, “Governing Resettlement: Bureaucracy, Vulnerability, and 
Fraud,” outlines the context of the larger institutional frameworks through which refugee 
resettlement operates—highlighting the unsynchronized nature of resettlement bureaucracy 
(Chapter 1), the cultural logics and structural forces that shape agencies’ decisions about which 
refugees to select for resettlement, and how discourses of fraud both illuminate and help to 
produce those logics (Chapter 2).  Part II of the dissertation, “Seeking Resettlement, Securitizing 
Resettlement: Kinship and Competing Claims,” builds the dissertation’s central theoretical 
argument.  Drawing on the analysis of discourses of fraud and anti-fraud practices introduced in 
Chater 2, the following chapters highlight the ways in which debate and contestation over 
kinship and family—what it is (what constitutes a family), and what it does (what kin are 
obligated to do for one another)—are at the center of larger anxieties about so-called fraud and 
the protection of national borders.  These same anxieties and their attendant policies, I show, 
ultimately shape the contours of families, social networks, and everyday life among displaced 
communities.  The concept of the “fraudulent family”—the family accused of having been 
constructed for immigration purposes—alerts us to the privileging not only of particular kinds of 
humans in humanitarian operations (Ticktin 2011), but also to the privileging of particular kinds 
of social relations.  Certain kinds of social bonds are deemed more worthy of care. 
*** 
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As of 2015, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reported that over 24 million people globally were refugees and asylum seekers.1  The vast 
majority of refugees live in global South countries that—for reasons including lack of 
resources—foreclose the possibility of citizenship to the unauthorized border crossers living 
within their national boundaries.  UNHCR, whose mandate is to protect refugees, defines its 
work around three “durable solutions”: local integration, repatriation, and third country 
resettlement.  As local integration and repatriation are rarely feasible options—including in the 
Somali and Congolese cases represented in this dissertation—third country resettlement to one of 
the 33 countries that participates in this global system has become an object of tremendous hope 
and desire in many refugee communities, including those chronicled here.2 
Yet, globally, fewer than 1 percent of refugees worldwide are granted resettlement to a 
third country in which they will have access to citizenship.  Despite its statistical improbability, 
resettlement looms large for refugees in East Africa and other parts of the global South—a social 
fact well documented by anthropologists (Abdi 2015; Horst 2006; Thomson 2012).  The numbers 
of asylum seekers whose lives have been lost in the Mediterranean, or in the deserts cut through 
by the US-Mexico border, for example, speak volumes about the desperation with which people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Refugee status” is an official, legal status granted to specific people who have crossed a 
national border without legal authorization on account of their “well-founded fear of 
persecution.”  Refugee status allows such individuals to legally reside within the country of 
asylum. “Asylum seeker status” means that a person who has crossed a border without legal 
authorization has made a claim to refugee status and is waiting for the claim to be adjudicated.  
 2	  As of 2015, the countries that accepted refugees for resettlement through the global 
resettlement program included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the 
United States.  The top resettlement countries are the United States—which accepts more 
refugees than all other countries combined (accepting 52,583 in 2015)—followed by Canada, 
Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UNHCR 2015a).  	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of the twenty-first century’s global South seek alternate possibilities—about which global media 
make them well aware (Abdi 2015; Albahari 2015; Ferguson 2006; Piot 2010; Ticktin 2011).  
These deaths are the “failed crossing[s] that dramatiz[e] [the] deadly solidity” of contemporary 
borders (Ferguson 2006:166).  The cultural meanings of the refugee resettlement system for 
refugees themselves should be understood within this desperate and deadly context.   
As of 2015, Kenya hosted the fourth largest UNHCR resettlement operation in the world.  
That year, their office submitted 7,586 cases to foreign governments, which comprised 
approximately 1.3% of the 593,881 documented refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya the same 
year.3  That number does not reveal how many people were accepted, as a proportion of the cases 
referred by UNHCR, typically after years of screening and waiting, are rejected by the would-be 
host governments.  The same year, worldwide, Congolese and Somalis accounted for the second 
and fourth most resettled populations, respectively. Of the 33 countries that participate in third 
country resettlement, the United States admits the vast majority of refugees (UNHCR 2015a).  In 
the US Government’s fiscal year 2015, 69,933 refugees arrived in the United States, of which 
Somalis represented 12.7% and Congolese 11.3% (Zong and Batalova 2015). With 21.3 million 
refugees documented by UNHCR worldwide, and with a continuous flow of refugees leaving 
their home countries in the post-Cold War era—many from conflicts that have no apparent end 
in sight—the supply of refugee resettlement spaces cannot come close to the demand for avenues 
to leave countries of first asylum in the global South—countries that, like Kenya, are typically 
unable or unwilling to provide refugees with a path to citizenship.4   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
3 This is still substantially smaller than the top three countries, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, 
which together made up 62,150 cases.  http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09  	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With the advent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which replaced 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) after September 11th, 2001, “fraud” has become a 
primary focus of energy in the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which has long been 
defined as a humanitarian initiative.  Some scholars writing on refugees and asylum seekers have 
noted the role of fraud in refugee aid (see Feldman 2007); others have dealt with lies, mistrust, 
and questions of evidence—terms that evoke, or relate to, notions of fraud (see below).  In this 
dissertation, I take “fraud” as a central category that requires more systematic investigation than 
it has previously received.  Given that fewer than 1 percent of refugees will be granted third 
country resettlement, non-governmental agencies such as UNHCR, as well as government 
institutions such as the US Departments of State and of Homeland Security, spend enormous 
energy trying to differentiate between genuine versus fake, deserving versus undeserving, good 
versus bad, safe versus dangerous refugees.  As I discuss in Chapter 2, refugees who are 
understood to be intentionally attempting to fit themselves in to categories of prioritization are 
often described both as “fraudulent” and as potential threats to national security.   
Writing about the occupied Palestinian territories, Hagar Kotef uses the term “securitized 
humanitarianism” to describe the ways in which Israeli delivery of humanitarian aid during the 
2008 attacks on Gaza did not constrain violence, but rather “accompanied violence and, 
moreover, made it possible” (Kotef 2010:181).  The pairing of violence and humanitarianism, 
she argues, is a “mode of control” in which aid and securitization are partners in a single 
regime—a partnership that eliminates “the very possibility of citizenship,” producing subjects 
that are “never included or fully excluded” (2010:186).  While the relationship between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  While accounting for global refugee situations since the Cold War era is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, see Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security 
Implications (Loescher et. al. 2008), as well as UNHCR reports such as The State of the World's 
Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium (2006), for broader context.  
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humanitarian aid and violence deserves attention (Kotef’s depiction of US aid in Iraq is equally 
compelling), I use the term “securitized humanitarianism” differently.  Here, I think about fraud 
as a term through which humanitarian impulses and national security anxieties concerning 
refugee resettlement congeal.   
In contrast to Kotef, my interest is less in the coupling of humanitarian aid with the 
violence of war, but in particular forms of anti-immigrant securitization that have emerged in the 
post-9/11 United States (De Genova 2007; Fassin 2011; Medovoi 2007).  The contemporary 
refugee subject embodies a perceived potential to be victim or perpetrator, as genuinely 
deserving recipient or as fraudulent criminal.  The increasing scrutiny of asylum seekers and 
refugees as possible terrorists since 9/11, and even more so since the terror attacks in Paris in 
2015 and the 2017 US presidential Executive Orders on immigration, increasingly ties the 
“fraudulent refugee” to the terror suspect.  Moreover, as Anthony Giddens writes, “The family is 
an object of political struggle around the world” (2000:70).  The family is a powerful institution, 
often perceived as stabilizing or destabilizing to hegemonic social norms.  Certain kinds of 
kinship—for example, the decline of two-parent households, or the legalization of gay 
marriage—are often discursively linked to other social problems, standing as symbols of broader 
anxieties.  The fraudulent refugee family now conjures anxieties about Islamic terror.   
 
The Refugee and UNHCR 
 Before journeying further, I want to contextualize “the refugee” historically.  While a 
more robust treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of the dissertation, briefly centering the 
notion of the refugee in history should help to throw into relief the specificity of the current 
moment, and its mechanisms of addressing refugees in the postcolonial, post-9/11, global age.   
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 “The refugee” as a political subjectivity is a product of twentieth-century international 
law.  Although Malkki warns against identifying a “proto-refugee” (1995:498), it is worth noting 
that legal and religious texts from long before the advent of the United Nations dictated rules and 
codes for dealing with people fleeing persecution.  The Hebrew Bible, the Quran, and ancient 
Greek literature and legal writings all refer to obligations to grant asylum to certain groups and 
individuals under specific conditions (Garland 2014:114-30).  Texts such as these suggest that 
moral questions about supplication and sanctuary have been relevant to human societies for 
thousands of years.  In other words, it is not only that people have always had reasons to flee, but 
more centrally that societies have been contemplating and codifying what to do about people 
seeking refuge for a very long time.   
 The beginning of a coordinated, international effort to manage refugee populations began 
in the aftermath of WWI, under the League of Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees—a precursor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  This 
agency was set up specifically to deal with refugees from the disolving Russian and Ottoman 
Empires.  Following WWII, the Allied powers organized a series of temporary agencies in an 
attempt to manage Europe’s tens of millions of displaced people.  In 1950, with the creation of 
UNHCR, and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, what would eventually 
become a permanent organization was put in place.  While at first limited in its temporal and 
geographic scope, UNHCR’s mandate was ultimately extended beyond its initial purpose of 
dealing with European refugees from WWII.  The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees extended the 1951 Convention to emerging refugee situations produced by Cold War 
conflicts in Africa and Asia, in particular.  As a “Western-dominated and donor-dependent 
organization,” UNHCR was necessarily allied with Western governments’ geopolitical, Cold 
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War, interests (Loescher et al. 2008:25-26).  In this sense, global refugee resettlement—and US 
involvement in resettlement—was long driven by national security interests. 
The 1951 Convention defined the refugee around the issue of individual persecution, 
rather than being derived automatically from membership in a particular group (Loescher et al. 
2008:6-16).  Specifically, the Convention defined the refugee as a person with “a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion” (UNHCR 1951:3).  The choice to issue refugee status based on 
individual as opposed to group status, and the burgeouning human rights discourse from which 
the refugee definition emerged, had enormous consequences for the allocation of asylum and 
refugee status, and in many ways structures the ways in which refugee status and resettlement 
work today.  Resettlement to a third country from the original country of asylum was one of the 
core mechanisms that UNHCR used to fulfill its mandate to protect refugees from the beginning 
of it life as an agency (Loescher et al. 2008:13; UNHCR 2011:47).  Ultimately, the origins of a 
coordinated, international refugee protection system in the two World Wars in Europe, and the 
orientation of resettlement around “First World” Cold War priorities, inform the global relations 
and politicical priorities that structure refugee aid and resettlement today.  
  
Humanitarianism: From Universal Suffering to Power and Knowledge 
 
Miriam Ticktin points out that early anthropological work on humanitarianism, beginning 
in the 1980s, was informed by a shift that followed decolonization and the accompanying 
critiques of anthropology that moved anthropological focus away from “the Other” and cross-
cultural analysis, and towards an interest in “the universal, global, and transnational—all brought 
together by a focus on suffering” (Ticktin 2014:276).  This scholarship—largely oriented around 
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legal and medical anthropology—also brought anthropological work into collaborative dialogue 
with on-the-ground humanitarian work that emerged as part of the rise of non-governmental 
organizations in the 1980s and ’90s—characterized by the work of scholars such as Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Paul Farmer (274-77).  Others, such as Liisa Malkki, brought a critical lens 
to humanitarianism beginning with her work on Hutu refugees in Tanzania in the 1990s.  She 
argued that “humanitarian practices tend to silence refugees,” critiquing a notion of a “universal, 
ahistorical humanity” that informed humanitarian work (Malkki 1996:378)—and that, Ticktin 
(2014) has argued, also structured earlier anthropological studies of humanitarianism. 
Influential scholarship on humanitarianism in the 2000s took up Malkki’s style of 
critique, studying the unintended consequences of humanitarian work (de Waal 1997; Ticktin 
2011; see also Ticktin 2014:277), the particular logics that underlie humanitarian ideals and 
practices (Redfield and Bornstein 2010), and more critical approaches to the concept of universal 
humanity and the kinds of political (or anti-political) projects that it engenders (Fassin 2012; 
Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Ticktin 2011).  The earlier writing of Hannah Arendt on “the decline 
of the nation-state and the end of the rights of man” (1951), and the philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben’s writing on “bare life” (1998), both provide a precursor, and a different disciplinary 
approach to humanitarianism and questions of rights based in biological life versus citizenship.  
Their scholarship has also informed anthropologists over the last decade (Besteman 2016; Cabot 
2014; Ticktin 2011).  Echoing Arendt’s earlier work, Agamben has written that refugees show 
that biological life and citizenship have become “irreparably loosened from each other” 
(Agamben 1998:132).  He argued that UNHCR, formed in 1951, “whose actions, according to 
statute, are to have not a political but rather a ‘solely humanitarian and social’ mission…can only 
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grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a 
secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight” (Agamben 1998:133).     
During this same period, contemporary with the 9/11 attacks and the US invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, anthropologists have tracked the intersections of humanitarianism with larger 
geopolitical projects at national, regional, and global scales.  For example, Miriam Ticktin writes 
about the ways in which Orientalist ideas about saving Muslim women provide asylum access to 
certain subjects while foreclosing it from others (Ticktin 2008).5  Work on asylum access that 
charts collaborations of humanitarianism and anti-immigrant and border-protecting regimes has 
been especially powerful in demonstrating the multifaceted aims and effects of contemporary 
humanitarianism (Albahari 2015; Cabot 2014; Coutin 2001; Fassin 2012).  Writing about the 
Italian “Mare Nostrum” program that patrols the Mediterranean Sea for refugees, for example, 
Maurizio Albahari writes, “This is where discourses, symbols, and technologies of 
humanitarianism and salvation have been materially put to work to enable national and European 
attempts to govern immigration” (Albahari 2015:15).  Other scholars have also highlighted the 
particular cultural logics that undergird this work, while demonstrating humanitarian actors’ 
awareness and attempts to negotiate the moral and political conundrums that their work entails 
(Cabot 2014; Fassin 2012; Redfield 2010), and the ways in which humanitarian work articulates 
with the complexities of their own vulnerability and human struggles (Malkki 2015).  
Among the most influential scholarship to the present study is work that has examined 
knowledge and power in the governance of refugee and asylum seekers, and the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.  Often conducted in courts, NGO offices, and the UNHCR, this research has 
demonstrated the ways in which the epistemologies, ontologies, and ideologies of aid and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For broader context on this argument, see Abu-Lughod (2002, 2013).   
	   12	  
asylum-giving institutions—and the societies in which they are rooted, and which they are tasked 
with representing and protecting—determine the terms by which aid and asylum are given.  Such 
scholars critique the purported self-evident morality of these systems.  Such institutions are 
plagued by “epistemic anxieties” (Stoler 2009; see also Cabot 2014:113); an obsessive search for 
defining the criteria upon which aid and asylum are allocated, and mechanisms to assess whether 
or not applicants meet them (Cabot 2014; Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; Feldman 2007; Griffiths 
2012; Sandvik 2011; Thompson 2012; Ticktin 2011).  Writing about France, for example, Fassin 
and d’Halluin (2005), and Ticktin (2011) demonstrate the ways in which the suffering body 
stands as the primary deserving humanitarian subject, while expert medical evidence discerns the 
“truth from the body” (Fassin and d’Halluin 2005).  Sandvik (2011) and Thomson (2012), 
writing about the UNHCR and refugees in Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, document the 
ways in which bureaucratic opacity enables corrupt and unsystematic allocation of refugee 
resettlement cases—a point that is essential for this study.  And, scholars such as Gale (2007), 
James (2010), and Thomson (2012) also write about the complex intersection of ways in which 
these policies are received and contested by refugees themselves—another aim taken up in the 
present work.   
Much of the scholarship mentioned here has implicitly or explicitly dealt questions about 
who constitutes a worthy recipient of aid, asylum, and resettlement.  While scholars such as 
Bornstein (2001, 2010) and Malkki (2010) have pointed out the ways in which children inhabit a 
special locus of interest in humanitarian projects, “the family” has not been systematically 
attended to in literature on humanitarianism—an area I seek to address.   
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Bringing the Critique of Kinship to Refugee Resettlement 
What constitutes kinship?  What counts as a family?  Why is “the family” central to 
questions about fraud, and how, in turn, do bureaucratic definitions of the family shape 
transnational social life among the displaced?  In what ways do obligations of kinship run up 
against, or challenge, notions of fraud?  These questions animate both the ethnographic and 
theoretical stakes of this dissertation.  Refugee resettlement policies use the family unit as a 
primary category for allocating resettlement and explicitly define the family in a particular 
way—primarily nuclear and biogenetic.  The role of the family in these programs, therefore, 
draws our attention to questions of kinship in two, complex, heterogeneous, but also distinct 
worlds—global North humanitarian and security agencies; and refugee communities that these 
institutions govern and aid.  In that sense, this dissertation charts contested claims to kinship 
among actors who inhabit vastly unequal positions as they come together to make and assess 
claims.  In this dissertation, I not only identify distinct cultural logics of kinship represented by 
these two groups of actors, I also examine the ways in which kinship—as an organizing and 
classificatory logic, an object of special humanitarian compassion, and an arena of security-based 
scrutiny—has come to the fore in the governance of stateless populations in the first two decades 
of the twenty-first century.   
In 2013, I interviewed a smart, experienced NGO staff member, Beth, who was, at the 
time, based in the United States.6   Prior to working for an NGO, Beth had worked on the 
government side of the US refugee resettlement program for two decades.  She spoke with 
generous ease throughout our conversation.  But when I pressed the issue of the definition of 
family in the US program, she seemed slightly uneasy as she suggested that there was, in fact, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 All names in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
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flexibility in the system, so long as refugees honestly represented their family relations.  She 
said: 
 “I actually think the State Department is fair on this issue—tries to be fair on this issue.  
They are not in the business of trying to separate real families—that really are dependent on each 
other—and that really are families—had a history of living together; ideally fled together—have 
lived together in the country of asylum.  That, like… families, you know?”   
She laughed, aware of the way in which her language of the “real” family confirmed the 
skepticism that had informed my question.   
 “I know that’s a loaded term,” she continued, “but, you know—that have the emotional 
and economic dependency.  They’re not trying to separate people like that, whether they’re 
biological or not biological.  But what they need is people to be honest about the real 
relationships.”   
  Beth’s statement reflected Kath Weston’s notion of the “know-one-when-you-see-one” 
family—an idea that Weston argues the study of kinship must actively resist (Weston 2001:149).  
I am intrigued by the ways in which Beth is simultaneously aware of the fact that she is defining 
“family” in a culturally specific way, and yet also maintains that “family” as she defines it is 
self-evident and natural—“real.”  A “real family,” she says, is made up of people who are 
dependent on one another, have a history of living together and lived together prior to fleeing 
their country, live together at present in the asylum country, and have both economic and 
emotional dependency.  If these criteria are met, she asserts, even a family comprised of people 
who are not a nuclear, biological family could be accommodated.  Nevertheless, even this more 
flexible definition of “family” (or “case composition” as she also calls it), as I will show 
throughout this dissertation, is not as flexible as she suggests here.  Beth went on to express that 
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the DNA testing policy had been necessary to curb widespread fraud—fraud that hurt deserving 
refugees, and that led to social problems once refugees who lacked genuine familial relationships 
arrived in the US—sometimes leaving children in precarious and dangerous positions.  Like 
many people I spoke to who had worked on the international side of resettlement, she believed it 
was important for there to be exceptions to the biological family norm in certain circumstances.7  
However—as in all policies and bureaucratic procedures—there had to be a norm, and a norm 
that could be objectively tested was ideal.   
The widespread notion of “sham marriages,” for example, tell us that families constructed 
explicitly for immigration purposes never count as a family in the eyes of adjudicators.  The 
kinds of families that may be designated “fraudulent” by DNA tests, or simply disqualified by 
family or “case composition” definitions in the US Refugee Family Reunification Program 
include polygynous families; families in which the father is the biological progenitor of some but 
not all of the children due to rape, sex work, or infidelity; marriages arranged for immigration 
purposes; and marriages in which someone has agreed to misrepresent the relationship to a child 
they have agreed to include in their case, to help the family, for financial gain, or both.  While 
UNHCR and the US government make accommodations for some, but not all, of these 
arrangements, I argue that even the most instrumental arrangements must also be considered in 
the context of kinship as a social category and an object of analysis.  Produced in conditions that 
take “the family” as the primary social unit that organizes access to resettlement, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 According to US policy, someone outside the nuclear family could be accommodated if they 
lived with the applicant family prior to leaving their country of origin and were part of the same 
economic unit.  This “add-on” status is generally reserved for minors (under the age of 21).  
Exceptions can be made for people such as elderly parents or grandparents, unmarried daughters 
or sisters in particular cultural contexts, or an adult sibling with a physical or mental disability, 
providing that there are no other people to care for such a person after the case’s departure.  It is 
important to note that these exceptions are not made for family reunification cases, in which an 
anchor is applying for their family to join them.   
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families/cases constructed to access resettlement must also be understood within this framework.  
This is not a policy recommendation.  Rather, it is a theoretical argument that insists that we 
understand the most instrumental constructions of familial relations within and not outside of the 
purview of kinship and kinship studies—and that we center them within the context of policies 
that are explicitly designed to prioritize relatedness and the family unit in organizing the 
allocation of refugee resettlement.   
Kinship and the family have held a central role in anthropological knowledge since its 
inception (Evans-Pritchard 1951; Morgan 1871; Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde 1950; see 
also Schneider 1972), and later went through tumultuous period of critique as an analytical 
framework, followed by a critical resurgence.  David Schneider’s Critique of the Study of 
Kinship, for example, questioned the use of “kinship” as a category in anthropological 
knowledge—arguing that kinship as defined by anthropological theory was merely a reflection of 
Euro-American conceptions of sociality, rather than a truly universal concept that could be used 
for cross-cultural comparison (1984; see also Bamford and Leach 2009; Carsten 2004; Weston 
2001).  Scholarship that took up Schneider’s critique, particularly in feminist and queer 
anthropology (Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako 1982; Weston 1991), drew inspiration from the 
critique not to abandon kinship, but to re-visit it with a critical approach—deconstructing 
genealogy and re-framing kinship “both as a theoretical concept and a social category” (Franklin 
and McKinnon 2001:1).  Of Schneider’s reaction to her book on lesbian/gay kinship ideologies 
in the US, Kath Weston wrote, “Why would I be interested, he [Schneider] wondered, in 
advocating for this historically destructive conception called family?” (Weston 2001:148).  
Weston argues that taking up kinship as a category, rather than abandoning it, has partially been 
compelled by calls “to attend to bitterly fought social struggles that, as Judith Stacey [1996] 
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would have it, stake their claims in the name of the family” (Weston 2001:150).  This is, 
perhaps, a useful entry point for this study of “the fraudulent family.”   
Weston refers to scholarship that has attended to social issues surrounding queer kinship, 
reproductive technologies, transnational adoption, and new notions of embodied kinship, 
genealogy, belonging, and inclusion and exclusion at various levels that have arisen from 
emergent scientific and technological discoveries (Bamford and Leach 2009; Franklin and 
McKinnon 2001), and novel processes emerging in an age of globalization (Kim 2010; Ong 
1999).  The use of genetic science, and particular claims about the meaning of family in the 
context of refugee resettlement between Africa and the United States, brings questions about the 
contested meanings of family into a new arena.   
 
Refugee Families between Norms and Practices 
The social worlds of the refugees from Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
who make up some of the primary voices in this dissertation are shaped by UNHCR and US 
government policies—perhaps especially those that define the family.  Both Somali and 
Banyamulenge Congolese have normative conceptions surrounding relatedness that congeal 
around patrilineal clans—umurara in Kinyamulenge,8 and qabil in Somali.  Eastern Congolese 
have had fairly flexible norms surrounding child exchange (Clark-Kazak 2011; Ivey 2000), and 
in both communities individuals are embedded in “extended” families that comprise networks of 
obligation and mutual assistance (Abdi 2015; Lewis 1994).  In Somalia, kinship and clan have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The majority of the refugees from Congo with whom I conducted fieldwork came from the 
minority Banyamulenge community.  “Banyamulenge” is the plural form referring to the 
community, Munyamulenge is singular, referring to one person, and Kinyamulenge is the 
language spoken by the Banyamulenge community—a dialect of Kinyarwanda, the major 
language spoken in Rwanda.	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played important roles in social and political life, including in the ways in which elites have 
manipulated clan identities for political gain during post-colonial struggles over power (Abdi 
2015:41), but also in the ways in which people have come to rely on far-flung transnational 
families since the war began in 1991, particularly in the form of remittances and family 
sponsorship (see Chapter 5) (Abdi 2015; Horst 2007; Lindley 2010). Among many eastern 
Congolese groups—including the Banyamulenge, who make up my primary interlocutors from 
Congo—wide circles of kinship obligation and reciprocity are also central to social life.  An 
“expansive and fluid notion of family,” as Christina Clark-Kazak writes in her ethnography of 
Congolese refugees in Uganda, is “at odds with the nuclear family focus of much refugee policy 
and programming” (Clark-Kazak 2011:101).  For both Somalis and Congolese in Kenya, 
extended kin and clan groups provide important networks for social life in the face of 
uncertainty, and the desire for greater security and opportunity. 
In the context of these two countries’ civil wars, familial arrangements have become 
more complex in the wake of massive levels of death and displacement.  Networks of social care 
and obligation have necessarily extended beyond normative, lineage-based models, if ever they 
were contained to them (Abdi 2015; Besteman 1999; Holmes 2009).  Refugees living in Nairobi, 
particularly new arrivals, and those who have been separated from family networks from home, 
often live in shifting social communities—sometimes with relatives, at other times with people 
who are initially strangers (see Chapter 3). 
These social worlds speak to recent anthropological scholarship on kinship in Africa in a 
number of ways.  For example, they intersect with research that foregrounds practices of flexible 
kin arrangements that trouble both biogenetic and nuclear family models (Alber 2003; Etienne 
1979; Evans-Pritchard 1951; Gottlieb 2009; Notermans 2004; Talle 2004).  Equally, the complex 
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and shifting networks of care intersect with anthropological scholarship on social relations 
forged in contexts of contemporary insecurity (de Boeck 2001; Ellison 2009; Gale 2007; Hunter 
2010; Murphy 2003; Peters and Richards 1998; Robson et al. 2006; Rodgers 2010; Utas 2005).  
This scholarship is connected to broader trends in anthropology that have moved away from an 
earlier, structural-functionalist, and “jural” concept of kinship and towards what Bamford and 
Leach have called “kinship as a ‘constructed process’” (2009:14) rather than a “state of being” 
(10; see also Peletz 2001; Stack 1974; Yan 2001), and what Janet Carsten calls the “crucial 
experiential aspects of everyday relatedness” (Carsten 2001:17).   
 
Defining “Family” 
The term “family” is slippery.  Like race and gender—which claim natural as opposed to 
social origins—the family as a social category has powerful effects in the world, including and 
excluding, shaping and defining social experience (see Franklin and McKinnon 2001:xx).  
Policies that ideologically invest in the family, and that take it as a unit of bureaucratic 
governance—as in refugee resettlement—struggle to define its limits through scientific 
measures, and by circumscribing its supposedly self-evident or natural qualities.  Yet, as others 
have shown in the case of race (e.g. Dominguez 1993), the messiness of historically produced 
identities and social relations continuously sneak beyond purportedly natural limits, troubling 
those who benefit from its boundaries.  This “troubling” is apparent in the NGO staff member’s 
statement that I quoted above, and her unease as she used the term “real families,” while, in an 
aside—“I know that’s a loaded term”—she evinced uncertainty that the boundaries are as clear 
as her initial statement suggested.  
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 For the same reason, “the family” is a slippery term for the analyst.  While the 
complexity of social relations blend beyond attempts to clearly define the term, the ways in 
which it is used by the actors in this study provide a starting point.  Thus, I begin by considering 
“the family” as an emic concept.  First, it is a central category within humanitarian and security 
work—used as a core unit by which to manage the resettlement of refugees, and a critical 
concept animating humanitarian sentiments—for example, in prioritizing keeping families 
together.  “Family” also appears critical to these institutions and their work because they have 
expended great energy in defining what family is not – identifying those social units that do not 
fit into the framework they have defined.   
The refugee communities represented in this research, likewise, use the term “family”—
reer in Somali, and familia in Swahili (the Anglicized/Francified version).  They also used the 
term “clan”—qabil in Somali, and umurara in Kinyamulenge—referring to a group of people all 
of whom trace their origins to an original forefather.  On the other hand, refugees’ primary and 
most important social worlds, as I have noted, both did and did not map onto these normative 
frameworks.  At times, I use the term networks of social care to identify people’s relations that 
involved combinations of cohabitation, economic obligation, social reliance, and affect.  People 
themselves may or may not have called such networks “family” at different times and for 
different purposes.    
In addition to using the term as an emic category presented by individual actors and 
social groups that appear in this study, I consider “family” as a site of contestation and an arena 
of struggle.  By centering my analysis on the “fraudulent family” I contribute to Weston’s sense 
of social struggles in the name of the family in a new context—family as a site around which 
transnational humanitarianism and national security intersect in the world of refugee 
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resettlement.  The contestations over definitions of family are not “social struggles” in the sense 
of organized movements for marriage equality or reproductive rights, for example.  Yet, the 
adjudication of families in the context of refugee resettlement is part of a struggle over the 
meanings of kinship even—and, perhaps, especially—when refugees intentionally try to deceive 
officials—to use “the family” as a tool in individual struggles against the conditions wrought by 
refugee-ness, and the absence of rights normally bestowed by a state.  Underlying contestations 
over kinship are therefore contestations over rights, ethics, and truth claims.   
  
The Fraudulent Family 
By bridging questions of kinship with discussions of knowledge and power in the 
humanitarian field, and by bridging the moral and the political in contemporary approaches to 
human suffering, I aim to rethink kinship in a new context.  As Sarah Franklin and Susan 
McKinnon write in the Introduction to their edited volume, Relative Values: 
As much as we are intrigued by the ways in which boundaries—of nations, cultures, 
species, races, persons, bodies, cells—have been breached, we are equally concerned to 
draw attention to the ways in which such ruptures become occasions to reestablish and 
reinforce familiar normative categories (2001:21).   
I am interested in both the breaching and reinforcing of normative categories in a 
transnational, twenty-first century context.  Commenting on Hilary Cunningham’s writing on 
mapping the human genome (and referencing Schneider’s critique of the genealogical grid), 
Bamford and Leach write, “It is no longer enough for anthropologists to worry that we are 
‘misrepresenting’ the people with whom we work.  A genealogical framework is coming to take 
on a life of its own and is shaping social realities at a transnational level” (2009:17).  “The 
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fraudulent family” illuminates this trend in the world.  It does so by studying the ways in which 
refugee resettlement policies impose a genealogical framework—as well as other cultural ideals 
about “the family.”  Further, it illuminates these policies in dialogue with multifaceted social 
worlds that contradict the genealogical at multiple points of contact, but that also intersect with 
it.   
More precisely, the “fraudulent family” highlights the ways in which the family exists as 
a site of contested knowledge at the intersection of competing claims that converge around 
refugee resettlement and the management of stateless populations on a global level.  These 
claims are: protecting refugees, on one hand; and protecting national borders and bureaucratic 
procedures, on the other.  The “fraudulent family” exemplifies a larger set of processes by which 
refugees and asylum seekers are cast categorically as objects of mistrust (Voutira and Harrell-
Bond 1995).  At the same time, the “fraudulent family” also stands as a broader theme 
encompassing many ways in which the family constitutes a fraught site of anxious contestation 
in the contemporary world (Giddens 2000).  By bringing questions of kinship into current 
discussions about “humanitarian government” (Fassin 2012), I locate the family as a critical 
category in producing, policing, and contesting national and cultural boundaries within the global 
refugee predicament.  
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Fieldwork 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The bridge over the Tana River, on the western edge of the Kenyan city of Garissa, is often invoked by 
Somalis as the “real border” between Somalia and Kenya.  Heavily securitized, people here (mostly Somalis) wait 
for their documents to be checked before boarding the bus again to proceed on their journey from northeastern 
Kenya to the capital.  Photo by author, 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: UNHCR office, Nairobi.  Photo by author, 2014. 
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Kenya, a relatively stable country in the region, has hosted refugees since the 1960s.  In 
the 1990s, the government began partnering with UNHCR and non-governmental agencies when 
large numbers of Somalis crossed Kenya’s northeastern border, fleeing the civil war that began 
in 1991 (Horst 2006b:19).  For the last two decades, amidst often contentious negotiations with 
the UN and non-governmental organizations, Kenya has hosted refugees from around the region, 
including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Somalia—today hosting well over half a million refugees and asylum 
seekers. 
The growth of Kenya’s refugee population has been facilitated by the development of 
two major refugee camps—the Kakuma camp in Kenya’s northwestern corner near the borders 
of Ethiopia and South Sudan; and the Dadaab camps, a conglomerate of camps in Kenya’s 
northeast near the Somali border—considered the largest refugee settlement in the world.  But 
the containment of refugees in these internationally-funded and -run “temporary” settlements is 
only part of the story.  As of 2013, Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, was also home to some 50,000 
documented refugees—the majority of them from Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  But there is no way to know exactly how many refugees reside in Nairobi, 
as many live without UN documentation, while others are documented in the camps but live in 
the capital in order to secure better work opportunities and access to education, healthcare, and 
physical security.  People working in refugee aid in Nairobi often estimate that there are double 
the number of documented refugees, closer to 100,000, which would make the refugee 
population approximately 3% of the city’s residents.  Despite fervent attempts by the Kenyan 
government to confine refugees to camps, refugees use the often perilous and highly securitized 
roads from these peripheral regions to Kenya’s capital to gain access to one of East Africa’s 
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largest commercial and cultural centers.  Others bypass the camps altogether, arriving by bus in 
one of Nairobi’s transportation hubs—sometimes with a phone number or address of a relative or 
other contact, but other times with nothing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Map of the road from Nairobi to Dadaab, sketched by two young men (Somali refugees) who grew up in 
Dadaab and traveled regularly between Dadaab and Nairobi, where they now resided.  They sketched the map as we 
discussed my plans to travel to Garissa, and as they advised me about what to expect along the way.  They have 
labeled the security checkpoints, which they knew by memory.  Photo by author, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Bus ticketing office in Garissa, Northeastern Kenya, showing routes from the Dadaab refugee camp’s 
nearest major city to other cities and towns throughout the country, as well as routes directly from Dadaab to 
Nairobi. Photo by author, 2015.   
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People showing up in a new place often try to go where they have kin, or at least where 
people speak their language.  Eastleigh is where many Somalis come when they arrive on buses 
from northeastern Kenya, often having passed through the Dadaab refugee camps—or having 
lived there for a decade—after crossing the Somali-Kenya border.  Once there, they may call a 
relative whose number they’ve been given.  Others find lodging in one of Eastleigh’s many 
hostels or cheap hotels.  Others live in the neighborhood’s tall, concrete apartment buildings, 
where families often occupy one or two rooms, sharing a four or five-bedroom apartment with 
other families—a woman and her baby whose husband is in Europe; three young men waiting for 
resettlement to Sweden where their uncle lives; a woman and her three daughters; her two sons 
and their friend from school—each group occupying a room—together constituting something 
that is perhaps not a family (in their own terms), nor quite a single household, but a community 
and a spatially-bound network of social connection.   
In the hallways of Eastleigh’s concrete buildings women tend to coal jiko stoves to cook, 
and laundry hangs from bars over the windows and lines strung across the rooftops.  There, 
young men pull straw mats out to pray at prayer times, the laundry fluttering around them.  From 
the rooftops, you see the dense rows of more concrete apartment buildings, interspersed with 
mosque minarets and megaphones.  Weaving around Eastleigh on foot, one passes an incredible 
array of shops and vendors—people selling everything from clothing imported from China or 
Dubai, to electronics, gold, camel milk and meat brought from other parts of the country, the 
stimulant plant khat or miraa, perfumes and cosmetics, copies of the Quran and prayer beads, 
and CDs and DVDs featuring movies made from Hollywood, Bollywood, and Nollywood.   
Farther north and east, in peri-urban neighborhoods such as Kasarani and Kayole, 
Congolese communities have made their homes in the apartment buildings built into the dry 
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sprawl of the city’s edges, where occasional cows graze along the roadside, and the Nairobi and 
Ngong Rivers trickle behind the built settlements.  The Banyamulenge Congolese, who formed 
the majority of my interlocutors in the Congolese community, settled here because of the draw of 
cheap and available housing—an apartment can be rented for around $50 per month in Kayole 
and slightly more in Kasarani.  However, the neighborhoods (particularly Kayole) are also 
known for crime, violence, and insecurity.  If Eastleigh is a historic and commercial center of 
Nairobi (while also considered by many to be unsafe), these places feel more peripheral.  Off of 
the main, paved roads that are dense with commercial life, the neighborhoods are cut through 
with dusty paths lined with occasional small stalls and shops carrying basic groceries, pay-as-you 
go “air time” for cell phones, an occasional Congolese woman selling kitenge material from a 
shoulder bag.9  In large fields, hundreds of primary school students in matching uniforms run in a 
game, or huddle in conversation during a mid-morning break.  Across the concrete buildings—
many occupied while still being built upwards—a hilltop in the distance makes you feel you 
could be close to the countryside, though you are less than ten miles from the city center. 
On the other side of the city—west of downtown’s commercial district—a robust 
expatriate community, as well as Kenyan elites, have homes in gated, luxury apartment 
buildings.  Young North Americans and Europeans share spacious three or four-bedroom 
apartments with shiny wooden floors, balconies, multiple bathrooms, spacious kitchens, pools, 
gyms, and hired house help.  More established expatriates live in large homes with beautiful 
gardens in places such as Karen or Gigiri, sending their children to elite international schools.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The recognizably “African,” wax print cloth is popular across West, Central, and East Africa.  
Unlike many women in Nairobi who wear clothing such as skirt suits or jeans and t-shirts, 
married Banymaulenge women typically wear long dresses constructed from kitenge material.  
Some of these women also buy the fabric in commercial centers in the city and then peddle it in 
their neighborhoods.   	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Neighborhoods such as Westlands, Lavington, and Kilimani are home to expatriates’ residences, 
as well as the large international organizations for which they work.  During the summer of 
2012, and for nineteen months between August of 2013 and March of 2015, all of these areas—
from Kayole shanties to the high-rise offices of the UNHCR—comprised the locations of my 
research.   
*** 
On September 17, 2013, I went, together with my husband, Michael (who would 
accompany me for the two years of my research between Kenya and the US, while he worked on 
his own writing projects), to sign a lease for an apartment in a newly constructed building in 
Nairobi’s Pangani neighborhood.  For about a month since we had arrived, we had lived in 
Kilimani, a popular expat hub, with American friends who I knew from a previous trip to Kenya, 
while we searched for a permanent home.  Planning to work with both Somali and Congolese 
communities, Pangani seemed ideal.  The neighborhood is home to a large number of refugees—
mostly from the Horn of Africa—but also blends seamlessly into Eastleigh, the heart of the 
Somali community in Kenya’s capital.  Pangani is bordered on its northern edge by Thika 
Highway, a newly expanded road that would serve as my route to Congolese communities living 
to the northeast.  Close to downtown, I would have access to the main transportation hub, so that 
traveling to other neighborhoods on the other side of the city, where NGO and UNHCR offices 
were located, would be relatively simple in a city infamous for its traffic.  A nearly perfect spot, I 
thought.  
Except that most people we knew didn’t agree.  A Kenyan friend who grew up in 
Eastlands—the name for the miles of poor and working-class neighborhoods on Nairobi’s east 
side—warned that Pangani was bad news.  She had been hearing about Ethiopian scammers—
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women who seduced and then robbed people.  “It’s better to live far away from Eastleigh,” she 
offered, knowing about my research plans, “so people can’t follow you home.”  An older woman 
whom I would run into from time to time as she walked the roads around my friend’s apartment 
in Kilimani looking for domestic work, similarly warned me when I told her I was about to 
move.  When I explained that I had previously stayed in Buruburu, a quintessentially “Eastlands” 
neighborhood with no wazungu (white people) in sight, she paused, “But Buru is different.  
People there are … respectable.”  If Pangani was bad, Eastleigh was considered even worse.  
Even the Somali-Kenyan landlord of my friend’s upscale Kilimani apartment asked me, “Why 
put yourself at risk?  If you want to learn Somali,” he told me, “there are plenty of Somalis living 
around here.  “Or get a Somali house girl [maid],” he suggested.  He paused, “Though you have 
to find one you can trust.” 
I listened carefully to people’s warnings as cultural discourses about security, risk, race, 
and class in the city.  But these warnings would also hit me in the pit of my stomach when I lay 
awake at night.  I bothered my new friend in Eastleigh, Moha, about what he thought of the 
location.  Always cautious, he was not willing to take on the personal responsibility of assuring 
me that I would be safe.   
Since the new highway had been re-built, turning it from a small, congested road to an 
eight-lane “super highway” in 2012, Pangani had begun to change, particularly the part of the 
neighborhood closest to the new road.  A couple of tall buildings with middle-class amenities, 
like hot water heaters and even elevators, started going up in place of the two-story, Indian 
homes that had been built at mid-century—after the original, African inhabitants of the 
neighborhood had been removed by the colonial government in the 1930s (White 1990:132-36). 
One of these new buildings had just been finished when we looked at a sixth-floor apartment. 
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Because a two-story home remained directly across the street, the view from the small balcony 
took in the newly-built highway, so I could watch the city in motion throughout the day, and 
across the highway the lush neighborhood of Muthaiga—home to embassies, the mansions of 
Kenyan Ministers of Parliament, and the famed colonial-era Muthaiga Country Club—all 
covered in a canopy of subtropical foliage.  Adjacent: the even denser Karura forest, famously 
protected from development by Nobel Laureate and environmental activist, Wangari Maathai.  
The view inspired for me a sense of Nairobi’s complicated postcolonial patchwork.  
Pangani and Eastleigh, which lie about two-and-a-half miles from downtown, are usually 
considered no-go zones by foreigners from the global North, and even by many Nairobians.  
Pangani was one of the original African settlements of the British colonial city, built to house 
African laborers, but it is largely known for the Indian inhabitants of the subsequent era.  By the 
time I first visited the neighborhood in 2012, it was also known for newer immigrants—
particularly from Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Like adjacent Eastleigh, it also had a reputation 
as a Muslim space, though small churches and mosques intermingle, and many of the buildings, 
including the one in which I had found the inspiring view, were owned by wealthy Christian 
Kikuyu entrepreneurs.  Many of the tenants, as well as the owners of the businesses on the 
ground floor, and in the small market across the street, also came from Kenya’s majority ethnic 
community.  Seduced by the neighborhood’s possibilities for my fieldwork, and by the view of 
the highway and the beautiful forest beyond, we signed the lease.   
Four days later, Al Shabaab militants attacked the upscale Westgate shopping mall in the 
neighborhood of Westlands, leaving 67 people dead.  Anxieties I had pushed to the background 
reared their heads.  What would it mean to be a white woman living in Pangani and working in 
Eastleigh?  How safe or unsafe would I be, and how could I realistically assess my safety?  A 
	   31	  
few days before Michael and I planned to move into the Pangani apartment, an expatriate 
director of an NGO I knew called me into the office to have a chat with a Kenyan staff member 
who had grown up in the Pangani area.  The staff member, Maina, advised me to look elsewhere 
for a home.  He was concerned about the adjacent slum area called Mlango Kubwa.  A nearby 
but different area farther from the slums would be better, he advised—in the commercial district 
where Indians live, he said.  “For Kenyans, these houses are very safe,” he told me, seated 
behind his desk, a Google map of the neighborhood on his large screen. “But you know, 
unfortunately, because of your skin color, you will attract attention.”  I nodded politely, adding a 
minor resistance here or there, mapping cultural geographies of safety and danger in my mind.  I 
had hoped to elicit some reassurance, and noted that I did see a couple of Indian residents in the 
building where we had signed a lease.  Maina replied that Indians have good security systems, 
and if I got to know them, I would benefit from their protection.  
Maina was not the first person to mention Indians.  Moha had also asked me about 
Indians several times: “Did you see any in the building?  You might be more comfortable with 
other foreigners,” he commented.  “Foreigners” was an interesting term, given that most Indians 
in Kenya are citizens whose families have been there for several generations.  I suspected both 
Maina and Moha’s interest in Indians was structured by deeply-held segregationist ideas about 
where different racial groups should and could live in this post-colonial city.10  If there were no 
white people around, Indians, they suggested, were the next best thing. As Luise White writes 
about urban planning in colonial Nairobi, “Racial communities had to be segregated not only to 
contain their own characteristics, but to protect other races” (1990:77).  This logic seemed alive, 
if differently structured, 75 years later.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For an exploration of Indians in racial classifications in colonial and postcolonial East Africa, 
see Brennan (2012).    
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White expatriates were considered safer in upper-class neighborhoods than in middle- 
class or poor ones, despite the fact that those same upper-class neighborhoods were plagued by 
house break-ins and motorcycle gangs that held people up for phones and cash at gunpoint. And, 
despite the massacre at the Westgate Mall, located in one of Nairobi’s most elite urban areas.  
This widespread fear of poor and working-class neighborhoods was so powerful that I did not 
know a single foreigner from the global North who lived outside of Nairobi’s upscale 
neighborhoods on the west side of the city, save for a few other dissertation researchers—mostly 
anthropologists and historians—and a couple of young people associated with Christian 
missions. The racial segregation of Nairobi meant that well-meaning people weighing in on my 
housing plans did not know what might happen if a mzungu lived in a decidedly non-mzungu 
neighborhood, but they assumed the worst, to be on the safe side.   
The meanings of racial identity and segregation in the city, and the heightened anxiety 
and feeling of insecurity that pervaded the country, along with my own experience as a foreigner 
and a fieldworker during this time, seem particularly apparent in my experiences searching for a 
home.  Moreover, the segregation of Nairobi as a city is important for understanding the 
geographical and architectural terrain that refugees navigated in their attempts to gain access to 
humanitarian aid, including third country resettlement, hence important for understanding the 
environment in which this fieldwork took place.  For many refugees, UNHCR and NGO offices 
were located two or three matatu rides from their homes, a traffic-filled journey of two hours or 
more.  After spending money otherwise needed for rent or food on transportation fare, many 
would return at the end of the day having waited without talking to anyone, or having been told 
something such as, “We’ll call you,” “Your case is in process,” “Just wait,” or “Go to the 
camps.”   
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*** 
In her ethnography of US deportation, Natalie Peutz draws on the methodological 
insights of Nicholas DeGenova and Susan Bibler Coutin, writing that “social scientists ought…to 
study ‘illegality’ and deportability as sociopolitical conditions generated by law.” Peutz cites 
Coutin, who described her own work as “ethnography of a legal process rather than of a 
particular group of people (2000:23)” (Peutz 2006:219; see also Cabot 2014:2).  This research 
follows a similar approach, as I take as my main object of study a process of transnational 
governance, accounting for its many constituent parts: Refugees in a country of first asylum 
(Kenya), and of second asylum (the United States); those countries’ refugee policies; and the 
institutions and their staff members that work in the “in between” spaces—the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and several of the non-governmental organizations 
that work parallel to UNHCR, as well as local resettlement agencies working in the United 
States.   
I chose to work in two refugee communities in both Nairobi and in Columbus, Ohio—the 
Somali community and the Banyamulenge Congolese community.  Although this dissertation is 
not a comparative study in the traditional sense, my interest has been in studying refugee 
resettlement and family reunification beyond a culturally particular lens focused on an ethnic 
community; rather, I view resettlement in the context of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural cities, as 
refugee aid and resettlement in Nairobi encompasses communities from all over East Africa and 
the Horn of Africa.  Nevertheless, we have much to gain by working with communities bounded 
by languages, histories, and common experiences, as anthropologists have long demonstrated.  
Taking an entirely multi-cultural approach—given the different neighborhoods, languages, and 
cultural norms of refugee communities as diverse as Pentecostal Christians from rural Burundi 
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and Muslims from urban, coastal Somalia—I chose an in-between approach, working in two 
communities that have comprised large numbers of refugees in Kenya, and also communities that 
have particularly benefited from UN and US resettlement programs.11   
Given the multi-layered, multi-community, urban nature of my research, finding one, 
full-time research assistant who was willing and able to do all of the tasks with which I sought 
assistance was not possible.  Instead, I worked with a number of different people who did 
research assistant-type work over the nineteen months of my fieldwork in Kenya.  In the Somali 
community, Moha worked with me as a Somali language tutor.  He also arranged a few formal 
interviews for me, as well, but more centrally I met many people more informally through our 
friendship.  I became a participant-observer in his circle of friends and relatives, and he also 
brought people together for four different focus group discussions, which provided wonderful 
insights.  I found that when people came together with others from their social circles, and were 
asked to discuss issues in general terms, rather than their own particular stories, they were not 
only more at ease, but enthusiastic about talking with each other about issues affecting their 
community.  Beyond Moha, I also sought advice about research assistance from a local NGO.  
Through one of their staff members, I met Ibrahim—a young, charismatic guy with lofty 
aspirations to change his country and lead his community, and who had the tenacity to introduce 
me to all kinds of people who I went on to interview formally.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A report published in 2010 estimated that there are up to 60,000 Somali refugees living in 
Eastleigh—the major Somali neighborhood in the capital.  The same report stated that as of 
2009, there were 4,598 Congolese refugees living in Nairobi, according to UNHCR’s official 
registration numbers.  Because of events in both countries, there were most likely more refugees 
of both nationalities living in Nairobi during the time of my research, between 2013 and 2015 
(Pavanello et al. 2010). 	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Eventually, Moha left for Canada after his own family sponsorship case was approved, 
and I began working with Asma—hoping to diversify my knowledge by working more closely 
with a young woman.  Indeed, Asma and her mother brought me into another social world in 
Eastleigh—a world of the struggles of women whose intersections with the humanitarian and 
resettlement worlds were structured by their responsibilities to large families.  More broadly, the 
Somali refugees with whom I conducted research spanned a wide range of class positions, with 
some living comfortably with support from family members abroad, and others in precarious 
economic situations. Most were single youth, and both younger and older single mothers, as well 
divorced women, widows, and married women whose husbands lived abroad.  These single men 
and women (including those who were single physically, if not in marital status) had much more 
time available to spend with friends (or researchers).  By contrast, my own status as a young, 
married woman made my access to married Somali men less feasible.   
In the Congolese community, I began by working with two research assistants—André 
and Annette.  As Rwandan refugees, André and Annette had worked with the Banyamulenge 
Congolese community (on account of shared language) for an NGO project.  Both were students 
in their twenties, and I met them through a mutual contact at the NGO.  Later, I hired a young 
Munyamulenge man, Jacques, who I had met through my research in the community.  When he 
left after his own resettlement case was approved, I hired one of his friends, Patrick.  My work in 
the Banyamulenge community was initially focused on people who were clients of the NGO for 
which André and Annette had worked.  Knowing families that had already been identified by the 
NGO, these were the first people to whom they introduced me (as well as their own families, 
who, particularly in André’s case, also led me to important stories and insights).  The majority 
were large, two-parent households or single-mother households, but also included some young, 
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single men, single women, and widows.  Later, when I began working with Jacques and Patrick, 
I continued to meet families and single people, but they also introduced me to community elders 
from whom they wanted me to hear their community’s history.  In both Somali and Banyaulenge 
communities, my work consisted of interviews in family settings, or with one or two single 
people who lived alone or with one another.  Over time, I began being invited to community 
events such as weddings, memorials, and going-away parties (for those who had at last achieved 
resettlement). 
Towards the end of my research, I started to forego research assistance altogether, finding 
it at times more of a burden than a help.  While assistance was essential in the beginning—
helping me to learn social norms and make contacts—I later found that I was able to more easily 
and independently navigate relationships that I had built over time on my own terms, when no 
one else was mediating the meeting.  Proficient in Swahili and learning Somali throughout my 
research, I was able to communicate with the people I needed to—either in English, Swahili, 
Somali, or a mix of two and sometimes even all three of these languages.  With people who 
spoke Somali exclusively, I always employed a regular, trusted interpreter—usually Ibrahim.  
Congolese typically speak Swahili as a second language (a lingua franca in eastern Congo, as 
well as in Kenya), and Kinyamulenge as their first language.  Many young refugees—both 
Somali and Congolese—speak English fluently, as it is the language of instruction in Kenyan 
schools.   
 Many of the people about whom I write in this dissertation were those with whom I 
developed relationships outside the confines of formal interviews.  Those initial interviews, 
however, were essential for the development not only of relationships, but also of my 
understanding of the political and ethical dynamics of a research project about refugee 
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resettlement.  Writing about Vietnamese refugees, John Knudsen argues that through several 
phases of interviews in locations of exile—including transit camps, and upon arriving in 
resettlement countries such as the US, as well as through the insecurity of war and surveillance 
in Vietnam—refugees with whom he worked learned that the information they provided in these 
interviews had the power to help or to harm them.  When refugees come into contact with 
researchers, Knudsen writes, they have “passed through several interviews and conversations 
with various categories of ‘helpers’” (Knudsen 1995:30)—of whom researchers are conceived of 
as yet another.  This was certainly true of my own research.  My interviews often became co-
interviews—wherein my questions were answered with other questions, most often some 
iteration of, “How can you help us?”   
 This question was necessarily structured by many refugees’ expectations based on my 
racial identity and national origins.  As a young, white American, I looked just like the only other 
wazungu that many people with refugee status had ever encountered—foreign staff at UNHCR 
and refugee-serving NGOs; or interviewers at the US State Department-contracted Resettlement 
Support Center.  On a couple of occasions, people even mistakenly called me by the name of a 
person who had interviewed them, highlighting the fact that I was firmly slotted in the same 
cognitive folder.  The common question, “How can you help us?” fundamentally structured this 
research landscape.  My answer to the question changed over time, and my own understanding of 
my capacities to “help” ebbed and flowed.  Particularly in the Congolese community—which, as 
a group of newer arrivals with fewer local and transnational networks of assistance than Somalis, 
had greater financial need—I brought people basic household staples each time I visited—flour 
or rice, cooking oil, milk, porridge, laundry soap.   
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One evening at a party hosted by expats in the ritzy Muthaiga neighborhood, I got into an 
argument with a social scientist of some kind who conducted research for an NGO or 
government program (I’ve forgotten the details).  She argued that providing any material benefit 
for participation in research was a bad practice because it could lead people to be coerced into 
participating.  I understood her point, but to take people’s time and energy with no material 
reciprocation when many were barely scraping by—sometimes going hungry—would have 
flown in the face of both ethical and culturally appropriate practice.  Even the suggestion that 
some other type of reciprocity would have been more appropriate than material assistance fails to 
understand the levels of material insecurity that many refugees (and citizens) in Nairobi were 
facing.  My research assistants made this patently clear to me, too—showing up empty-handed 
would have been socially and morally shameful. 
 Yet, primarily, especially for people in the most precarious situations, “How can you help 
us?” was informed by the idea that—as an American—I had a key to the institutions that they 
were desperately trying to gain access.  Some had resettlement cases that had been on hold for 
months or years.  They had no idea what was happening with the process.  As one Congolese 
woman reflected, “We don’t know what goes on.  We don’t know why or what we’re waiting 
for.  Everyone just tells us to wait –‘We’ll call you.’”  Others were desperate to enter the 
resettlement system.  With extremely limited access to information about their own cases, or to 
initiate claims within the resettlement system, having a seemingly-sympathetic American woman 
show up at their home often appeared as a promising opportunity.   
  The access that people imagined I had to institutions such as UNHCR and various 
NGOs, as well as the US government, was actually extremely limited.  Over time, I gained some 
access to UNHCR and to one NGO in particular, in whose US-based office I had done an 
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internship before arriving in Nairobi in 2013.  However, my access to the governmental side of 
the US resettlement program was always only in the capacity of officially authorized interviews, 
which were to be used for “context” only.  However, I had the opportunity to interview several 
former US Resettlement Support Center (RSC) staff members, who were able to give me further 
insights, less constrained now that they had moved on professionally.  Nevertheless, if access to 
refugee communities had to be delicately negotiated, access to these large, bureaucratic 
institutions was perhaps even more challenging to enter.   
 I became a kind of tentative, haphazard, rogue caseworker with few resources and no 
training, as I attempted to answer the question, “How can you help us?”  My attempts to refer 
people directly to NGOs such as the one at which I had interned were not met with openness.  
The general attitude of staff members, including the director, was that it would not be good for 
anyone if someone outside of their staff were making “referrals.”  Given organizations’ anxieties 
about people posing as humanitarian workers to take advantage of refugees, and the role of 
rumor in refugee communities themselves, I was not in a good position to be helpful.  Yet, the 
NGO director, Len—about whom I write at some length in the chapters that follow—was also 
interested in and sympathetic towards my work, and he provided me access to information in 
other ways.  Similarly, Tanya, a high-ranking official at UNHCR whom I had contacted, invited 
me to observe UNHCR’s work—including “resettlement counseling” (Chapter 2), resettlement 
interviews, and internal staff meetings.   
Nevertheless, I was regarded by many of the caseworkers with ambivalence or 
skepticism.  A recent Human Rights Watch report that had criticized UNHCR, Tanya explained, 
had made people especially suspicious of outside researchers who had come to the office, and 
were perceived to have twisted staff members’ words.  At times I felt like a pariah.  Once, after 
	   40	  
Tanya had invited me to the monthly meeting of refugee-serving organizations in Nairobi—the 
Urban Refugee Protection Network (URPN)—Len mentioned to me in an e-mail that he was 
holding his breath when he saw me, as he had seen the Director kick out researchers in the past.  
At an institutional level, there was minimal interest or investment in my research on the part of 
these organizations; rather, I felt a high level of mistrust.  Perhaps most centrally, none of these 
organizations had even close to the capacity to serve the numbers of refugees who demanded and 
warranted their attention.  That lack of capacity was not only a limitation of these organizations 
alone, but rather structured by the limited resettlement slots made up by the governments 
participating in third country resettlement.  In this context of scarcity and insecurity, any kind of 
“referral” made from an outside person was at best ignored, and at worst met with significant 
irritation.   
 My “help,” therefore—the reciprocity that was an ethical requirement of the research—
had to take more ad hoc, trial-by-error forms.  As I learned about how the resettlement and aid 
systems worked, and the kinds of resources that were available, I tried to be a provider of reliable 
information.  I read people’s documents and made phone calls.  Often, I accompanied people to 
institutions—offices such as the UNHCR, Kenyan NGOs such as the Refugee Consortium of 
Kenya which assisted refugees with security problems, and the Kenyan government’s 
Department of Refugee Affairs.  Using English in face-to-face interactions, on the phone, and in 
reading documents (as well as basic knowledge of bureaucratic language) allowed me to assist 
people to get information and make claims of various kinds.  Often my attempts were in vain, but 
at other times they were effective.  In these spaces, I also learned about how these institutions 
operated, and how refugees interfaced with them.   
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In the end, I was left feeling that anything I did was of little consequence in the scheme 
of a system that left the vast majority of people—more than 99%—in precarious conditions 
outside the margins of the nation-state and the rights it theoretically guarantees.  I have no 
conclusion or resolution regarding the ethical dilemmas of this research, but at my most 
optimistic I hope that some of my attempts at reciprocity had positive effects for some 
individuals.  In the longer term, I hope that the knowledge gained from this research may 
contribute to the uphill efforts towards more open borders in an age of fences and walls.  
Nonetheless, if I came to Kenya and my work with refugees with a critical approach towards a 
nation-state system that allows millions of people to live in the metaphorical spaces between 
national borders, this view was only confirmed.  The systems put in place to protect refugees 
have left millions of people in protracted displacement for decades, while desperately seeking 
access to resources that few will ever achieve.   
*** 
 Being outside of an institution in the position to systematically assist people, while 
listening to people’s stories and pleas for help, left me with a feeling of helplessness myself.  At 
the same time, my position between institutions and refugee communities also provided a useful 
vantage point on the resettlement system.  My periodic frustration at being outside of the 
seemingly all-powerful institutions deciding the fates of refugees helped me to understand many 
refugees’ sense of being in the dark.  My uncertainty—especially in the early phases of my 
research—about how, exactly, these institutions worked (despite conducting many interviews 
with people working within them) meant that I often relied on refugees for information, and 
came to take on many of their perceptions and opinions.  This is not to say that I reproduce those 
perceptions and opinions here without filtering them through other forms of knowledge.  But 
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ingesting refugees’ ideas about institutions that I, too (for different reasons), was eager to more 
fully comprehend through their many layers of insulation, was a challenging but productive lens. 
In the spring of 2015, I left Nairobi and headed to Columbus, Ohio—a growing city, with 
the second largest Somali population in the United States (second to Minneapolis), and a large 
and growing community of refugees from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.  Through 
contacts in Nairobi, I had met the director of Ohio Refugee Assistance (ORA),12 one of 
Columbus’ three VOLAGs—or voluntary agencies—the non-profit organizations that receive 
and assist refugees for three months after their arrival in the United States.  Marissa Thompson 
was known in Nairobi for her long tenure in the field, and for submitting a large proportion of 
the Family Reunification applications from the United States.  Marissa kindly agreed to allow me 
to spend time at ORA.  There, I worked as a fulltime volunteer intern and fieldworker, doing 
tasks from interpreting in Swahili, teaching English, and conducting small legal research tasks, to 
picking up refugees at the airport, moving donated furniture, shadowing caseworkers, and 
observing family reunification consultations.   
 The ORA staff set me up in an apartment in a building in which they typically place their 
newly arrived clients.  While I conducted formal interviews, particularly towards the end of my 
five months in Columbus, the majority of my learning took place as a participant and an observer 
in the enmeshed community of resettlement workers and refugees.  Many of the resettlement 
staff at ORA had themselves come to the United States as refugees, and many of the American-
born staff had close relationships in the communities.  In the summer of 2015, I spent several 
nights during Ramadan together with a Somali caseworker, Ikran, the large family with whom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A pseudonym.  
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she lived (a mother and six children), and two white, non-Muslim, American-born caseworkers 
who often fasted during the month, as well.  In Columbus, I was quickly drawn into the life of 
the community.  Events I attended often included both refugees and resettlement workers—a 5K 
charity run for ORA, fundraising events for the Nepal earthquake that summer, Ramadan iftar 
break-fasts, or the engagement and wedding events for one of the daughters in Ikran’s house. 
If insecurity and segregation produced a clear separation between refugees and people 
working in humanitarian agencies in Nairobi, Columbus offered a very different kind of setting.  
The staff members had both secular and religious convictions that made their close relations with 
refugee communities core to their professional vocations.  People working in refugee aid in 
Nairobi had such convictions, too, but the possibilities of communion with refugees were 
foreclosed in Nairobi by numerous structural conditions.  In Columbus, the more fluid 
relationships between refugee resettlement workers and refugee communities enabled me to be 
differently slotted into the community.  In this context, I had the ability to traverse the blended 
spaces of “refugee community” and “resettlement institution” with much greater ease.  With an 
official designation within the organization, I also had the capacity to assist people in systematic 
ways—including as an interpreter.  When the apartment building adjacent to mine flooded, my 
neighbors asked me to document the damage and report it to ORA.  Working with staff and 
summoning Legal Aid, we were able to get the family that rented the two, basement apartments 
out of their leases, enabling them to move into a new apartment.  I could run upstairs to my 
neighbors’ apartment to interpret when a maintenance man came by, or give rides to people 
without transportation.  I was not a foreign guest, as in Kenya, but now a host in my home 
society.   
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 Studying refugee resettlement from these two spaces—Columbus and Nairobi—I learned 
about how refugee resettlement worked and how it was experienced by different actors at 
different points in time.  I also learned about the different possible conditions of fieldwork and 
what these conditions could produce.  While I can only speculate where alternative choices 
would have led, my choice (or the necessity) to invest the majority of my time and energy in 
refugee communities in Nairobi, while existing on the margins of refugee-serving institutions, 
likely hindered certain kinds of knowledge, but opened up others.  In Columbus, the two 
“spaces”—of refugee communities and aiding institutions—were less starkly divided.  I recall 
sitting around a desk at ORA’s office at lunchtime with two Somali-American women, and two 
white, US-born American women—all staff members—eating rice, meat, chili and banana that 
had been prepared by the women in Ikran’s house from a single plate (in typical Somali style); or 
accompanying staff members to refugees’ homes, then staying to chat and visit; or eating 
breakfast prepared by a Somali woman while I taught her rudimentary English, and 
unsuccessfully trying to assist her son in fixing the television.  The intimate worlds of refugees’ 
lives were present in the ORA office, and the world of resettlement work was carried out in the 
intimate spaces of newly-arrived refugees’ daily lives—a stark contrast from the geographical 
separation of refugee communities in Nairobi and the gated and guarded offices of international 
organizations on the other side of town.  Thus, my insistence on traversing these arenas as a 
researcher were welcomed in Columbus where there was already a framework for this kind of 
mobility, while in Nairobi, where the separation between refugee communities and international 
NGOs was strictly, structurally enforced, I met more obstacles.  
*** 
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 Finally, I want to address some of the complexity surrounding research on refugee 
resettlement, drawing on the reflections of others who have studied refugees and asylum seekers 
before me.  These issues are not wholly unique to the asylum/refugee context, but emerge in 
particular ways because of the uncertainty surrounding refugees’ and asylum seekers’ claims, 
and because of the fraught image of refugees and asylum seekers in political discourses and 
policy making today.  First, I want to acknowledge the parallel indeterminacy of my own 
knowledge about people’s stories and claims.  As Heath Cabot notes in her writing on the Greek 
asylum context, “social aesthetics, and the unstable, indeterminate forms of knowledge that they 
produce, have a crucial role in eligibility assessments, reflecting the epistemic anxiety endemic 
to vulnerability claims and asylum-related adjudication practices” (Cabot 2014:114).  She 
continues, “ethnographic knowledge, like legal knowledge, also takes shape through the 
dialogisms of social aesthetics” (116).  In this light, I want to point out explicitly that refugees’ 
narratives in the context of ethnographic interviews were also shaped by their expectations about 
me and our relationship. This is, of course, always true in ethnographic research, but the high 
stakes surrounding refugees’ desires for resettlement, and their ideas about my power to 
intervene based on my race and nationality, make this issue particularly sticky in this context.  At 
the same time, people’s portrayals of their experience with the resettlement system were not 
homogeneous, nor were the positionalities of my interlocutors or the nature of our relationships.  
In this sense, I hope that the range of experiences that I listened to, and the contexts in which 
they were told, help inform a more nuanced—if always partial and mediated—ethnographic 
portrayal of refugee resettlement.  Addressing this from the outset, I hope readers will bring their 
own conclusions to the ethnographic narratives that follow.   
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 Second, I want to acknowledge the complexity of putting this kind of knowledge into the 
world.  Concluding her ethnography on French asylum processes, Miriam Ticktin writes,  
[i]t has not escaped my attention that anti-immigrant proponents could try to use the 
ethnography of this book to play into the rhetoric of immigrants as “liars” who 
manipulate the system in order to take advantage of state benefits—in other words, they 
would try to use what I show are the multifaceted ways in which sans-papiers have 
responded to restrictive and exploitative French legislation in order to have a chance at 
better lives.  
Ticktin argues that her ethnography shows that the very fact of people’s sacrifices of their own 
bodies and health in order to have opportunities to work and to be safe evinces the legitimacy of 
their actions, and illuminates the violence of the structures they negotiate (Ticktin 2011:225).  
Similarly, in this dissertation I highlight “fraud” precisely to show that at the same time that the 
term points to practices of “working the system,” it also points back to the ways in which refugee 
resettlement systems themselves produce the conditions for practices that are labeled “fraud.”  
And more, that “fraud” refers to a complex range of practices that cannot be easily subsumed in a 
single term.  My aim is not to suggest that either these practices or these structures demonstrate a 
need to demolish the current refugee resettlement.  Rather, I hope that they point out ways in 
which these systems’ emphasis on identifying the most worthy beneficiaries of assistance creates 
a circular struggle that often undermines any empowerment of people living outside of 
citizenship rights.  My hope is that these conclusions about fraud may inform innovative thinking 
about how to manage displacement.    
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Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1, “The Patchwork Governance of Non-citizenship,” examines the ways in which 
resettlement is constructed through intersecting state and non-state actors who have competing 
claims and interests.  Most centrally, these competing claims are oriented around humanitarian 
imperatives to rescue the most vulnerable refugees on one hand, and to protect national borders 
by keeping out those who do not fit into the bureaucratic definitions of the deserving refugee.  I 
examine the metaphor of a refugee “pipeline,” used by bureaucrats and officials, and the ways in 
which that metaphor contrasts with refugees’ articulations of an unsynchronized assemblage of 
institutions. I envision this assemblage through the experiences of refugees as they attempt to 
access and navigate the resettlement system, and are simultaneously caught in Kenya’s 2014 
anti-refugee security operations. I argue that being subject to many competing, but partial, 
governing bodies is central to the condition of statelessness in the twenty-first century.  
In Chapter 2, “Fraud and Corruption: Discourses of Mutual Mistrust and the Politics of 
Proof,” I examine fraud as a central category of concern in global refugee aid and resettlement 
work.  Unpacking that term, I show that the practices to which it points emerge from the very 
structures of refugee resettlement itself, including the mutual mistrust that is a categorical 
characteristic of the resettlement system, and of humanitarian aid more broadly.  While a 
growing body of work in anthropology examines the politics and epistemologies that underlie 
asylum adjudications, if we listen to refugees themselves, we see that refugees accuse institutions 
of operating without transparency and honesty, as well, yet they lack equivalent power to hold 
these institutions accountable.  I argue that the term “fraud,” and the way it is used to discredit 
refugees who act with intentionality, works to further disable refugees from actively participating 
in aid and resettlement systems.   
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Chapter 3, “Two Broken Bones, Two Somali Families: Uncertainty, Obligation, and 
Competing Moral Claims,” tells stories of two refugees—a young, single man who is connected 
to a transnational family that represent “good kin,” and a single mother of five who is 
marginalized by orphanhood and divorce.  Through their stories, I consider the ways in which 
resettlement and humanitarian aid are connected to the deeper social networks and cultural logics 
of refugees’ lives. While officials regard one of their primary obligations as protecting the 
integrity of their programs by separating true from false claims, refugees often have obligations 
to kin and community that conflict with official notions of truth-telling. As a valuable resource 
and opportunity, transnational resettlement is stitched into the fabric of cultural ideas about 
moral behavior and obligations to support kin in ways that diminish hierarchical dependency. I 
argue that the moral logics of humanitarian programs and the moral claims of kinship intersect 
and shape one another in the global management of displaced populations.   
Chapter 4, “DNA, Securing Borders, and Shaping Transnational Communities,” 
examines the forms of social care among Somali and Congolese communities in Nairobi, and the 
ways in which they conflict with the definition of “family” employed by the US refugee 
program.  Somali and Congolese practices of care in Nairobi spring from both longstanding 
cultural practices, and novel forms of insecurity in exile that often produce expansive networks 
of relation and duty.  By contrast, refugee resettlement largely defines  
the family based on a biogenetic, nuclear family—a definition that is enforced by DNA testing.  I 
argue that this definition not only clashes with refugees’ social realities, but that it is shaping 
transnational communities, at times destructively, and producing culturally “safe” and 
“acceptable” subjects for resettlement to the United States and elsewhere. While recent work in 
the anthropology of kinship in the global North has focused on how relatedness is reckoned vis-
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à-vis genetics and new technologies, much of the recent Africanist scholarship on kinship has 
examined social care in contexts of political and economic insecurity. By examining the 
emergence of genetic technology in an African context, I bring these relatively separate bodies of 
scholarship into dialogue.  
 Chapter 5, “Resettlement from the Other Side,” relocates the ethnography from Nairobi 
to Columbus, Ohio.  This chapter is based on ethnographic research inside refugee communities 
and at a local resettlement agency where staff members oversee family reunification claims.  
Following linkages between refugees in the US and their families abroad, I discuss resettlement 
not as an end-point, but as part of refugees’ ongoing relationships with national security and 
transnational bureaucracies.  In the United States, Muslim refugees in particular manage new and 
familiar forms of uncertainty while they attempt to financially support and sponsor family 
members in East Africa. 
Ultimately, conflicting ideas about kinship, and notions of fraud more broadly, are central 
to the paradoxes of humanitarian programs and the global management of refugees. Refugee 
resettlement is structured by competing claims: protecting refugees on one hand, and protecting 
national security and Euro-American humanitarian ideals on the other. “The family” constitutes a 
central locus of these dual claims, treated both as an object of special care and of intense 
scrutiny. Taking fraud, including “family composition fraud,” as a crucial category, I move 
critical approaches to kinship to the center of the study of humanitarianism and securitization, 
while charting the ways in which global refugee resettlement policies shape the borders of 
transnational communities.  
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PART I 
 
Governing Resettlement: Bureaucracy, Vulnerability, and Fraud 
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Chapter 1 
The Patchwork Governance of Non-citizenship 
 
 
Field notes, Monday, February 3, 2014:  
At a certain point a cousin of A’s called.  He told me it was the one who was going to Australia, 
but now she’s facing a problem.  She’s gone for medical [screening], and they told her to pick up 
her visa.  She has six months to do it.  But to pick up the visa, she needs the Good Conduct 
report from the CID [Kenyan Criminal Investigation Department] headquarters.  You’re 
supposed to wait one month after you make the request, and if you’re in Dadaab, it takes two 
months.  But now they’re telling her there’s nothing there for her.  Now she’s practically crying.  
She’s afraid her visa will expire.  They’re calling her asking why she hasn’t picked it.  She says 
she’s having problems getting the Good Conduct [report], and they just say, “Bring it.”  You 
know, the medical [report] has an expiration – so if the medical [report] expires, then she has to 
apply for another appointment and have it done again – and then by that time the visa may be 
expired.  Now she’s going to pay 12000 KSH [nearly $120] to get [the Good Conduct report].  
 
Field notes, Monday, November 17, 2014:  
H’s mom: For every refugee, Kenya takes money, so they help.  So that money [UNHCR is] 
paying to the government is helping refugees.  If there was no Kenyan government, where would 
UNHCR take all those refugees?  But if there was no UNHCR, Kenya wouldn’t have taken us.  
… If I would have just thrown away those mandates [UN identity documents] [ie, given up on 
the prospects of resettlement], I’d have no stress. 
	  
H says:  “Nowadays, rights are based on money.”  When I ask [H and her mom] who gets 
assisted by the organizations, she says, “People with money.  That’s what we’ve seen.”   
  
 In these excerpts from my field notes, my interlocutors—all refugees from Somalia—
comment in different ways on what I term the patchwork governance of non-citizenship.  In 
conversations such as these, and in observing refugee friends and interlocutors engage with 
refugee resettlement, their words and experiences drew my attention to the complex assemblage 
of governing institutions to which people living outside of citizenship are subject.  In these short 
excerpts, “A,” “H,” and “H’s mom” highlight the experience of being in-between governing 
institutions that have competing priorities and aims.  They critique the fact that no governing 
body guarantees—even theoretically—their rights.  As a starting point for an ethnography of 
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refugee resettlement, I begin here, attending to the larger context of governing structures in 
which the resettlement system exists. 
Non-governmental organizations and humanitarianism have become important topics to 
anthropology over the last two decades (Bornstein and Redfield 2010; Fassin 2012; Harrell-Bond 
1986; James 2010). Some scholars have focused on non-governmental organizations in contrast 
to the state, as forging alternative extensions of post-colonial power (Hardt and Negri 2001), or 
have highlighted the rise of NGOs in an age of neoliberal privatization (Kaag 2008; Piot 2010).  
Scholars writing about refugees and asylum have foregrounded the work of the UN and NGOs 
(Cabot 2014; Thomson 2012; Sandvik 2011), or government policies (Fassin 2012; Ticktin 
2011).  In this chapter, I take as my main object the interdigitation of state and non-governmental 
agencies that form a refugee resettlement apparatus—a part of what I term the patchwork 
governance of refugee subjects.  Writing about the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and refugee 
resettlement in Kenya’s neighboring Uganda, Kristin Bergtora Sandvik discusses the ways in 
which “soft law instruments” of international agencies such as UNHCR “allow for novel ways of 
perpetuating exploitative exchanges” with refugees, which are “intrinsic to soft-law governance” 
(2011:26).  These instruments, such as “administrative handbooks, bureaucratic guidelines, codes 
of conduct, and standards of procedure that are formally nonbinding but which in practice have 
direct or indirect effects on the legal situations of individuals,” Sandvik argues, “contribute to a 
highly heterogeneous ‘legal’ structure on the ground” (12).   
Expanding the viewfinder beyond UNHCR, I examine the larger refugee resettlement 
process, which involves multiple governmental and non-governmental agencies, to capture the 
nature of the refugee resettlement process being not a singular “system,” as official 
representations may purport, but rather being unsystematic, uncoordinated, halting, and arbitrary.  
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What does it mean to be subject to many governing institutions but citizen of none?  What does it 
mean for over 24 million refugees and asylum seekers worldwide to live amidst a patchwork of 
bureaucratic institutions that claim partial, but not exclusive, authority over them?  By directing 
attention not only to many, uncoordinated governing institutions that preside over a single 
population, but also to non-citizenship, I am naming a quality of statelessness in the twenty-first 
century in which refugees are subject to governing institutions that have conflicting claims and 
imperatives.   
Scholars such as Arendt (1972) and Agamben (1995) have pointed out the ways in which 
refugees expose the lie of human rights divorced from rights guaranteed by the nation-state and 
national citizenship.  Following anthropologists who have called for an ethnographic 
investigation of bureaucracies (Gupta 2014) and humanitarian institutions (Fassin 2012), I am 
interested not only in refugees’ exclusion from rights bestowed by citizenship, but also what 
exists in their absence.  What constitutes the governance of non-citizens, and how is it 
experienced?  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “patchwork” as “Something composed of 
many different pieces or elements, esp. when put together in a makeshift or incongruous way.”  I 
find “patchwork” a useful term for describing the assemblage of governing structures to which 
refugees are subject.  The physical metaphor of a patchwork highlights not only “many different 
pieces” and their incongruity, but also metaphorical spaces or margins between institutions.  The 
notion of a patchwork and its margins helps to illustrate the “places” where refugees become 
stuck—or the state of “stuck-ness” itself, and the ways in which the contradictions between 
bureaucratic institutions immobilize refugees. 	  
Refugees became objects of systematized global humanitarian policy beginning in World 
War I, with greater institutional structures put in place after World War II, and again during the 
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Cold War (Loescher et. al. 2008).  Within this global regime, refugees are not only excluded 
from the nation-state, but are also subject to a particular regime of governance.  A “humanitarian 
government,” in which “the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and make 
us want to remedy them” are deployed in politics (2012: 1), as Fassin writes, is a starting point 
for understanding a part of the “regimes of care” (Ticktin 2011: 3) to which refugees are subject.  
As unauthorized border crossers (unauthorized, that is, until they are vetted and documented 
through an official Refugee Status Determination process) refugees are also often suspect—a 
“Trojan Horse,” in the language of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign (Kopan 2015).13  
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and even more so since 
attacks in Europe such as the one Paris in 2015 which have coincided with the so-called 
“European migrant crisis,” refugees have increasingly come to represent a dangerous specter for 
the public, and an object of national security anxieties and actions for governments.  For refugees 
in Kenya, as in many other places, this is true both in the country in which they live, and the 
countries to which they seek to emigrate.  Excluded from citizenship, refugees are instead subject 
to the governing authority of multiple institutions at once—among and between the United 
Nations, NGOs, and government agencies of multiple countries.   
Examining this patchwork of state and non-state bureaucracies, I highlight the 
relationship between security and humanitarianism—a complex assemblage of security- and 
humanitarian-oriented ideas and practices deployed within various levels of all the institutions 
involved in the refugee resettlement process.  To this end, I chart ethnographically the 
governance of non-citizens in the twenty-first century—at the center of the “humanitarian 
government” on one hand, and, paradoxically, the increasing criminalization of immigrants and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In countries such as Kenya, refugees are at first unauthorized.  In countries such as the US, by 
contrast, they are vetted and authorized prior to entering the country.  
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refugees on the other (Fassin 2011).  In his writing on bureaucracy and structural violence, Akhil 
Gupta argues that we must disrupt the idea of the state as a unified entity, as “the constant 
reference made to the state as a single, cohesive apparatus makes it impossible to understand the 
production of arbitrariness vis-à-vis the poor” (2014:33).  Gupta argues that structural violence is 
unintentionally but systematically produced “by the friction between agendas, bureaus, levels, 
and spaces that make up the state” (46).  Similarly, in the patchwork of governing institutions to 
which refugees are subject, we can locate competing priorities, protocols, and requirements 
among the institutions involved, which create gridlocks, gaps, and cracks between ill-fitting 
pieces—a myriad of spaces in which refugees fall or become trapped.   
By ethnographically charting refugees themselves as they engage with and navigate the 
process of resettlement, and the assemblage of governing structures that embrace them as a 
population more broadly, one is able to envision an unstable, shifting “whole,” with multiple 
parts blinking and fading in and out.  This “whole”—which is nevertheless a non-system—poses 
challenges for writing.  The multi-institutional nature of refugee resettlement, the consistently 
shifting nature of policies and rules responding to various kinds of pressures and events—from 
new civil wars to changing security practices after events such as 9/11, terror attacks in Kenya 
and beyond, or the election of right-wing, anti-immigrant politicians like Donald Trump in 
resettlement countries—create a moving target.  Moreover, secrecy surrounding policies and 
practices within both governments and UNHCR informs the partiality of my own knowledge, 
and the knowledge that refugees themselves possess.  To some degree, this was also true for staff 
working in refugee resettlement, many of whom at least claimed they had little knowledge of the 
Homeland Security side of the resettlement process. Yet, by following refugees as they navigate 
the resettlement process, one sees periods of long stagnation and interruption, sometimes whole 
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lives lived, whole generations born and raised in the “temporary” world of the refugee camp, or 
life seemingly on long-term pause as people wait for resettlement processes to come to fruition.  
Perhaps we cannot see the “whole” assemblage, but we can see the cracks in it when people get 
stuck—when one agency, for example, dictates that a refugee move to the next phase, but other 
parts of the assemblage disrupt the idealized process.  
I begin by examining Kenya as a site of refuge, and the political context in Kenya that 
has developed over the past decade and longer that is central to understanding the position of 
refugees living there.  I then explicate the resettlement process itself, tracing the bureaucratic 
coordination among several institutions as it is meant to work, in theory.  With these two 
contexts in mind—one national, the other transnational—I turn to the ways in which the 
bureaucracy of refugee resettlement, and the national context (itself part of the resettlement 
system), elucidate a critique that my interlocutors were making in the excerpts from my field 
notes quoted above, and the texture of everyday life within the structure on which they were 
commenting.  It is the lived experience that ultimately illuminates the patchwork, disjointed, and 
contradictory nature of the aims and practices of the institutions to which non-citizens are subject 
in Kenya and beyond.14  The stories of two young Somali men—the ultimate refugee-cum-terror 
suspect—illuminate the patchwork governance of non-citizenship through resettlement’s 
“cracks,” and the relationship between those spaces and the ways in which refugees navigate 
them.   
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 On the standardization and globalization of “key techniques for managing mass 
displacements,” Malkki (1995:497) . 
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Kenya as an Uncertain Refuge 
Today, “the refugee” is always, simultaneously, an object of humanitarian concern, and 
an object of scrutiny as a possible fraud, criminal, or terrorist (Besteman 2016, Daniel and 
Knudsen 1996, Feldman 2007).  At UNHCR, NGO offices, and in government interviews, the 
work of being a refugee is to prove oneself to be neither a war criminal and perpetrator, nor a 
fraud trying to exploit the system and garner benefits meant for genuine, vulnerable victims.  In 
addition to the content of one’s narrative, one must speak and comport oneself like a “real 
refugee,” a pure victim, (Malkki 1996; Thomson 2012), as opposed to a hustler, a liar, or a fraud.  
But it is not only in the context of the UN and foreign embassies where refugees are 
mistrusted.  Refugees are often considered suspect in the countries to which they have first fled, 
by government authorities and citizens alike.  Often, as with other migrant groups, they are seen 
as usurping national resources such as jobs or land from citizens.  In the case of Somalis in 
Kenya, refugees are especially mistrusted because of fraught historical relations between 
neighboring countries and racialized ideas about the other on both sides.  In Kenya, British 
colonialists depicted Somalis as both inferior and superior to their “racially distinct,” “Bantu” 
neighbors—but always as racially “other” (Thompson 1995:17).  During the British colonial 
period, Somalis in the Kenya colony—indigenous to the Kenyan side of the Somali-Kenya 
border—vied for and gained a privileged “non-native” status through the Somali Exemption 
Ordinance of 1919, although they later lost many such privileges (Turton 1972).15  The 
production of social difference during the colonial period, and the Somali majority in 
Northeastern Kenya’s attempt to join independent Somalia in what was deemed the Shifta War 
between 1963 and ‘68, contribute to the discrimination in Kenya against Somalis today.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In colonial Kenya, African “natives” occupied the lowest rung in a racial hierarchy that 
organized social and political life.  
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Kenyan military invasion of Somalia in 2011 to fight al-Shabaab, and Somalis continuing to 
cross the border into Kenya, further produce new forms of mutual mistrust.  Just as Somali 
vocabulary includes racializing, derogatory terms for Kenyans, I have heard Kenyans derisively 
describe Somalis, and refer to Somalis simply as “al-Shabaab.”  During my fieldwork in Nairobi 
more than a few Kenyan landlords refused to rent to Somalis, stereotyping them as destructive 
and dirty. 
For decades, and especially since the 1980s and ‘90s, Kenya has hosted refugees fleeing 
civil and international conflicts all over the region—including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.  As a 
signatory to the United Nations and African Union Conventions on refugees, at the centers of 
which are the concept of non-refoulement, or no forced return, Kenya is obliged to register 
asylum seekers who cross its borders, and to permit them to reside in the country by providing 
authorized refugee documentation.  The international rule of “country of first asylum” dictates 
that whichever country first grants an asylum seeker protection holds responsibility for that 
person, and, under international law, no other country has an obligation to accept them.  Because 
most refugee-sending countries are in the global South, the first countries that grant asylum to 
displaced people are also in the global South.  As a relatively stable country in a region that has 
been mired in civil conflicts since soon after many of these countries gained independence in the 
1960s, Kenya has played a major role in hosting not only the region’s but the world’s refugees.   
At the conclusion of 2014, the largest countries sending refugees globally were Syria, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo.  According to 
UNHCR’s most recent major statistical report, “developing regions” hosted 86% of the world’s 
refugees.  In refugees hosted per GDP per capita, Ethiopia ranks number one, with 441 refugees 
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hosted per 1 US dollar GDP per capita, followed by Pakistan, Chad, Uganda, and Kenya.  As of 
the same year, Kenya was the 7th largest refugee hosting country in the world, with over half a 
million refugees residing within its border (UNHCR 2015:32-5), the majority of whom are 
Somali— around 400,000 of the 600,000 total.16 
*** 
When I left Kenya in August 2011, I had spent much of the summer in Old Town 
Mombasa on the coast with other US-based students.  We had spent afternoons perched on 
cement steps over the Indian Ocean, not far from the 14th century Fort Jesus, practicing Swahili 
over cardamom coffee and fried mandazi, chatting up youth and old men.  At night, we took the 
small, three-wheeled tuktuks to places where we could sit street-side in plastic chairs eating meat 
and drinking soda, or to some of Mombasa’s nightclubs, where Mombasans imbibed Tusker and 
caipirinhas, and sang karaoke.  Our Swahili program, organized by a US university, had taken us 
up and down the coast—Diyani, Malindi, Lamu—carefree.  By that July, Kenyan newspapers 
were reporting a new wave of Somali refugees driven by drought and famine across the border, 
hours away in the northeast.  Although I read the reporting carefully, the stories felt far away 
from Mombasa, and from the upscale neighborhood of Westlands where I stayed for a couple of 
weeks in Nairobi at the end of the summer.   
 That October, motivated by concerns about regional instability wrought by the militant 
group, al-Shabaab, in Somalia, the Kenyan army occupied southern Somalia in Operation Linda 
Nchi (Protect the Country), and soon joined the African Union’s peacekeeping forces there—
compelled by Kenya’s particular national interests.  A backlash of violence in Kenya—allegedly 
perpetrated by al-Shabaab or its Kenyan affiliate, al-Hijra—started to become commonplace in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 UNHCR measures contributions to global refugee hosting based on refugees relative to the 
national population, and relative to GDP per capita.   
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the primarily Muslim and ethnically Somali northeast, including the Dadaab refugee camps; in 
Mombasa and along the coast; and in Nairobi.  By June 2014, conservative estimates reported 80 
grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Kenya since the beginning of the 
invasion less than three years prior (Anderson and McKnight 2014:15).  
  It was in that climate that I returned to Kenya to begin research in Nairobi in the summer 
of 2012, and then for a year-and-a-half beginning in August 2013.  In my earlier research plans, I 
had thought considerably about insecurity methodologically, and how I would conduct fieldwork 
in this environment, but I had spent less time conceptualizing analytically or theoretically the 
Kenyan security situation.  When I returned to Kenya in 2013, the threat of violence in public 
spaces, and its effects on the people with whom I was developing relationships took on an 
increasingly central role in the way I understood refugee situations in Kenya and the lives of 
friends and interlocutors.   
  On a Saturday a month after arriving in Nairobi, I was at the Kenyan National Museum 
to attend the Story Moja Hay Festival—a literary event bringing African writers from all over the 
world for a week of readings and workshops open to the public.  In the auditorium named for 
famed British-Kenyan archaeologist Louis Leakey, I listened to the New York-based Nigerian 
writer and art historian, Teju Cole, discuss his new novel, Open City.  In line for the bathroom 
before his talk, there was rumbling about something unfolding at the Westgate Shopping Mall, 
about a mile away—an establishment that would be frequented the festival’s mostly upper-class 
attendees.  Cole mentioned the mall as he began his talk, and by the time he finished, phones 
buzzing throughout the auditorium showed gruesome reports of shoppers and diners gunned 
down, others held hostage.  Feeling the need to get out of the crowds, I called a taxi.  The driver 
who picked me up informed me that he was trying to get in touch with a passenger whom he had 
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dropped at the mall earlier in the day.  We later learned that the young man from Trinidad—a 
friend of the friends with whom I was staying at the time—was dead, along with sixty-six other 
people, both Kenyan and foreign.   
 The three-day Westgate attack, which was mired in confusing and conflicting reports, but 
immediately claimed by al-Shabaab, was the largest act of foreign terrorism in Kenya since the 
1998 US embassy bombings.  For the following two days, during which the mall remained under 
siege, I holed up in the seeming protection of the apartment in a quiet, elite neighborhood where 
my husband and I were staying with American friends while looking for an apartment that would 
be more conducive to my research.  We stayed glued to our laptops and newspapers, watching 
the event on TV news and on Twitter—the attackers, hostages, and Kenyan police and military 
still inside the building.  We watched images of shocked and bloodied hostages emerging from 
the building, and read terrifying details, as well as rumors that we could neither verify nor dispel.  
I received a message from a friend at the NGO, International Rescue Committee, that Somali 
neighborhoods should be avoided.  Eastleigh, the well-known Somali neighborhood just east of 
downtown, had been on the US government’s security warning for some time.  Having just paid 
a deposit of two months’ rent for a place in Pangani, a neighborhood adjacent to Eastleigh, my 
uncertainty about my research plans spiked.  The young man, Moha, whom I had recently hired 
as a Somali language instructor, and whom I had begun meeting in Eastleigh every other day, 
was suddenly incommunicado, his cell phone out of service in the days following the Westgate 
attack—stolen, I later learned.  
 On September 24, three days after the attack, I had heard from Moha on his new phone, 
and I headed back to Eastleigh.  Not without worries, I began making plans to move into the new 
apartment.  A couple of weeks later, on the day we were to finally move to Pangani, I asked 
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Moha to meet me downtown.  I planned to buy some things at Tuskey’s—a grocery chain and 
department store of sorts, and so we agreed to meet outside the National Archives—an imposing 
colonial building that had housed the Bank of India before independence.  Today, aside from 
being a center of historical research in the country, it is a popular meeting spot, looking across a 
busy public square to the equally well-known landmark, the Hilton Hotel.   
Moha was late.  As I waited for him, anxiously looking at my phone, regarding the 
people around me, I became more and more nervous.  I wandered across the square and scanned 
headlines of the various Kenyan newspapers that were neatly piled in stacks for sale.  My eyes 
grew wide at an article about the mutilation of bodies at Westgate.  “Is this a credible paper?” I 
asked the salesman, hoping what I was reading was more of a National Enquirer than a New 
York Times.  “The Star? Yes, it’s a good paper,” he replied nonchalantly.  An hour later I was 
feeling sick when Moha finally arrived.  We made our way to a quiet café a couple of blocks 
away, discussing the events of the previous days.  A security operation had occurred the night 
before in the neighborhood of Majengo, which borders Eastleigh on the opposite side from 
Pangani.  A sheikh and thirty young men, Moha said, were arrested from a mosque on suspicion 
of promoting radical ideas.  Moha told me that when I had suggested meeting at the National 
Archives, he had decided to wait at his friend’s shop instead, since he didn’t feel safe waiting at 
the Archives.  At first I was taken aback.  I had been waiting there for an hour!  If he thought it 
was unsafe, why didn’t he tell me?  I wondered.   
“You don’t think it’s safe?” I asked.   
Moha replied, “Of course not, I could be caught!”   
In the depth of my own fears following Westgate, I had failed to recognize how different 
his fears were from mine, structured by different positions in the world.  His greatest fear, he told 
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me, was not being caught up in an attack, as mine was, but of being mistaken for a terrorist, of 
being arrested and even disappeared—all in the realm of possible for a young man, a Somali, a 
refugee, and a Muslim.   
In the months following Westgate, and especially beginning in April 2014, when the 
Kenyan Ministry of Interior launched Operation Usalama (Security) Watch—a police and 
military crackdown on Eastleigh, and later on other Somali and refugee neighborhoods—racial 
profiling, abuse, extortion, and deportation to camps structured daily life for Somalis.  Secretary 
for Interior Joseph Ole Lenku stated that the relocation directive aimed “to address the increasing 
threat of terrorism in the country,” as “refugees could be behind the terror attacks” (Ombati, 
March 25, 2014).  President Kenyatta announced, “Kenya will not continue hosting refugees at 
the expense of peace and suffering of its citizens” (Somali Current, April 4, 2014).  News 
articles and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) quoted a confidential report 
that stated the Operation’s aim as “to flush out Al Shabaab/aliens… ” (The Star, April 5, 2014; 
IPOA 2014:2).  Security operations and policies developed to tighten the government’s grip on 
refugees, and on the Somali population in particular, shaped refugee resettlement efforts in ways 
that highlight the patchwork of bureaucratic institutions in which refugees can become entangled 
and immobilized.   
The backlash against Somali refugees in the aftermath of the Westgate attack was not a 
novel development in Kenya’s relations with its Somali population—refugee or citizen.  Rather, 
the Westgate attack precipitated an intensification of these relations.  Anxiety about Somali 
loyalty to the nation was stoked during the 1960s Shifta War, in which the guerilla tactics of the 
Somali Northern Frontier District Liberation Army were met with violence and forced 
villageization—in other words, encampment of the entire Somali population.  These tactics were 
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compelled by the notion that halting mobility would enable surveillance of seditious activities, 
including mobility across the Somali border (Turton 1972; Whittaker 2008).  Emma Lochery 
(2012) writes about a screening exercise conducted in 1989 in order to distinguish Somali 
citizens of Kenya from Somalis who had illicitly crossed the border—part of generations-old 
migration patterns.  In other words, since Kenyan independence, Somali movement across the 
border has been seen as productive of insecurity and disorder.  The Somali refugee crisis 
beginning in the early 1990s, and the emergence of the militant group al-Shabaab in the late 
2000s, heightened an already existing dynamic.  Hyndman and Nylund have documented raids 
on refugee neighborhoods as early as 1991, and throughout the 1990s (Hyndman and Nylund 
1998).  Operation Usalama Watch built on these longer histories of recurring violence against 
Somali citizens and refugees. 
 Despite Kenyan security’s aggressive stance towards Somali residents of the country, I 
do not intend to suggest that the resettlement system’s “international” players—the UN, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), NGOs, and foreign governments such as the 
US—otherwise operate a smooth-running system, if only they could work without the 
interference of Kenyan corruption or hostility to human rights.  Governments of the global North 
finance the United Nations to keep refugees in poorer, global South countries, which bear a 
vastly disproportionate burden of refugees worldwide.  These countries have promoted “regional 
solutions” for refugees, and have invested in infrastructure that keep asylum seekers out, from 
border security and detention centers to off-shore asylum processing centers (Lewellen 2002; 
Troeller 2008).  Aiding refugees, but also producing the infrastructure of refugees’ encampment 
in places such as Kenya, UNHCR also enables the unequal division of labor in hosting refugees 
(Hyndman 1997).  While in later chapters, I highlight other institutions and ideological forces—
	   65	  
namely, the entanglement of US national security and humanitarian imperatives—here I 
highlight the ways in which international governmental and non-governmental organizations are 
structured by the Kenyan government and security context.   
 
The Refugee Resettlement System: An Ideal Type 
Systematic refugee resettlement efforts by international organizations began in the period 
between World War I and II.  With the advent of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1949, resettlement was further systematized and 
globalized (Malkki 1995).  International law pertaining to refugees was codified in 1951 in the 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and applied specifically to 
European refugees who had been displaced during World War II.  In 1967, the Convention was 
updated through the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which extended the Convention 
to all refugees worldwide.  While the United States accepted refugees prior to 1980, that year 
President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Refugee Act, which put in place a 
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform 
provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are 
admitted  (Public Law 96-212 1980).  
This Act was developed in response to the flight of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian 
refugees in the 1970s.  While during the Cold War period, accepting refugees from communist 
countries had a geopolitical, as well as a humanitarian significance for the United States, in the 
period since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the advent of the War on Terror, 
accepting refugees has been increasingly fraught (Troeller 2008).  This tension is intensifying in 
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the US with the presidency of Donald Trump, and globally with events such as Brexit and the 
rise of anti-immigrant, right-wing nationalist movements in Europe.  
The refugee resettlement assemblage in lived experience means different things to 
different actors that move within it.  For elite internationals (usually from the global North) who 
work in resettlement, it may mean a couple of years of adventure abroad, while for others, it may 
be a job in which one gains respected experience in the humanitarian field before moving on to 
another post in another far-flung place.  For Kenyans (and other “local” staff in refugee-hosting 
countries), it may mean a highly regarded job in an international organization with decent pay, 
enabling a middle- or upper-class lifestyle and financial stability in a country in which most 
people hustle to scrape by with no guarantee of meeting basic needs.   
For refugees, the resettlement processis full of silence and waiting, illegible documents 
and mysterious turns of event.  The way refugees talk about the logic of this system often 
contrasts with the ways that policies are defined and explained in official discourses.  Officials 
who work in this system may understand the process more closely to the way it is defined in 
handbooks and documents outlining standard operating procedures, but they, too, know that its 
workings spread out beyond the spaces in the forms they fill and reports they write.  
Nevertheless, outlining the ideal typical structure of this system – the way it’s “supposed to 
go”— serves to show the basic relationships between various state and non-governmental 
agencies involved in this system, and therefore a scaffold upon which to explore refugee 
resettlement as it is lived and experienced by refugees.   
In Nairobi, many people who work in the resettlement system refer to it as a “pipeline”—
a metaphor that refers both to a flow of refugees moving from one step to the next enabling 
organizations and governments to meet target numbers, and to an apparatus—imagined as a 
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seamless interlocking of parts—“a continuous line of joined pipes” (Oxford English Dictionary), 
through which refugees smoothly pass.  Refugees’ experiences of this system contrast with the 
pipeline image, and their depictions evoke many uncoordinated parts that create a patchwork of 
bureaucratic systems and processes.  Nevertheless, considering the system in an idealized form 
gives us an outline and a starting point from which to consider the way the system actually 
operates—the so-called “rules”—before seeing how they work in practice.  In order to outline 
the system in theory, let us imagine an ideal-typical case going through this process to illustrate 
its basic structure.  Fleshing out the system with people (though fictional composites) helps to 
illustrate how these interlinking organizations theoretically operate.    
 
Figure 5: The above image, created by the US Resettlement Support Center, represents multiple institutional players 
in resettlement, though leaves out the government of Kenya. The refugee family pictured moving along the orange 
path, or pipeline, and the yellow arrows which represent one-way movement, reflect the official notion that 
resettlement is a systematic and coordinated single process.   
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While various types of individuals are selected for resettlement, I invoke here, as an ideal 
type, a single mother and her children, for reasons I outline below.  UNHCR, which typically 
first identifies refugees as resettlement candidates, uses seven main criteria.  In theory, several of 
them are broad enough to potentially encompass a majority of refugees.  Others are more 
specific, including “women and girls at risk,” and “children and adolescents at risk.”  Single 
mothers are often identified as especially “vulnerable,” and therefore good candidates for 
resettlement.  Because men, and single men, in particular, undergo greater scrutiny as possible 
security threats, or as inadmissible to countries on account of participation in or material support 
of rebel groups, women and children are often deemed simpler cases that move faster.  In some 
organizations, large families are also prioritized because they enable moving more individuals 
with less work and time; a family of ten, for example, takes considerably less labor than ten 
individual cases.  One NGO contact told me that single people were unlikely to be selected for 
resettlement at all since, in addition to these bureaucratic reasons, “family is valued in both 
cultures,” as he put it.  With the death and disappearance of men in war, many such families are 
also female-headed.  As of 2016, 78% of Syrian refugees who had entered the US, for example, 
were women, and children under the age of 17 (Goyette 2016).   
My “ideal type,” who I am calling Esperence, represents a “good refugee” (Thomson 
2012), whose life history and engagement with the resettlement system is consistent with an 
idealized version of a vulnerable subject and deserving victim.  Given that less than 1 percent of 
refugees globally will be resettled, Esperence is among the select few who are accepted into the  
resettlement system.  Esperence is a minority Banyamulenge woman from eastern Democratic of 
Congo—an identity that gives her claim particular weight due to the persecution of her 
community.  After her husband was killed by government-supported rebels and she was raped, 
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Esperence escaped her village with her children to a nearby city, then traveled by bus to Uganda, 
and finally to Nairobi.  The idealized journey that Esperence takes through the resettlement 
system contrasts with the real people I write about later in this chapter—single young men whose 
experiences with bureaucracy and security show a different picture from the idealized version I 
outline here.
 
Figure 6 
*** 
 When Esperence arrived in Nairobi, she sought out the Banyamulenge community.  She 
found a relative of her late husband’s at church, and he took her and her children to the Kenyan 
Department of Refugee Affairs office to register as refugees.  After several trips, Esperence’s 
biographical data and photo were taken, she was given a “waiting” paper to prove she had 
applied for her ID card, and was told to come back in several months to pick up her ID.  
Meanwhile, her husband’s relative brought her to UNHCR to register there, as well.  She was 
given an asylum seeker’s pass, which enables her to stay in Nairobi for a period of time while 
waiting for her refugee status determination appointment.  After about six months, it is time for 
her appointment.  With the aid of a UNHCR-provided interpreter, she tells her story, describing 
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the attack on her village, her husband’s death, her assault and flight to Kenya.  She explains that 
she has received menacing threats by young Congolese men in her neighborhood who know her 
ethnic identity and even the identity of her deceased husband. 
 The UNHCR interviewer deems Esperence’s story credible.  Her testimony is consistent 
with the timeline of known events occurring in her home area, and her children’s testimonies are 
consistent with hers.  They grant her a “Mandate,” or refugee identity document.  Her children 
are included on her document and gain refugee status as her dependents.  Because of the 
continued threats that she is facing, the Refugee Status Determination Unit refers Esperence to 
the Protection Unit, giving her an appointment for several weeks later.  While the Protection Unit 
may take a number of steps based on a refugee’s claim of security concerns, the staff member 
with whom Esperence meets deems her to be exceptionally vulnerable.  This assessment is based 
upon her minority ethnicity, making her return to Congo unsafe; her experience of gender-based 
violence; her status as a single mother; and the threats she has received while living in Nairobi.  
She brings to her interview a police report that she filed regarding the threats, as well as a 
menacing text message on her phone.  Knowing such occurrences to be consistent with other 
reports, the Protection Unit deems her a candidate for resettlement.  More, the US government 
has agreed to take 50,000 Congolese refugees over five years.  Not only is Esperence a worthy 
candidate by UNHCR criteria, she fits into a US government priority, as well.   
While Esperence is referred by UNHCR’s Protection Unit, other refugees might instead   
be referred to UNHCR by other organizations.  For example, after getting legal, medical, 
psychological, or financial assistance from an NGO, the NGO may, in certain cases, refer the 
person to UNHCR for resettlement.  In the case of two NGOs in Nairobi, the NGOs themselves 
are authorized to conduct resettlement interviews and refer cases directly to foreign embassies.  
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While Esperence’s case was immediately taken note of, many refugees who are eventually 
identified for resettlement live for many years in Nairobi or in one of Kenya’s refugee camps 
before being identified.     
 Esperence is given an appointment for her next interview with a UNHCR resettlement 
officer for three months later.  In her first interview, she must give background information about 
her family and her life.  Family information is recorded so that there is an extensive and precise 
record.  This record will be used to verify any family-related claims made in the future.  
Esperence waits for eight long months after this interview until being called back for a second 
interview.  In her second interview, she must carefully explain things exactly as she did in the 
previous one, as well as in her interviews with the Protection Unit, and the Refugee Status 
Determination Unit.  Information must be consistent over time; inconsistency is a common 
reason for rejection.  
 After about seven months, Esperence and her children are notified by UNHCR that their 
case has been approved for resettlement and referred to the United States.  The United States has 
the largest resettlement program globally, although other people she knows have been referred to 
Australia, Canada, Sweden, and elsewhere.  Now she must wait to hear from the US 
Resettlement Support Center (RSC), or “Overseas Processing Entity.”  The RSC is run by the 
non-profit Church World Services, which is contracted by the US State Department to screen 
refugees prior to being interviewed by US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), under 
the Department of Homeland Security.  Currently, there are two RSCs in Africa, the largest one 
located in Nairobi.  Their staff members—both international (primarily American) and 
Kenyan—travel throughout the continent to different camps and cities to perform screening 
interviews for every refugee referred to the US government.  While Church World Services 
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holds the government contract in Nairobi, in other parts of the world it is held by other non-
governmental organizations. After hearing from UNHCR about the positive determination of her 
case, it’s another three months before she hears from RSC, and three more before her interview.   
 A few months after her interview at RSC in Nairobi, Esperence has been notified that she 
has passed, and waits to be notified about an interview with USCIS.  In the meantime, she and 
her children are undergoing security checks by several US intelligence agencies.  She receives 
notice of her USCIS interview, which is for nearly a year after her interview with RSC.  Her 
UNHCR and Kenyan government refugee identity documents have expired since she first 
arrived, so she must renew them, and will have to bring them with her to her interview.  
Esperence passes this second interview and a few months later receives a letter from USCIS 
about the positive determination of her case.  She is notified by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) in Nairobi that she will have to come on two different days for medical 
screenings.  Since neither she nor her children have any communicable diseases (such as 
tuberculosis), her case will not be delayed for medical treatment.  Her security clearances have 
also passed without any problems—neither she, her children, nor anyone with matching names 
and birthdates have come up in any of the security databases.  USCIS did not have doubts about 
the credibility of her narrative, and no significant inconsistencies arose in her USCIS interview 
with previous statements she had given.  Her interviewer found that she met the definition of an 
eligible refugee, and did not match any of the categories of inadmissibility, such as participation 
in or material support of terror groups—a significant problem for people who have lived under 
the control of such organizations.   
 Now Esperence just has to wait for her flight.  She is called to attend a cultural 
orientation at the IOM Transit Center in Nairobi.  At the week-long orientation, she and her 
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children are given information about the United States, including laws and cultural practices, as 
well as what they can expect in their first months after arrival.  She is notified that she will be 
resettled in Houston, Texas, and will be met at the airport by a local resettlement agency.  On the 
day of their flight, Esperence and her children return to the Transit Center, where their bags are 
checked and weighed, they undergo a final medical check, and Esperence is given all the 
documents they will need for departing Kenya, transiting through Istanbul, and entering the 
United States.  From the time that she fled her home in Congo, over four years have elapsed 
since she and her children board their flight to the United States.  This is a best-case scenario, in 
which not only is Esperence among less than 1 percent identified for resettlement, but she is also 
identified immediately, and the bureaucratic processes through which she must pass operate 
smoothly, without causing major delays.   
*** 
 Consider this story an outline of how things are meant to work in theory.  But the above 
narrative does not describe refugees’ actual lived experiences of this process.  Rather, the 
experiences of people trying to access and navigate resettlement are often agonizing—filled with 
uncertainty, mistrust, abuse, and frustration—experiences that the above, idealized version of 
events does not encompass.  Moreover, the bureaucratic inter-working of these various 
institutions themselves rarely run so smoothly.  Instead, requirements of one institution butt up 
against those of another.  Requirements for medical and security checks to be up-to-date by the 
time of departure, for example, mean that such checks must often be done and re-done when one 
certification expires while waiting for another.  In the course of my fieldwork, I met people who 
had had their medical screenings re-done seven times because they continued to expire while 
waiting for other clearances to come through.  Problems obtaining and renewing documents in a 
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timely manner are also a major cause of frustration and delay.  Nevertheless, the idealized 
outline that I offer above summarizes the basic structure of the interlinking institutions that make 
up refugee resettlement globally, and from Kenya, in particular: the Kenyan Department of 
Refugee Affairs, several units at the UNHCR, several NGOs, foreign embassies, the US 
Resettlement Support Center (RSC) contracted by the State Department, US Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) under Homeland Security, the International Organization for 
Migration, and Kenyan Immigration.    
 Given the multi-tiered structure of this complex and shifting system, it would be 
impossible to explain every combination of bureaucratic complication that arises for people in 
the refugee resettlement process.  Everyone I met during my research who had either 
successfully completed a resettlement case, or who was attempting to access the system, had a 
story about how requirements in one institution conflicted with the demands of another; how 
their inability to access a needed document prevented their case from moving forward at some 
point or from beginning at all; how their claim to meriting resettlement conflicted with rules and 
priorities, despite their own certainty that their condition was as bad as that of anyone they knew 
who had been accepted for resettlement; or how their family situation clashed with rules 
surrounding family composition—an issue I discuss in detail in Chapter 5.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I describe intersections of the bureaucratic assemblage of 
the resettlement process with the security context in Kenya.  I do so by tracing the experiences of 
refugees who embody the “al Shabaab/aliens” who are increasingly at the forefront of not only 
Kenyan but global anxieties that join the figure of the migrant and the terrorist (de Genova 2007; 
Fassin 2011; Medovoi 2007; Rana 2011).  In what follows, I highlight the Kenyan security 
context, and the ways in which it structures and informs the stories of two young Somali men as 
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they navigate the so-called pipeline.  In doing so, I aim to bring into relief what I call the 
patchwork governance of non-citizenship—an unsynchronized assemblage of institutions that 
may pose as a single system (wherein bureaucrats use metaphors such as the “pipeline” to 
imagine the system as a unified whole) but in which refugees lack the relative (at least 
theoretical) protection of citizenship.  Instead, they are subject to multiple institutions, that 
maintain only partial claims to legitimacy in their governing actions.    
 
Patchwork Governance in Life: Somali Men between UNHCR and the State 
Operation Usalama Watch, and the relocation directives of 2012 and 2014 that ordered 
refugees out of urban areas and to Kenya’s two, large refugee camps, affected refugee 
registration and resettlement.  Both the Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR 
register refugees and issue refugee identification.  Because the two recent relocation directives 
officially made urban refugees illegal residents of the city, the government closed its registration 
centers, and UNHCR, in compliance with the Kenyan government, did the same—although, over 
time, exceptions developed.  Moreover, while foreign governments typically used the UNHCR 
identity document as verification of refugee status, this changed when the Kenyan government 
instituted an exit permit requirement.  Prior to leaving the country for resettlement, and 
regardless of permission from a foreign government to enter their country, refugees could no 
longer leave Kenya without a permit, which would be issued only if the applicant had legally 
resided in Kenya, as evinced by a Kenyan government refugee ID. 
The result was that NGOs and UNHCR stopped processing cases of refugees who lacked 
the Kenyan “alien” ID card, referred to by many refugees simply as “the alien.”  But with 
registration closed in Nairobi, the card became exceedingly difficult to obtain.  People began 
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making uncertain journeys to refugee camps where they would register (or try to), and then 
return to the city.  The cost of travel, the insecurity of traveling without the document, and the 
predicament of a one- to three-day bus ride, particularly for the sick and elderly, created further 
obstacles.  Conflicting identification requirements were only one of the problems that arose from 
the relocation directives.  In addition, the US Resettlement Support Center (RSC) halted 
interviews in Nairobi in compliance with Kenyan government directives that would make such 
activities oppositional to Kenyan policy.  Several NGOs also went underground, removing their 
logos from their buildings and vehicles, and stopping much of their community-based work, 
particularly after several NGO workers were arrested (Daily Nation 2014).17  Competing 
priorities, protocols, and requirements among the institutions involved in managing and 
resettling refugees created gridlocks and gaps wherein refugees were halted from pursuing their 
resettlement cases.  This resulted in further uncertainty and insecurity pervading daily life in the 
liminal, supposedly temporary state of non-citizenship.18   
 
Maneuvering the Spaces between Institutions 
My friend and Somali tutor, Moha, was waiting for his own resettlement case.  His case 
was not going through the UNHCR resettlement process, but through family sponsorship from an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In addition to the Westgate context, and general anxiety about Somali refugees, this came at a 
time of more general suspicion of foreign NGOs, precipitated by President Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
indictment at the International Criminal Court.  His reaction involved a general anti-international 
sentiment, calling the ICC and foreign NGOs imperialist projects.   	  18	  We might consider refugees as existing in a “liminal” period, drawing on Turner (1967). In the 
global system of nation-states, there is a normative presumption that when one loses one’s 
citizenship—willingly or unwillingly—one will ultimately be granted a new one.  UNCHR’s 
“durable solutions”—local integration, repatriation, and third country resettlement—presuppose 
that a “solution” requires reincorporation into a national body as a citizen.  Refugees living as 
refugees for years or even decades in places such as Kenya, however, demonstrate that there is 
often no foreseeable conclusion to their liminal state.  
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uncle in Canada.  Unlike in the US Refugee Family Reunification Program, Canadian citizens 
can sponsor refugees beyond their spouse, parents, and children under 21.  Thus, Moha’s 
Canadian uncle and uncle’s wife were sponsoring him, along with his brother (technically, his 
cousin), Ahmed, with whom he grew up, and his uncle’s wife’s brother, Issa.  In Chapter 4, we 
will return to Moha’s story, with an account of his life that brings to light the nature of familial 
obligations as they intersect with the resettlement system.  Here, I look at just one moment in the 
story of his waiting and hoping for his case to come to fruition.  
 Moha was an impatient teacher—often seeming neither confident in my ability to learn 
Somali, nor confident that the effort would yield any benefit, even if I did manage to learn to 
communicate.  Not until much later, when he saw how my attempts at speaking Somali helped 
me earn people’s acceptance and trust, did he appear to accept the idea that our endeavor was 
worth more than the enjoyment of socializing over tea.  But he had time to spare, and we got 
along.  With common interests in politics and history, we enjoyed discussing current events, and 
learning about how the other saw the world.  When Moha got tired of my slow progress, and my 
irritating mispronunciations, he would launch into a story of a neighbor or friend or relative—
news from home in Somalia, from the neighborhood, or from elsewhere in the diaspora from 
Stockholm to Sydney.  When we met, Moha’s family had been trying to make plans for him and 
his cousin to leave East Africa for many years.  His uncle had begun a sponsorship case for them 
a couple of years prior, and our conversations would often turn to his hopes and anticipations for 
the case.  When we first met, all the paperwork had been filed, but they had yet to hear from the 
Canadian Embassy.   
 In early 2014, Moha was finally called for an interview.  The news was met with 
enormous anticipation, hope, and anxiety.  Moha knew from friends that the interviews could be 
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antagonistic—there could be misunderstandings; sometimes questions felt intrusive or offensive.  
Most of all, Moha knew that he had to answer all the questions consistently with the information 
he had given when he registered with UNHCR in 2007, with the information given by his uncle 
when he filed the paperwork in 2011, and with the responses that Ahmed and Issa would give in 
their interviews at the Embassy.  The day of his first interview ended in disappointment when, 
after waiting all day at the Embassy, he was told that the Somali interpreter had not shown up.  
Despite his fluent English, the Embassy staff told him that it was their policy to have an 
interpreter present.  It was another month before Moha got another appointment.   
 After two interviews, Moha finally had good news.  While the first interview had been 
long and grueling—full of scrutinizing attempts to uncover any sympathies for radical religious 
ideologies, the second interview was a mere half-hour and had a more congenial tone, although 
the interviewer had expressed his doubts that Moha was really a Somali national and not a 
Kenyan citizen posing as a refugee. (Moha took this skepticism, in part, as a compliment to his 
cosmopolitanism—his English was excellent and his knowledge of Kenyan politics impressive).  
Nevertheless, the short interview had concluded with Moha signing the official documents 
attesting to the truth of his statements, and accepting a loan from the Canadian government that 
would pay for his airline ticket.19  Only one barrier remained.  Moha had to renew his UNHCR 
mandate, and, more dauntingly, get the government-issued “alien” card in order to be granted an 
exit permit from the Kenyan Department of Immigration.  While people with resettlement cases 
at the UNHCR stage were not even being forwarded to embassies until they obtained the card, 
Moha’s family sponsorship case had continued without the document.  However, without it now, 
no paperwork from the Canadian government could get him out of Kenya. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In both Canada and the United States, refugees receive loans for their airline tickets, which 
they must pay back over time.   
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Moha had re-applied for his alien card in Nairobi in August of 2012, after the card that 
had been issued to him in the Dadaab camps had been stolen.  When Moha went to the 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) office in Shauri Moyo—not far from his home in 
Eastleigh—he was told to return in three months.  But at the time, Moha, who lived with his 
brother, was deep in the rhythms of his senior year of high school, and intently studying for his 
final high school exams.  He delayed returning when the three months were up, and by 
December, in the midst of the first relocation directive in 2012, the government had shut down 
the DRA office.  No one was able to register, or even obtain the IDs for which they had already 
applied.  Moha had a waiting slip—a paper that showed he had applied for the ID—but the 
Canadian official told him he would need to have the official document.  Now, two years after 
submitting his application to Canada, and a decade or more after other, more speculative ideas 
about going to a country that would grant him a path to citizenship, Moha needed a solution to 
this new obstacle to his long-in-the-making plans.   
While renewing the UNHCR ID went smoothly, getting the government alien card was 
another matter.  Since the DRA office had closed in 2012, it had only re-opened for a matter of 
weeks before being shut down yet again in the wake of the Kenyan Ministry of Interior’s 2014 
relocation directive and initiation of Operation Usalama Watch.  Now, at the height of the 
Operation, it was particularly difficult to get an alien card.  Moha could not leave the country 
without it, at a time when he and other Somali refugees were especially desperate to do so.     
Moha called Amina, our mutual friend in the US.  Through her work at UNHCR, she had 
contacts in both the NGO world and the government world in Nairobi.  She sent Moha the phone 
number of a friend who she hoped would be able to help him.  The contact told Moha to call 
again the next day, and Moha and I waited downtown for most of the afternoon as he tried 
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calling the number.  We ate lunch slowly at one of downtown’s Somali restaurants—Moha 
anxiously watching his phone.  After lunch and coffee, we had all but given up.  We headed to 
the matatu stage, dejected.  To buy some time in case the contact called, I browsed in some 
open-front shoe shops around the large lot of matatus where young men in maroon uniforms 
milled around waiting for their mat to fill, cajoling potential customers to enter their vehicle.  I 
was purchasing a pair of electric blue flats from the rows of cheap, synthetic shoes when our 
contact finally called.  We took off across the city again, down Kenyatta Avenue and up to the 
Upper Hill area that overlooks Uhuru Park and downtown, home to several government 
buildings.   
The contact, a young-ish man in a suit, met us outside at some distance from his office 
building, where hawkers sold newspapers, belts, and ties—things for the men working inside the 
government buildings nearby.  I lingered nearby reading a newspaper, while the contact told 
Moha that his ID card had been issued in Mombasa—a bus trip of eight or nine hours—for 
reasons we did not understand.  If the contact had some information about why, he did not share 
it.  His colleague in Mombasa instructed that Moha he would need to travel there to retrieve the 
card.  But traveling without identification (and even with it) posed a huge risk for a young 
Somali man at the height of the Operation—when people were being arrested in their homes and 
neighborhood checkpoints, let alone along major highways.  After some negotiation, it was 
agreed that he would pay our contact’s colleague in Mombasa to send the ID card to our contact, 
who would call when it arrived.  Although Moha had some trepidation, he felt he had no other 
choice.  Moha’s lack of a government ID card meant that he could not register his phone line, 
which also meant that he could not send and receive money via M-Pesa or other mobile money 
transfer systems that formed the most common system of banking in Kenya, where most people 
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do not have access to traditional bank accounts or credit cards, and where carrying cash can be 
risky.   
Thus, we sent the money from my cell phone.  This was an easily surmountable problem 
for Moha, a person with an expansive social network.  Less well-connected people in Moha’s 
position might not have had ties to a reliable person who could send the money, let alone having 
the money to send right then and there.  Moreover, few people would have the option of 
obtaining an ID directly through a government contact.  Moha and the contact’s mutual 
friendship with Amina (for whom the contact seemed to have a fondness) enabled Moha to skirt 
the system and obtain the ID card.  Perhaps the man took a cut from the money we sent to his 
Mombasa colleague, but in the scheme of the kinds of bribes Somalis were being coerced into 
paying during the Operation—sometimes in the thousands of dollars, requiring people to call 
upon wealthier relatives in Nairobi or relatives (wealthy or not) abroad—the $20 that Moha sent 
for his card seems to have represented an act of goodwill for the friend of a friend, perhaps 
covering the cost of mailing the card, possibly a small bribe the Mombasa contact would have to 
pay to get it, or perhaps just a fee for the unofficial work both men were doing.  Either way, the 
scenario was illustrative of Moha’s powerful social network—not unconnected to his clan and 
lineage background, which structured his friendships with people with power and influence.  
Seven months later, Moha was living in the finished basement of his uncle’s home on a cul-de-
sac in suburban Toronto.   
 
Waiting in Spaces between Institutions  
Several months after our trip downtown, Moha introduced me to a young man with less 
access to social networks and capital, who fared considerably worse as he tried to circumvent 
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obstacles to his resettlement produced by the government’s latest crackdown on refugees.  I 
arrived at Sultan Restaurant to meet Moha and Saiid, a place where Moha and I often met.  
Sultan Restaurant is a popular location for a relatively well-to-do Somali clientele—featuring 
menu items like pizza and fried chicken that cater to the tastes of diasporan Somalis who come to 
Nairobi to visit family or do business.  Moha and I would normally nurse cups of camel milk tea 
or watermelon juice over a few hours while we did our language lessons and told stories in the 
“ladies section” of the restaurant, where women and mixed-gender patrons were welcome to sit.  
On the second floor of a large commercial building, the outer part of the restaurant is for men 
only.  Men in suits, or a long qamis, sit in quiet conversation at spic-and-span tables, meeting to 
discuss business, politics, and family matters, while flat-screen TVs mounted on the walls play 
Somali news stations, Al Jazeera, or KTN (Kenya Television Network).  With a cup of tea 
double the price of the tea sold at a street-side café, this was one of several meeting spots for 
well-off Somali patrons who, despite their greater financial and social capital, still patronized 
Eastleigh businesses, and often lived in Eastleigh—the center of Somali life in Nairobi.   
Despite the price of tea, with a designated space for women (and mixed gender) patrons, 
Moha considered this a safe and appropriate venue for our meetings.  He believed that a more 
diverse, international crowd that included visiting diasporans, would be less perplexed by or 
suspicious of the two of us.  At times, we chatted with women in cascading, glittering abaya and 
headscarves, their faces made up and hands covered in intricate henna in honor of their travel, or 
a wedding, visiting from Norway or Sweden.  Once Moha laughed as he overheard a mother 
speaking to her daughter who replied in Somali with a marked American accent and was clearly, 
according to Moha, half-white, and shocked by her new surroundings.  These were patrons for 
whom I would be slightly less of a spectacle, and who occasionally overheard Moha and me 
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talking and would strike up a conversation about who I was and what I was doing.  Frequenting 
Sultan Restaurant a couple of times a week, the manager and wait staff came to know us well, 
and greeted us warmly, if bemusedly.  The frequency of our patronage, our friendly dispositions, 
and my little notebooks filled with simple Somali sentences seemed to calm initial anxieties 
about who I was and what we were doing—anxieties the manager had initially expressed to 
Moha.  “Student,” I learned, was a safe and legible identity to nearly everyone I encountered. 
   When I arrived at Sultan the day I was to meet with Saiid, Moha was not there yet, so I 
sat by an open window letting in an afternoon breeze.  September—springtime in Nairobi; the 
clouds and chilly mornings of Nairobi’s winter behind us.  From the second-story restaurant, I 
watched men entering the large mosque across the street for afternoon prayers, Kenyan taxi 
drivers leaning against their cabs, covered women inspecting brightly colored cotton diirac (a 
loose-fitting dress) on tables where they were neatly displayed for sale, and a constant flow of 
vehicle and pedestrian traffic crisscrossing a main road leading to First Avenue, the central artery 
of Eastleigh and a major commercial district.  Moha arrived tired, having spent the morning with 
a relative at the Swedish Embassy.  Saiid, who I was meeting for the first time, accompanied 
him.  
Saiid seemed undisturbed by talking to me, seemingly without any of the anxieties that 
people sometimes had when first meeting me, nor with any of the performative styles that I saw 
in some people accustomed to narrating their experiences for the evaluation of bureaucrats.  
Saiid seemed trusting, and perhaps socially unaware.  He corrected my pronunciation of his 
name without any of the softening techniques that people usually employ to avoid embarrassing 
someone; later, he texted me asking for money in a way that was peculiar by community 
standards.   
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I also found that in the months following the Operation, I was positioned differently: Not 
just a person digging for people’s intimate secrets regarding the highly fraught resettlement 
process, but I was also a foreign researcher digging into stories of abuse of refugees by the 
Kenyan government, and neglect by the international bodies trusted with their protection.  Some 
people suddenly wanted to tell me their stories and, while desire to share resettlement 
experiences often came with a request for my assistance with their cases, these narratives came 
with expectations that fit a shared understanding of my work and position—that I could make 
stories of injustice known to a wider, international audience.    
Saiid was prepared to go to the Canadian Embassy the same day as Moha for his final 
security interview.  The night before, he was at home in Eastleigh where he lived with his 
brother when the police arrived at the door—a routine element of the nightly terror of the 
Operation.  They demanded identification, and when he showed them his alien card, he was 
taken to the police station.  The alien card no longer “worked” to legitimize his right to be in 
Nairobi; instead, it now incriminated him.  The very same card that he and Moha needed in order 
to be issued an exit permit by Kenyan Immigration to leave the country also exposed them as 
unlawful residents in the eyes of police and military.  The card was still legitimate and required 
by one government agency—Immigration—but illegitimate for the purpose of residing in the 
city, according to the Ministry of the Interior that oversaw the Operation.   
Saiid and his brother didn’t have money to pay off the police—a common practice.  
Slipping the police some money in your apartment could save you from being taken to the police 
station, where you would pay a much higher sum, or be interned and then deported to the camps, 
or to Somalia if you had no documentation at all.  Unable, and also unwilling, Saiid told me, to 
pay a bribe, the two young men were taken to the local police station in Pangani, where Saiid, 
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naively perhaps, tried to reason with the police, showing them his appointment letter for the next 
day.  Calling the Canadian Embassy later on, he was told that there was nothing they could do, 
and that he would be given another appointment once he was able to move freely again.   
Saiid had come to Kenya five years prior, and had stayed in Wajir for much of that 
time—an ethnically Somali city just across the border.  He did not possess the same level of 
social connections and street savvy—the Nairobi cultural and Swahili language acumen—that 
allowed young men like Moha to navigate the Operation.  Unlike Moha, who had gone to high 
school in Nairobi, Saiid had come to Nairobi only when his cousin began the sponsorship 
process a couple of years prior.  Now Saiid described with amazement and disgust his sleepless 
night in a cell at the infamous Pangani Police Station, which was flooded with sewage and feces.  
The next day, he and his brother were taken to Kasarani Stadium—a massive sports arena that 
had been turned into a place of internment and vetting of suspected terrorists/ illegal refugees.  
There, Saiid refused to eat, imagining that the food could be poisoned.   
“Why did you think that?” I asked.  
“If people arrest you without any cause, can you eat the food they give you?” he replied, 
incredulous.  Saiid and his brother were transferred to Industrial Area Prison, moved back to 
Kasarani two days later, and from there taken to Hagadeira, one of the Dadaab camps a day’s 
travel away.  
Arriving in Hagadeira, Saiid explained, UNHCR was registering the new arrivals coming 
off trucks from Nairobi.  But Saiid refused to register, fearing that if he took a ration card that 
entitled him to food and a blanket, he would be stuck there.  Expressing the uncertainty about the 
meanings and effects of bureaucratic practices, and the ambiguity of the many governing 
structures to which he is subject, Saiid said, “I didn’t want to take any of the rations because I am 
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registered in Nairobi.  Can I be registered twice?  Isn’t it one organization?”  Fearing that 
registering and accepting aid would obligate him to stay, or make it impossible to leave, he 
instead shared the food of relatives who lived in the camp.  Saiid approached UNHCR to ask for 
help.  “If you give me a paper to go back to Nairobi that will be good, but if you can’t, what can I 
do?” he asked them.  “We can’t help you,” the UNHCR staff member reportedly responded, 
unable to authorize movement back to Nairobi, as it conflicted with the new policy of the 
government, under whose permission UNHCR operated.  Demoralized, the two young men 
decided to go to Dagahaley, one of the other Dadaab camps, where they had more relatives.   
When Saiid’s brother was called for his security interview a couple of months later (the 
same interview that Saiid had missed), their planning became more urgent.  Their cousin 
sponsoring their resettlement in Canada considered paying a broker to smuggle them back, but 
ultimately couldn’t afford the 40,000 shillings (nearly $400).  Finally, they went to the 
Department of Refugee Affairs office in the camp, which issued them a fourteen-day movement 
pass so that they could travel to Nairobi for the interview.  The young men traveled the 295 miles 
by bus on the long, partly unpaved, road that stretches from the dry Northeast, bypassing Somali 
villages and herds of camels, into the green, pineapple-growing town of Thika, and finally onto 
the speeding, eight-lane highway leading into Nairobi, stopping frequently to show their 
identification at the police and military checkpoints along the way.  They arrived the night before 
Saiid’s brother’s interview.  In the morning, Saiid’s brother arrived at the guarded Embassy gates 
on Limuru Road, only to be told, “Sorry, your name isn’t on the list today.”   
I asked Saiid, “When does the movement pass expire?   
“It’s already finished,” he answered.  “It expired on the 7th.  That was yesterday, right?”  
“What will you do now?” 
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“I can’t do anything.  Just waiting.  After I do the interview, I’ll go back.” 
“How will you travel back?  Will you have to get a new document?” 
“I’ll have to go to the DRA office to get another paper.” 
The Canadian Embassy apologized for the wait, and told the two young men they were 
still in line for an interview.  When I checked in with Saiid months and even a year later, he was 
still in Nairobi waiting.   
These two stories illustrate the uncertainty of the resettlement process in relation to 
unsynchronized institutions.  As I will continue to show, the two young men’s experiences are 
structured by competing claims of humanitarianism and national security—securing refugees and 
securing borders.  The role of national security on the part of countries such as the United States 
will become even more apparent in the following chapters.  Arrested in places where one has 
suddenly been deemed “illegal,” holding documents whose meanings change overnight, relying 
on institutions such as foreign embassies and the UN that have limited authority, and caught 
between governing bodies whose purposes are at odds.  Moha cannot move freely with his 
government–issued ID, but is required to hold it by virtue of his new relationship with the 
Canadian government, as Kenyan Immigration deems it valid and necessary.  Saiid is caught in 
the government’s relocation directive at the very moment he is summoned by the government of 
Canada.  Since he is not a Canadian resident yet, the Canadian Embassy has no power to override 
the Kenyan Directive; nor does the UN, the other institution to which he is subject as a registered 
refugee.  This leaves Saiid in limbo – stuck in Dadaab for months – trying to work it out on his 
own, then stuck in Nairobi with no recognized documents while waiting for the Embassy to call 
him.   
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Conclusion 
 
 In the wake of Operation Usalama Watch, some Somalis described money as their 
government or, as “H” says in the excerpts from my field notes with which I open this chapter, 
“Nowadays, rights are based on money.”  I have argued elsewhere that in making such claims, 
Somalis both named and critiqued a system of citizenship-based rights from which they are 
excluded, as well as the possibilities for claiming rights (such as the freedom of movement or 
urban residence) that only money could secure for them (Balakian 2016).  In this chapter, money 
plays an ever-present, if supporting role.  Money often enables people to manage the cracks in 
the patchwork governance of non-citizenship—as when “A’s cousin,” also described in my field 
notes, plans to pay 12,000 shillings, close to $120, to get her “good conduct” report from the 
Kenyan police that she needs to obtain her Australian visa.  Or, when Moha uses his connections 
to buy his government document, which he could not obtain through official channels.   
 Writing about humanitarian aid and Somalis in Kenya in the late 1990s, Jennifer 
Hyndman highlighted “the politics of mobility” that structure the immobility of refugees on one 
hand, and cross-border flows of European capital that aids them.  She writes, “borders are more 
porous to humanitarian aid flowing from Europe to Africa than to the displaced people for whom 
such aid is intended” (1997:173).  Writing about the same context nearly two decades later, my 
research demonstrates ways in which refugees have strategically used money to maneuver the 
cracks of unsynchronized governing regimes, as well as social capital that at times emanates 
from the non-governmental organizations set up to aid refugees—as, for example, when Moha 
capitalized on Amina’s connections through her previous work at UNHCR.   
If corruption exposes a lack of legitimacy of official institutions, (some) refugees’ use of 
money to maneuver bureaucratic impasses speaks to the partial legitimacy of the patchwork of 
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institutions to which they are subject, and the ambiguity and uncertainty of the documents that 
signify their power, and its limits.  The government “alien card” has power to grant access 
through Kenyan immigration, but not the police and internal security ministry.  The UNHCR 
document holds power with NGOs and foreign governments, but not with the Kenyan security 
apparatus.  An official letter from the US government granting resettlement could grant access 
across US borders, but alone does nothing to enable exit from Kenya.  This plurality and 
partiality is often navigated illegally using other papers—money.  Nonetheless, the two young 
men’s stories demonstrate the ways in which being subject to multiple institutions, but citizen of 
none, engenders experiences of being stuck between different instiutional agendas and systems 
of recognition.  In the following chapter, can I move from the large-scale level of intersecting 
institutions to the level of the dominant ideologies that structure their practices.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Fraud and Corruption:  
Discourses of Mutual Mistrust and the Politics of Proof 
 
 
“When only the absolutely innocent elicit care, giving, and empathy—and Malkki shows that 
such figures are exceptional—our solidarity and ability to create lasting peace remains dependent 
on a mirage and thus easily thwarted.” 
 
- Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin, In the Name of Humanity: The Government of  
Threat and Care  
 
 
“[T]he whole structure of the humanitarian regime is predicated on the exercise of a type of 
authority, which is itself maintained and legitimized by the absence of trust between the givers 
and the recipients….  There is no locus for nurturing ‘trust.’”  
 
- Eftihia Voutira and Barbara Harrell-Bond, In Search of the Locus of Trust: The Social 
World of the Refugee Camp  
 
 
 I am sitting with Asma and her mother, Halima, in their apartment on the third floor of a 
building in Eastleigh that overlooks a large mosque.  Halima is the head of a household that 
includes her own seven children; Asma, who is actually her much-younger half-sister from their 
father; a nephew; and two grandchildren.  Everyone calls her hooyo—mom.  Asma’s mother runs 
a tight ship, struggling to keep the family of twelve fed, clothed, schooled, and out of trouble.  
She has been trying to get her family resettled abroad through the UNHCR resettlement process 
for many years, and recently moved them to Nairobi from another city so that they could be in 
close proximity to the UNHCR offices.   
Asma tells me, “We went [to UNHCR] twice last week, and twice the week before.  So 
when we got there on Friday, I called and I reached someone who knows us, and knows our case.  
So I told him, ‘I’m here outside, can you meet us to speak to us?’  He said, ‘Sure, no problem, I 
know you, I know you by face, I’m coming in ten minutes.’  But we waited for three hours!  
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Until ten, when they closed the doors and everyone had gone.  When I called again it was 
someone else on the phone.  They said they can’t connect us back to the same person. We send 
an SMS [text message] every night, but they never reply, we don’t even know where that SMS 
goes.” 
Asma’s mother says that she thinks someone has stolen their case. 
“How would we know if they had?” I ask. 
“You put your fingerprints [on the fingerprint scanner],” Asma says.  “Then they see. 
‘We thought you had already gone.  Why are you still here?’  That happened to someone we 
know.  The woman went through the doors [of UNHCR] by force.  And when they looked up her 
case they saw that someone else had gone in her place.  They said, ‘Didn’t you already go to 
Canada?’” 
The term “fraud” in refugee aid and resettlement indexes a broad range of activities and 
behaviors that often (though not always) refer to refugees’ attempts to make systems work for 
them—a strategy that is often deemed in and of itself antithetical to a “good refugee”—one who 
is deserving of aid, waiting patiently to be identified and rescued.  If government and non-
governmental officials are centrally concerned with fraud, as I will show, refugees share a 
mutual feeling of mistrust in the system—a mistrust that Asma and her mother, Halima, evinced 
when they described their fears that their case had been sold to someone else.  As stateless 
“clients” of various institutions, however, refugees in Nairobi have little leverage with which to 
hold organizations accountable and make demands that promoted their wellbeing or rights.  
Mutual mistrust invited the very actions that institutions deemed “fraudulent.”  Understanding 
the system to be arbitrary at best and corrupt at worst, refugees often saw little benefit to 
following rules to the letter, nor were they always certain which information in circulation was 
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official or served their best interests.  In this sense, I discuss “fraud” as a term that refers to a 
diverse set of practices, some of which are produced by this system and its inherent, mutual 
mistrust. Put a different way, the resettlement system itself produces the conditions for so-called 
fraudulent practices.   
Anthropological literature on asylum and refugees over the past decade has 
ethnographically and theoretically charted the epistemological and political bases of granting 
refugee status and aid by international agencies and global North governments (Cabot 2014; 
Coutin 2001; Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; Fassin 2011; Feldman 2007; Kobelinsky 2015; Ticktin 
2008, 2011; Sandvik 2011).  Studying courts (Coutin 2001), the UNHCR (Sandvik 2011; 
Thomson 2012), humanitarian charities or non-governmental organizations (Cabot 2014; 
Feldman 2007), and the use of expert knowledge (Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; Fassin 2011; Good 
2008; Ticktin 2011), these anthropologists have demonstrated the power of these institutions and 
their representatives to define who is worthy of humanitarian sympathy and aid (see also 
Redfield 2011), who can and cannot cross borders, and on what ideological and political 
grounds.   
Implicitly or explicitly, these scholars have demonstrated that refugees seeking asylum 
and assistance are never taken at their word.  The interest in the epistemological underpinnings 
of humanitarian and asylum work ultimately stems from the understanding that asylum seekers 
and refugees seeking aid always carry a heavy burden of proof.  In this chapter, I contribute to 
this body of work in two ways.  First, I highlight the ways in which officials’ perceptions of 
refugees’ intent to access asylum and resettlement makes them inherently suspect.  In doing so, I 
argue that the cultural schemas that produce the notion of a “good” and “bad” refugee work to 
disable refugees from being active participants in this system.   
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Second, I turn to the narratives of refugees themselves.  The research for this dissertation 
has spanned two “spaces”—the space of refugee communities, and the space of international 
humanitarian work—in order to chart the interactions between these two sets of actors 
(themselves diverse, and sometimes overlapping).  Bridging these arenas, I examine what, 
together, they reveal about the governance of populations that have fled across international 
borders.  While much of the scholarship on asylum has focused primarily on the assessing 
institutions, by turning to refugees’ experiences and counter-narratives, I argue that “fraud” 
emerges from the very structures of refugee resettlement, including the mutual mistrust that is a 
categorical characteristic of the resettlement system, and of humanitarian aid more broadly 
(Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1995).  “Fraud,” then, represents a focal point through which 
refugees’ and humanitarian agencies’ conflicting claims can be traced—through which refugees 
claim their deservingness and that of others’ in their circles of social and moral obligation, and 
agencies narrow the definition of the deserving, including around family relations.   
 
Eligibility, Vulnerability, and the One Percent  
 
Globally, less than 1 percent of refugees will be resettled from a country of asylum in the 
global South to a country in the global North that will grant them a path to citizenship.  But the 
tiny number of resettlement slots may obscure the ways in which resettlement opportunities loom 
in the cultural landscapes of refugee communities.  In East Africa, resettlement is part of a 
collective fantasy, and a major force in many refugees’ orientations towards their futures and the 
ways in which they imagine the world.  In her important work based on research in Kenya’s 
Dadaab camps, Cindy Horst writes about buufis—a condition of longing and desire for 
resettlement that may become “madness” “when the dream of going overseas is shattered” (Horst 
2006:144).  Horst argues that buufis—a Somali term that emerged in the Dadaab camps in the 
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1990s, and that is now part of mainstream vocabulary throughout the Somali diaspora—must be 
understood in a longer history of Somali migration and nomadic tradition.  Extending this 
argument, I consider buufis and the dreams of resettlement in many refugee communities to be 
part and parcel of the resettlement system itself.  
UNHCR, relevant NGOs, and host governments have discrete eligibility criteria for 
resettlement.  Moreover, each resettlement country has its own, continually shifting priorities 
based on political, security, and humanitarian developments globally, which determine the 
nationalities and ethnicities of the refugees that countries will accept, as well as other social 
identities such as gender, age, marital and family status, health, and education, among others.20  
For example, during my research, as of 2014, the US was the only country accepting Somali 
cases from Kenya.  In 2012, the US government also announced an initiative to resettle 50,000 
Congolese refugees between 2013 and 2018.  By contrast, in previous periods, the US had 
focused on particular minority communities from Somalia, while Congolese were not part of 
resettlement quotas and initiatives at all.  And most recently, two 2017 Executive Orders by 
President Trump attempting to temporarily halt refugee resettlement to the U.S., and (in the first 
order) permanently halt resettlement from Syria.21   
UNHCR, on the other hand, has a stable set of broad categories for resettlement 
priorities, but must use these categories strategically in relation to the admission numbers, 
priorities, and restrictions of resettlement countries.  Because the US resettles the largest number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For an in-depth discussion of some of these categories in the asylum process in France (France 
does not participate in third country refugee resettlement,) see Ticktin, 2011. 
 21	  At the time of writing, it is unclear if the Executive Order will be implemented due to pending 
legal challenges. The first order also included a temporary halt on all travel from seven, Muslim-
majority countries: Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The second removed 
Iraq.   
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of refugees—more than every other country combined—the US resettlement criteria and 
restrictions figure centrally in UNHCR’s selections for resettlement.  UNHCR’s submission 
categories include legal and/or physical protection needs in the country of refuge; experiences of 
torture and/or violence; medical needs requiring life-saving treatment unavailable in the country 
of first asylum; gender-based protection issues (focused on women and girls); family 
reunification; children and adolescents at risk; and “lack of foreseeable alternative durable 
solutions”—a broad category that, in theory, includes many refugees, particularly those in a 
protracted refugee situation, but which necessarily is used strategically and discriminatingly 
(UNHCR 2011:243-87).  Non-governmental organizations, too, have particular priorities they 
seek to advance based on their institutional histories, donor interests, and their identification of 
needs, while also working with host government policies and regulations.  
It may be worth emphasizing, especially for readers more familiar with asylum 
procedures in North America and Europe, that asylum/refugee status and third country 
resettlement are distinct processes.  Somalis are granted prima facie refugee status in Kenya, 
meaning that they are automatically granted asylum in Kenya on the basis of conditions in their 
country of origins.  Asylum seekers from other countries must prove, on an individual basis, that 
they have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and, “owing to such fear,” cannot 
return to the country of their nationality (UNHCR).  Asylum seekers in Kenya go through an 
interview to determine whether or not they merit refugee status.  Unlike in the United States and 
European countries, rates of granting asylum are fairly high.  But among over half a million 
recognized refugees in Kenya, very few are granted third country resettlement, as I have noted.  
We can think of this as a two-tiered system.  Many people are granted asylum, or refugee status, 
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in Kenya, but only a select few of these will be identified as appropriate candidates to be 
resettled to a third country.22  
“Vulnerability” is a key term in defining the appropriate subjects for resettlement, and 
refugees must narrate and perform an authentic presentation of vulnerability to be taken seriously 
as a candidate for resettlement. At one NGO in Nairobi where I interviewed several staff 
members, “most vulnerable” was a term that the organization frequently used to describe their 
clients. While staff members also expressed the unresolved challenge of how one locates “the 
most vulnerable,” this was a critical category to the identity and mission of the organization.  
Len, the director of the NGO, told me,  “If you can make it all the way here [to the office], 
you’re not the most vulnerable.”  Instead, he explained, he and his staff were looking for people 
who could not make it to the office—this was part of the conundrum of their mission.  He 
explained: 
Who are the walk-ins?  Typically, they’re the young males.  Because they’re most able to 
seek assistance, and move around safely.  Or, typically were able to get a couple days of 
work and could afford the matatu [micro bus] to come here.  Therefore, they’re also best 
suited to become self-sufficient.  We want to find the single mom who can’t afford to 
take herself and the three small kids on the matatu, doesn’t have the time to walk across 
town because she’s too busy trying to survive….  Often the refugees who get the services 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Unlike in the United States, where many people are denied refugee status because they are 
deemed “economic migrants” as opposed to victims of political persecution, asylum seekers in 
Kenya may be denied for other types of reasons.  For example, they may be judged to have 
perpetrated violence or participated in or supported a militant group.  Their interviewer may 
deny their claim about being unable to return to their home country on the basis of current events 
there and how those events are affecting people of their particular ethnic or religious identity.  
Often, the precise reason for which they are denied is not made explicit.  As I will explain 
further, inconsistencies in their interviews, or information that is deemed not credible, are often 
used to deny refugee status without further elaboration about why these inconsistent or non-
credible statements are evidence that the individual does not merit refugee status.   
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are the noisy ones.  And that’s a valid survival technique.  But, we don’t want those 
ones….  As a survival technique, refugees will present themselves in the most 
advantageous way they perceive possible….  Six or seven years ago, every Somali was 
from a minority clan….  [Everyone had] disappearing husbands.  Because everyone 
thinks single moms will get in. 
There is a circular logic in Len’s statement that reveals one of the central predicaments in this 
work.  He expresses both that his organization wants to find single mothers, but also that 
refugees know their preference, and thus may attempt to pose as single mothers.  Specific criteria 
produce refugees’ need to present themselves, as Len said, “in the most advantageous way they 
perceive possible” (see also Knudsen 1995).23  
 Len later commented,  
So, how to get access to our systems?  If I was to put myself in the shoes of a refugee, I 
would not be very impressed with the refugee agencies.  Because, we’re arbitrary, we are 
not clear and transparent – deliberately – we are probably often rude, partly because 
people keep pushing and pushing, and the squeaky wheel sometimes has to be told to 
butter off.  Because being polite won’t get them to move.   
Len was communicating, at one level, that the way agencies operate is for the greater good of the 
system, and therefore for refugees more broadly.  But in saying that “we’re arbitrary, we are not 
clear and transparent—deliberately,” Len confirmed my growing awareness during my fieldwork 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “Vulnerability” is not about deserving resettlement based on past suffering.  Rather, in line 
with UNHCR’s notion of “durable solutions,” “vulnerability” has a future orientation and 
temporality.  It is a state of being at-risk for negative potential outcomes based on a current 
condition, rather than the present state in itself.  Resettlement is framed as an action that will 
alleviate the risk.  There is a utilitarian logic at work: the elderly man with a terminal illness is 
unlikely to be resettled, while a young person with an ailment theoretically treatable in another 
country with a different medical system is a good candidate for resettlement. 
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that the policies of UNHCR, various NGOs, and resettlement governments, were designed to 
maintain exclusive control over information, and keep refugees in the dark about their systems.  
This was largely for anti-fraud purposes, understanding that, as Len articulated numerous times, 
the more the agencies could control who was accessing the process and information about how 
the process worked, the less criminal, dishonest, or simply non-priority refugees would find ways 
to access the system.   
As David Martin writes in a comprehensive report on the US resettlement program, 
several of the government employees he interviewed “emphasized the need for…a ‘stealth’ 
approach to resettlement,” in which individuals are identified for resettlement prior to any 
mention of a resettlement program (Martin 2005: 6).  In Kenya, resettlement has been ongoing 
since the early 1990s at the start of Somalia’s crisis, so a “stealth approach” is not possible.  But 
the same idea underlies the restricted access to official spaces and information, as well as the 
cumbersome methods for refugees to communicate with organizations.  The less refugees know 
about how the system works, so the logic goes, the less they can “work” the system.  From a 
different standpoint, we could say that the less they know about the system, the less capable they 
are of advocating for themselves and actively asserting claims.     
In the context of the scarcity of resettlement opportunities globally, and organizations’ 
attempts to control the way resettlement is allocated through specific, yet shifting and often 
ambiguous criteria, fraud and identifying fraud become a central activity for refugee aid 
agencies.  Agencies fear that refugees will learn resettlement priorities and present themselves in 
advantageous ways, thus disrupting a supposedly systematic identification of the “most 
vulnerable” refugees.  As one UNHCR caseworker, Justine, put it, “Sometimes I wonder if it just 
nullifies everything we’re doing.  Are we just putting people in these situations, forcing them to 
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lie, and then sending them off?”  Len told me that his NGO once resettled seventy young men, 
“and made a big noise about it,” in hopes of garnering more truthful applicants and testimonies 
after confusing people’s ideas about resettlement priorities.  Resettlement workers told me that 
they struggled not only with refugees who did not fit into resettlement categories and presented 
themselves as such, but also with refugees who may have qualified for resettlement but who told 
“camp stories”—stories known in refugee communities to have been effective in garnering 
attention and sympathy—instead of discussing their actual experiences that they may not have 
realized would demonstrate their vulnerability.  As Justine said, “I always begin my interviews 
by telling people, ‘Tell me the truth,’ but what they hear from other people weighs more heavily 
on them than what I tell them.”   
 
Fraud and the Bad Refugee  
On the walls of UNHCR and NGO offices in Nairobi, posters created by UNHCR depict 
fraud and corruption scenarios in a variety of languages—English, Swahili, Somali, Amharic, 
Kinyarwanda—the primary languages spoken by refugees living in Kenya.  The posters hang in 
waiting areas, where refugees have plenty of time to study their messages.  Cartoons depict 
refugees being tempted by misleading “brokers” offering opportunities to gain access to 
resettlement or hasten their cases by misconstruing the status of their families or their particular 
claims to resettlement priorities.  The cartoons show some refugees making “good” decisions—
presenting truthful information despite rumors or advice that tempted them to do otherwise.  
These characters have good outcomes: for example, a UN official notifies the “good refugee” 
that his family has been accepted for resettlement.  Other cartoons show refugees taking the 
advice of dubious characters and lying to officials.  The last frames of one such cartoon depicts 
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the main character demoralized, head hanging low, his plans thwarted by angry-looking officials.  
“Ukweli hauna mwanandani,” reads a slogan at the bottom of these posters, a Swahili proverb 
meaning “The truth has no grave”—or perhaps more idiomatically, “You cannot bury the 
truth”—a particularly grim way of impressing the importance of truth telling.    
The “bad refugee” and the “good refugee” are concepts that have been used by several 
scholars in refugee studies (Espiritu 2006; Sandvik 2011; Tang 2015).  For example, in her 
ethnographic work on UNHCR in Uganda, Kristin Sandvik uses the term “bad refugees” to point 
to what she calls “a particular form of bureaucratic memory” in which UNHCR staff members 
label certain refugees “unruly or disobedient” and ultimately blacklist them from getting 
assistance.  Association with such clients by other refugees, she writes, “implied impurity—
specifically, lack of credibility—by association.”  Writing about Vietnamese refugees and US 
justifications for the Vietnam War, Yen Le Espiritu describes Cold War geopolitical imperatives 
and narratives of American exceptionalism that made the Vietnamese “good refugees,” as 
humanitarian objects of rescue from a so-called just war (Espiritu 2006; see also Tang 2015:5).   
In this chapter, I use the term “bad refugee” in ways that are related to Sandvik’s.  Many 
of my interlocutors were doubly “bad refugees”—both in the sense that they did not support a 
geopolitical agenda (and those who were Muslim provoked US anxieties about homeland 
security), and were deemed “unruly” in the specific sense of being seen as dishonest—frauds.24 
Fraud is a central category around which policy-making, official discourse, worry, and 
everyday talk in the refugee aid and resettlement world operate.  UNHCR defines “fraud” in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots 
of Terror (2004) for a discussion about the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate allegiance 
to “the West” held by Muslims in the United States after 9/11, and the ways in which that burden 
of proof was structured around the moralizing labels of “good Muslim” and “bad Muslim.”  	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general as “the misrepresentation of fact for personal gain” (UNHCR 2011:128), and 
“resettlement fraud” in particular as:  
the intentional misrepresentation or concealment of facts or evidence material to  
the resettlement process with the intent of obtaining a resettlement or other benefit  
for the refugee concerned or for another individual who otherwise would not be  
entitled to be resettled or to obtain such a benefit (UNHCR 2011:128).  
In the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, a 428-page guide for UNHCR staff, as well as a 
reference for resettlement countries and NGOs, the word “fraud” appears on 77 pages, a total of 
264 times.  The Handbook lists three major types of resettlement fraud: Internal (perpetrated by 
someone inside UNHCR); external (perpetrated by someone outside of UNHCR, including 
refugees); and “mixed or complex fraud” (perpetrated by the collusion of people internal and 
external to UNHCR).  Within “external” fraud, which primarily focuses on fraud perpetrated by 
refugees themselves, UNHCR names five sub-types: identity fraud, family composition fraud, 
document fraud, material misrepresentation fraud (including “omission” and “commission”), and 
bribery (129-30).  This substantial taxonomy of fraud in and of itself points to the concept’s 
centrality to the way UNHCR defines itself and its work (see also Sandvik 2011, Thomson 
2012).    
For governments such as the US, fraud prevention is similarly critical to refugee 
resettlement work.  As described in the previous chapter, the US Refugee Admissions Program is 
orchestrated by three government agencies: Health and Human Services, the Department of 
State, and the Department of Homeland Security which replaced Immigration and Naturalization 
Services after 9/11.  Each agency plays a different role in the larger refugee resettlement process. 
While the State Department, for example, articulates resettlement as reflecting the country’s 
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“highest values and aspirations to compassion, generosity and leadership” (US Department of 
State 2016), national security has a central role in structuring the ways in which both the State 
Department and Homeland Security manage the vetting or screening of refugees.  Naming and 
identifying fraud has had major implications for the US resettlement program, including the 2008 
suspension of its Family Reunification Program (one part of the US Refugee Admissions 
Program), which I discuss at greater length in Chapter 4.  
What are the meanings of the term “fraud” in this context, and what kinds of work does it 
perform?  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of fraud’s common definitions refers 
to “criminal deception.”  Unlike “lying,” “trickery,” “imitation,” or “passing,” which have social 
and moral connotations, but not a legal one, the term “fraud” suggests that resettlement is an 
official and legal process, in contrast to the ambiguous status of international law and its 
enforcement (Merry 2006).  As a category, fraud helps produce official and purportedly 
systematic responses to behaviors and activities that confound these agencies’ abilities to carry 
out their goals of identifying the most authentically and verifiably vulnerable refugees.    
More centrally, discourses of fraud and anti-fraud practices frame the refugee as always 
potentially both victim and criminal (Daniel and Knudsen 1995).  This two-sided figure, which 
also appears in contemporary public discourses, highlights the competing claims of security 
initiatives that aim to protect national borders and humanitarian procedures on one hand, and 
humanitarian imperatives to protect refugees on the other.  The attention to fraud within refugee 
aid processes evinces the idea that lying (which is intrinsic to fraud) not only uncovers someone 
who is either ineligible as a refugee, or not exceptionally vulnerable among refugees, it also 
reveals a bad character.  While US policy distinguishes between material and immaterial 
inconsistencies—those that fundamentally change the nature and merit of one’s claim versus 
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those that do not—officials I spoke to also mentioned a more general concern: “If you lied about 
this, what else are you lying about?”  Lies unveil something that the officers must try to 
uncover—not only: Does this person have a credible claim? but also, Is this a good or a bad 
person?  Will this person ultimately become a decent, law-abiding citizen of the United States, or 
a resident who is a potential threat to our society and security?  
A fraud maintains an outer image over an inner reality that is hidden from view (Nelson 
2001).  Fraud indexes anxieties about the slippery nature of refugees’ identities, the possibility 
for unworthy individuals to take advantage of a humanitarian program, and the ability for war 
criminals and terrorists to obtain and use a refugee identity to cross borders, shirk justice, and 
perpetrate violence against countries in the global North.  While the refugee as suspect or fake, 
and the potential for refugees to dupe humanitarians, have been part of anthropological 
scholarship on refugees since some of the earliest work on the subject (Daniel and Knudsen 
1995; Malkki 1996), this idea has gained more public visibility in light of the Syrian refugee 
situation, the 2015 attacks in Paris that stoked fears about refugees, the large influx of Middle 
Eastern and African refugees in Europe, and a simultaneous rise in Central Americans crossing 
the US-Mexico border.  These events have been employed by conservative politicians and 
publics in their increasing scrutiny of the US refugee program, most dramatically in the 2017 
Trump Executive Orders on refugees and immigrants from several Muslim-majority countries.  
The kinds of border crossers that governments count as refugees is a contested social and 
political question.  But even for those ethnic or national groups deemed to warrant refugee status 
in general, how governments and non-governmental institutions define individuals as worthy of 
third country resettlement remains yet another question.  Assessing refugees stretches the human 
imagination to consider the possibility of victim and perpetrator in a single person—the 
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possibility of both the most and least morally deserving recipient of help and trust—a potential 
both symbolized and inscribed by the term fraud and its attendant practices.  
 
Refugees, Evidence, and the Problem of Intention 
Several scholars writing on refugees and asylum seekers have noted the ways in which 
stereotypes of authenticity or legitimacy are read through comportment or appearance.  Heath 
Cabot calls this “the social aesthetics of eligibility” in granting asylum (2013, 2014).  Kristen 
Sandvik describes “appropriate standards of behavior,” “appropriate demeanor,” “appearance” of 
refugees, as well as the “personal preferences” of resettlement officers (Sandvik 2011: 21).  Liisa 
Malkki discusses “elaborate normative expectations and definitions of ‘the refugee’…in the 
shadow of the law” (Malkki 1996: 378).  Didier Fassin argues that, in France, the high numbers 
of asylum applicants vs. the low rate of granting refugee status in a country that identifies itself 
as “the cradle of human rights,” “had been resolved ideologically by increasingly discrediting the 
word of asylum seekers so as to justify the progressive reduction in the rate of acceptance of 
their request” (Fassin 2011:109-10).  In this context, judgments privilege expert medical 
evidence as opposed to asylum seeker’ testimonies.  In other words, these scholars have pointed 
out that official assessments of refugees and asylum seekers often involve sentiments and 
stereotypes that have little to do with legal categories or evidence, or employ experts to discern 
the truth in ways that allow officials to dismiss of the overwhelming majority of cases.  
Likewise, amidst the necessary arbitrariness of identifying for resettlement a tiny minority of 
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refugees living in places such as Kenya, these “social aesthetics,” in Cabot’s terms, produce 
mechanisms for making decisions that suit particular moral and epistemological scripts.25  
Len told me several stories that illuminated the nature of institutions’ and bureaucrats’ 
mistrust of refugees, and a particular moral epistemology.  For example, he narrated a story of 
working on resettlement cases of Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire during his tenure working 
for the US government.  He had had ten cases, comprised of what he called, “a noisy group of 
people.” On the day of handing out the decision letters, he saw a noisy crowd appear at the gate 
of his office building, which was guarded by an Ivoirian police officer.  The letters were 
distributed, but Len had stayed clear, knowing that all but two were rejection letters.  As it 
happened, the two who had been accepted for resettlement had not shown up that morning.  As 
he finished his business in the office for the day, there was a knock on the door.  The police 
officer informed him that the final two applicants had arrived.  To the policeman’s shock, Len 
himself went out to the gate to distribute the letters.  “The two quiet ones who weren’t like all the 
rest were the two that were approved.  So often the refugees who get services are the noisy ones.  
And that’s a valid survival technique.  But, we don’t want those ones,” he concluded, now 
referring to the strategy of the NGO where he currently worked. 
During the course of my fieldwork, the majority of refugees I knew were not in immanent 
danger.  They were in precarious situations lacking citizenship and stable documentation, living 
with financial uncertainty, physical and mental health conditions, and subject to hostile policies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In a large study of the United States asylum process titled “Refugee Roulette,” legal scholars 
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag demonstrate the major inconsistencies of how asylum is 
allocated, and the arbitrariness of the asylum process in the US (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2012).  
While no similar study has been conducted on refugee resettlement conducted from a country of 
first asylum, such as Kenya, as opposed to the asylum process that is conducted in the United 
States, I would venture that the refugee resettlement process—because of the even larger number 
of resettlement candidates—is similarly inconsistent and arbitrary.   
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by the Kenyan government.  However, I knew a handful of people who fit into a different 
category, and who reported facing immediate danger.  In more than one case, they were 
Banyamulenge Congolese men who had been forcibly recruited by the Rwandan-backed rebel 
group, M23, and who reported being in danger of being tracked by Rwandan agents.  One such 
young man, Patrick, had fled to Nairobi, where he had located his cousin, Innocent, who had a 
wife and young children.  Patrick and Innocent began receiving threats and went into hiding.  
They approached several human rights NGOs; I was surprised one day when I received a phone 
call about them from an anthropologist friend conducting research in Mombasa, who had met 
them at the human rights organization where she was doing fieldwork.  
I had met Patrick and Innocent on several occasions, first through Innocent’s relatives 
whom I had gotten to know through my research.  Innocent first confided his story to my 
research assistant and friend, André, and after some weeks of receiving updates, including 
hearing from my friend in Mombasa, I decided to contact Len.  I was always hesitant to advocate 
for specific refugees to any of the organizations at which I had contacts.  More frequently, I 
accompanied people to places where they could be assessed through the standard channels.  The 
couple of times that I had reached out to Len or any of his staff members, I learned quickly that 
they had very specific criteria and policies, and that they often had their own information about 
people and cases that I did not have.  Moreover, they made it clear that they did not think it was a 
good idea—either for my research or for their work—for someone unauthorized by their 
organization to be making any kind of referral, even informally.  Nevertheless, given the nature 
of Patrick and Innocent’s situation, I decided to give Len a call.   
Len was dismissive, suggesting that if the two young men were so bent on tracking down 
resettlement agencies, their story was probably made up, though I had told him they were 
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approaching human rights organizations, too.  He doubted that Rwandan officials would come 
after a low-level recruit.  Len, it seemed, did not want more “noisy” refugees—bad refugees—
sent in his direction.  Maybe he was right.  Perhaps his long tenure in the field told him 
something about the case that I was unable to discern.  Not jaded by nearly two decades of 
assessing cases, I was surely more trusting than he was.  Still, I thought, given the gravity of their 
claim, and the precedent for Rwandan officials to track down and even assassinate so-called 
enemies of the state, would it not be worth looking into?  In the end, the episode highlighted a 
moral script that said that pushy, noisy refugees, those who were intentionally seeking assistance, 
were often bad refugees—dishonest, and undesirable as candidates for help. 
Writing about the historical emergence of epistemological grounds for facts and evidence 
beginning in early modern Europe, historian of science Lorraine Daston writes:  
In order for facts to qualify as credible evidence, they must appear innocent of human 
intention.  Facts fabricated as evidence, that is, to make a particular point, are thereby 
disqualified as evidence.  Nature’s facts are above suspicion, because presumed free of 
any intention, but many manmade facts also qualify: the blood-stained weapon found at 
the scene of a murder counts as incriminating evidence as long as it was not planted there 
with the intention of incriminating (1991:244).  
In refugee resettlement, the relationship between credibility and intention is paramount.  The act 
of intentionally seeking resettlement (or being perceived as such) can discredit one’s claims.  
Evidence put forth explicitly to garner resettlement appears suspect.  But what is the result of a 
cultural schema that deems “noisy” refugees suspect?  This set of ideas punishes refugees who 
attempt to take an active role in this process, and who advocate for themselves, their families, 
and their claims and grievances.  The lack of communication and transparency in the refugee aid 
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and resettlement process, along with discourses and practices that punish refugees who attempt 
to actively seek out resources, including resettlement opportunities, are all part of the production 
of the conditions of many of the practices labeled “fraud” by state and non-governmental 
institutions.   
 
Responding to Fraud Accusations: Mutual Mistrust and Refugees’ Critiques 
 If agency staff who listen to refugees’ narratives are trained to suspect the validity of 
their claims, how do refugees themselves experience and respond to accusations of fraud?  Here, 
I consider the ways in which refugees level their own critiques against institutions, especially 
UNHCR.  In doing so, I describe a particular community—the Banyamulenge Congolese—that,  
along with Somalis, comprised one of the primary communities in which I conducted 
ethnographic research.  I use the story of a Munyamulenge (sing., Banyamulenge) woman who 
was denied refugee status to consider the ways in which her response to being accused of fraud 
highlights her mistrust of UNHCR.  She exemplifies some of the ways in which refugees make 
critiques of the institutions that bear similarities to those that institutions make of refugees (see 
James 2010).  
 
Good Refugees: Banyamulenge from Congo to Kenya 
 For a community of well under half a million, making up only a fraction of a percentage 
of the Congolese population (Stearns 2011:59), the Banyamulenge community has loomed large 
in the Congolese national imaginary, on the front lines of Congo’s civil and regional wars since 
the 1990s.  Scholars debate the precise origins of the community—a politicized question in 
Congo—dating the arrival of Tutsi migrants from Rwanda to the current South Kivu province  
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between the 17th (Prunier 2008:51) and 19th centuries (Stearns 2011:60).  Gerard Prunier writes 
that a large migration occurred at the end of the eighteenth century caused by Rwandan political 
tension (Prunier 2008:51), but numbers also grew over the next two centuries as other waves of 
anti-Tutsi violence occurred in Rwanda.  Because of their Rwandan origins and language, they 
were originally called simply Banyarwanda—Rwandans. After Congolese independence, they 
were barred from running for office, many were refused national identity cards, and their 
citizenship became a matter of public debate (Stearns 2011:65).  They began referring to 
themselves as “Banyamulenge”—people of Mulenge, the area where they originally settled in 
Congo, as a way of claiming their national belonging (Prunier 2008: 52).  Many of my 
conversations with older Banyamulenge men began with them narrating the community’s 
struggles in the post-independence era in the 1960s—struggles that only grew in the following 
decades.   
In the aftermath of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994, the Banyamulenge 
became embroiled in the conflict as it crashed over the border.  The community was situated in 
Congo’s growing crisis in specific ways as Congolese citizens who were identified both by other 
Congolese and by Rwandans as Tutsis of Rwandan origins.  When the Tutsi-led Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide that primarily targeted Tutsis in Rwanda, and assumed 
control of the government, well over a million Hutus fled the country to Congo—both genocide 
perpetrators and innocents.  These refugees initiated the conflict’s expansion across Rwandan 
borders into an even more complicated set of political problems (Prunier 2008:53).   
Beginning in 1996, the Rwandan Patriotic Army declared war, pursuing the genocide 
perpetrators in Congo.  In the complex intersection of Rwanda’s military motives in Congo, a 
pan-African initiative to overthrow Congo’s president Mobutu, and Congolese electoral politics, 
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the Banyamulenge became pawns with disastrous consequences.  Some Banyamulenge were 
employed by General Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), while Mobutu stoked hatred 
against them among previously anti-Mobutu neighboring communities in his bid for re-election.  
In an already highly militarized environment, violence erupted among neighboring communities 
in eastern Congo, and the Banyamulenge were told by the government to leave or be slaughtered 
(ibid.: 67-72).   
As minorities that had faced persecution in their own country based on their ethnic 
identity, the Banyamulenge were deemed good candidates for refugee status and resettlement.  
When I began my research, this was a relatively recent change, as for several years after the 
conflict in eastern Congo began, all Congolese were deemed ineligible for resettlement because 
of the relative stability of other parts of the very large country.  However, this notion had shifted 
in recent years.  Len explained that the policy change was in part for pragmatic reasons.  
Somalis, who have long comprised a major portion of the Africa caseload for the United States’ 
refugee program, were increasingly backlogged because of heightened security screening due to 
concerns about al-Shabaab.  Congolese have been deemed good candidates for resettlement not 
only because of humanitarian concerns, but also because they do not generally face the same 
security backlogs that Somalis do.  While no publicly available statistics exist on resettlement by 
ethnicity (only by nationality), Len noted that in his NGO Banyamulenge make up more of their 
Congolese clients than do other communities because they have a more pressing claim to being 
neither able to live in Kenya nor to return home.  
In 2004, Congolese rebels crossed the border into Burundi and massacred 166 
Banyamulenge refugees in the Gatumba refugee camp.  Survivors from Gatumba, and families of 
those killed, were members of the communities in which I conducted research.  While massacres 
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of civilians had become common in Congo since 1996, the Gatumba massacre held a special 
place in the historical consciousness of the Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi and around the 
world.26  In August 2014, I attended the community’s tenth annual commemoration of the event 
at a local church in Nairobi.  On the heels of Operation Usalama Watch, in which over 100 
Banyamulenge refugees had been arrested at their church and deported to the Dadaab camps—a 
rare crackdown on a non-Somali community—the Gatumba commemoration echoed the 
aftershock of that more recent event.   
In attendance at the memorial were representatives of UNHCR and the Kenyan NGO, 
Kituo cha Sheria, which had helped to finance the event.  A friend, Jacques, had met me outside, 
and once within the church, we were ushered to the front pews.  With music, survivors’ 
testimonies, and a video that had been filmed right after the massacre and showed the charred 
and bloodied remains of victims, the event seemed aimed to compel its guests, as much or more 
than to create a space of commemoration for the community.  In many remarks that were made 
throughout the day the fact that Banyamulnege had been butchered while in “the hands of the 
UN” was a recurring theme.  The memorial made a criticism of the UN and the possibility of 
trusting host governments, such as Burundi’s or Kenya’s, by recalling past suffering.  In doing 
so, this narrative also affirmed the legitimacy of the community’s refusal to go to the refugee 
camps, the impossibility of going home, and the need for resettlement in a new country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Each year since 2007, the Banyamulenge community in the US has held a memorial for 
Gatumba in a different US city.  Many of the first Banyamulenge arrivals to the US were 
Gatumba survivors.  
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Figure 7: Members of the Banyamulenge community in Nairobi leaving the 10th anniversary commemoration of the 
Gatumba massacre. August, 2014. Photo by author.  
 
Kristen Sandvik writes that Congolese refugees in Uganda were stereotyped as “wild,’ 
‘dirty,’ or ‘primitive,’” as well as “tricksters” (Sandvik 2011: 21).  In Kenya, Congolese also had 
a reputation as partyers, irresponsible, and lazy—an idea I encountered as I sought a Congolese 
research assistant early in my fieldwork.  If Congolese broadly were considered unruly and 
noisy, Banyamulenge, by contrast—women dressed elegantly in “African” vitenge clothing, 
known for a quiet and stoic character, indexing the vulnerability of Rwandan Tutsis slaughtered 
in the 1994 genocide—represented “good refugees.”  They were “good refugees” not only based 
on their minority status that made them unable to return home, and created particular 
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complications for life in Kenya; they also physically embodied the truly vulnerable refugee who 
needed help and gratefully accepted it.  
 
Fraud Accusations and Critiques of International Institutions  
I first met André—one of my research assistants—through a woman who worked at a 
refugee-serving NGO, where André had been hired as an interpreter for a short-term project.  As 
a client of the same NGO, and a fluent English, French, Kinyarwanda, and Swahili speaker, 
André had been identified as someone who could work with the Banyamulenge community, 
specifically because of his language skills—Kinyrwanda and Kinyamulenge only differing in 
accent and minor vocabulary. In this capacity, he had gotten to know the Banyamulenge 
community in several parts of town, and our mutual friend suggested that André could assist me 
with my work and help me to make initial contacts.   
Because André and I lived in different parts of town, we would meet at a juncture on 
Nairobi’s peripheries called Mwiki—part of the larger Kasarani neighborhood—a poor and 
working-class area that marked the end of a long route between the northeastern peri-urban 
sprawl and downtown.  Leaving town in the morning, the bus would careen down the newly-
built Thika Highway towards Kasarani, whipping past lanes jammed with commuters traveling 
in the opposite direction towards offices and businesses in Nairobi’s commercial centers.  When 
the bus reached the roundabout at Roysambu and turned onto the infamous Mwiki Road, we 
passengers found ourselves bumping over potholes and then no pavement at all, rumbling 
alongside pastures dotted with cows, machinery, and Marabou storks pecking at garbage.  Past 
expanding concrete apartment buildings, the narrow road soon clogged with the Mwiki matatus 
making their final dropoffs before turning around to head back towards downtown.  A mzungu 
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(white person) in Mwiki, I was an odd sight—far from downtown where one might see an 
occasional European tourist, let alone the whiter suburbs on the western side of the city.  The 
matatu touts would greet me with amusement as they waited for their buses to fill, slapping their 
hands against the sides of the wildly painted vehicles that thumped with music, creating their 
own cacophony. “Tao, tao, tao!” (town), they would shout, wearing their piecemeal uniforms—
worn maroon vest over jeans, or maroon pants below a T-shirt with an American sports logo that 
came from one of the many used clothing markets in the city.   
After meeting at this junction of matatus and commuters, André and I would transfer to a 
cramped, nine-seat matatu, that would take us on winding roads south and west towards other 
peri-urban areas.  The gentle hills stretch out along the asphalt, the sky pierced by occasional 
thorn trees, and the suddenly rural landscape makes one feel further from the city than one 
actually is, until our mat turned and we would find ourselves back amidst crowded shops 
advertising their wares outside—brightly colored clothing, chickens crammed into crates, stacks 
of cellophane-wrapped CDs and DVDs, the Jamaican singer Busy Signal blaring from the CD 
player of a salesman. 
One day in April, 2014, at the height of Operation Usalama Watch, André and I visited 
Maombi, who had invited us to return to talk with her when we had met her on a previous visit to 
her neighborhood.  Maombi lived with her husband, their four children, and the daughter of her 
brother.  When we arrived at her apartment, she was attending to her brother-in-law’s small shop, 
which had been robbed, and so we spent the morning talking with her two sons, as well as the 
child of a family friend who had just arrived from Rwanda and was staying with them.  When 
Maombi finally reached home, we discussed her experience with UNHCR and her family’s 
resettlement case—which did not include her seventeen-year-old cousin, who had come to live 
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with the family only after their case had begun.  As we discussed the challenges of her case, 
Maombi offered to introduce us to another woman who had been denied a UNHCR mandate—
the identity document that confers refugee status.  André and I agreed, and she led us to a small 
apartment on the first floor of another building across the dirt road from her own, where we met 
Beatrice.   
 We enter a home that is small and dark.  Two couches sit facing each other, in between 
which is a small table.  In the corner is a small television on a stand, and by the door a sewing 
machine.  Above it is a large poster that shows dozens of dresses made from kitenge material, 
each varying by length, sleeves, neckline, and hem.  Beatrice herself wears a loose-fitting blue 
dress embroidered with gold-colored thread around the neck and sleeves. She wears a chocolate 
brown wig that falls past her chin, and a gold chain around her neck. She is a solid woman, not 
tall and thin like the Banyamulenge stereotype. 
 Maombi introduces us as Beatrice welcomes us to sit on the small couch.  To my 
surprise, she does not wait for my careful Swahili introduction, my cautious explanation of my 
work.  She does not sit silently, allowing, as many do, a husband to take the lead (hers was dead).  
Speaking emphatically, with startling emotion, Beatrice describes her arrival in Kenya and the 
rejection of her application for refugee status, which quickly brings her to tears.  Her tears, I 
think to myself, are not those of someone trying to hold them back, but angry tears of someone 
trying to impress upon an audience the suffering she has endured—to make her suffering visible.   
 Beatrice, or Mama Immaculée, as I later called her, had come to Kenya in 2010.27  When 
we met, she was living with two daughters and one granddaughter, and sometimes other young 
women and their children.  She had gone to school in Congo.  Born in 1965, her education made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In much of East Africa, women and men are addressed using teknonyms—by “Mama” or 
“Baba” followed by the name of their firstborn child.  
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her unusual among Banyamulenge women of her generation, and she had later lived in the city—
Uvira—where she had worked as a businesswoman and a primary school teacher.  So, she 
explained, when her interviewers at UNHCR saw her with her earrings and her wig—unlike the 
stereotypical slender, unadorned Munyamulenge woman with cropped hair—they did not believe 
her.  This was Mama Immaculée’s explanation of her rejection from asylum, or refugee status, 
on the day we met her.  In subsequent conversations, she had different explanations for 
something that seemed to her inexplicable—an injustice she must have turned over in her mind 
over many long, hot and hungry days.    
While Somalis in Kenya are prima facie refugees—granted refugee status on account of 
their nationality regardless of their individual claims—Congolese are not.  Rather, asylum 
seekers from Congo must prove their claims to refugee status on an individual basis through the 
Refugee Status Determination process at UNHCR.  According to a report published by a Kenyan 
NGO, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, in collaboration with an international NGO, the Danish 
Refugee Council, rejection rates for Congolese asylum seekers in Kenya between 2008 and 2012 
were an average of 19 percent, though the number varied significantly between those years, and 
was 25 percent the year Mama Immaculée received her rejection letter (RCK 2014:16).  Thus, 
she was one of many Congolese living without documentation in Nairobi, though likely one of 
few among Banyamulenge.   
 Sitting across from André and me, Mama Immaculée asks me to pass her a handbag that 
is lying next to me on the couch.  She opens it and begins unfolding heavily creased papers and 
passing them back across the table.  There is a police report filed after her twenty-two year old 
daughter was raped; the report of the medical examination her daughter subsequently underwent 
at the office of Médecins sans Frontières in Eastleigh; her asylum seeker’s document issued to 
	   117	  
her by UNHCR before they had reviewed her claim; the rejection letter they sent her; her letter 
of appeal; a letter written by community elders on her behalf; and so on. 
Mama Immaculée and her daughters had done four interviews at UNHCR, all conducted 
in Swahili.  As a lingua franca in Eastern Congo, the fact that Mama Immaculée spoke Swahili 
might have been taken as evidence of her Congolese (rather than Rwandan) origins, since 
Swahili is less commonly spoken in Rwanda.  Nevertheless, her fifth and final interview was 
conducted in Kinyamulenge, and the interpreter had been Rwandan, she said.  The rejection 
letter addressed to Mama Immaculée’s oldest daughter stated the following: 
The information you provided in support of your refugee claim was vague and unclear in 
important areas.  In particular, you were not able to provide sufficient detail to support 
your claim that you are a Congolese national of Banyamulenge ethnicity who was born 
and raised in [name of village], DRC.  You were lacking in details about [your village] 
and the surrounding areas including the geographical features therein, which you would 
be expected to know.  Besides, you claimed to be fluent in Kinyamulenge but when the 
language test was administered, you answered in Kinyarwanda.  
The letter was particularly notable to me and André because Kinyarwanda and Kinyamulenge 
are dialects with only minor differences in accent and vocabulary.  “Maybe they lived in Rwanda 
for a while,” André suggested to me after we had left, “and her daughter picked up the accent.”  
But Mama Immaculée, André asserted, definitely spoke like a Munyamulenge, and the 
community seemed to vouch for her.  Of course, we had no way to know a “God’s eye truth,” as 
André and I discussed it.  
After Mama Immaculée’s claim was rejected, she went to Refugee Consortium of Kenya 
(RCK), an organization that provides legal assistance to refugees.  The organization appealed the 
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UNHCR rejection on her behalf.  But when she returned to UNHCR with the appeal, she 
continued to be given new appointments to come back several months later.  As we sat together 
in her house, it was April of 2014, almost four years exactly since her arrival.  After her relative, 
who had previously worked as an interpreter at UNHCR, tried to intervene on her behalf, things 
became even worse.  Instead of being given new appointments for three and four months later, 
they gave her an appointment for seven months in the future.   
Mama Immaculée was weeping and shouting: “I’ve been here for five years, and they are 
just increasing the days [of the appointments]!  Some people stay for one month and get a 
mandate.  Why have I been rejected?!”  She described returning to UNHCR and encountering a 
Rwandan staff member: “We’ve rejected you! We’ve given you a response! You’ve gotten what 
you deserve!” she said the woman had shouted at her.  Upon subsequently returning to the office, 
the same woman mocked her, “Oh, look who it is!  Let’s see what happens to this woman!”28  
Mama Immaculée is a “bad refugee” in Sandvik’s sense: “Unruly clients were 
blacklisted… and would be ‘put in the black book.’”  Sandvik writes that a staff member she was 
interviewing pointed to an actual book on her desk—“with the consequence that people would 
refuse to help you” (Sandvik 2011: 22).  Mama Immaculée and her daughter were considered 
“unruly” as well as dishonest.  Refugees in Nairobi sometimes described UNHCR as “our 
mother and our father”—using kinship terms and their implicit obligations to “interpret and 
reinterpret their social contacts” and make claims (Geschier 2013:xvi; see also Schatzberg 2001).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Mama Immaculée also described her rejection, and this woman’s vitriol against her, as a 
playing out of ethnic hatred.  She explained that the woman was Hutu, and knowing that she was 
a Munyamulenge (Tutsi), she conspired to ruin her case.  I have no way to assess the likelihood 
of Mama Immaculée’s charge.  However, the staff member’s cruelty and demonstration of her 
power over her (even, or especially, if she really believed Mama Immaculée to be a Rwandan 
Tutsi posing as a Munyamulenge) seems plausibly connected to recent historical ethnic enmity.   
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Banyamulenge, in particular, whose identities were importantly constructed through their sense 
of betrayal by their own country, saw UNHCR as a force that was supposed be their protector, 
but which often failed its duty.  If Mama Immaculée and her daughters were bad refugees or 
fraudulent refugees, they conceived of UNHCR as a “bad parent” that had betrayed its duty to 
protect its children.  
In subsequent meetings, Mama Immaculée would explain different reasons for her 
rejection—not only her appearance, which indexed a different ethnic or national identity, but 
also corruption from within UNHCR, tribalism and sabotage by Hutu interpreters, and the ill will 
of her kin and community who hated her because she was of ethnically mixed parentage—with a 
Banyamulenge mother, and a father of Bembe birth who had been raised by a Banyamulenge 
family.  Her rejection troubled her deeply—not only because of the pragmatic complications of 
living without documentation, but because she had been denied her identity as a person worthy 
of protection:  
“Look how I’ve been abandoned (nimeachwa),” she shouted.  “I’ve been thrown out 
(nimetupwa). I don’t have a place (mahali), I don’t have refuge (kimbilio).  We don’t have our 
rights (haki) as refugees (marefugees),” she told André and me (in Swahili) during a later 
conversation at her home.  
While resources for urban refugees are scarce, the conferral of refugee status by UNHCR 
enables potential access to free medical care, school fees, food aid, and, the most coveted 
opportunity—a ticket to citizenship in “the West” via resettlement.  For Mama Immaculée, the 
denial of the mandate was not only of material significance—a denial of access to potential 
benefits, resources and opportunities.  She experienced the rejection as a denial of her suffering, 
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of her claim to be a person deserving protection and rights, and of her membership in a 
community.29   
Without a refugee identity document, Mama Immaculée was “just there in space” as she 
described it (using the French word espace)—not under any institutional protection.  With an 
implicit understanding of what Hannah Arendt called “the decline of the nation state and the end 
of the rights of man,” Mama Immaculée recognized herself as unprotected by either a 
government or the UN (Arendt 1973).  Using the word espace, she gestured towards the 
relationship between territoriality and rights.  Un-grounded, she experienced herself as floating 
in space without protection, even as a recognized refugee.  Without a mandate, she was doubly 
outcast—first from her country, then from the agency of international protection, the UN.  In her 
testimony of her experience with UNHCR, Mama Immaculée also portrayed the institution as 
unfair and corrupted by the toxic politics of the community.   
Many refugees I met imagined UNHCR not as malicious in itself, but as failing to 
perform its duties due to corrupting forces of money and power.  This was similar to the ways in 
which many people spoke about the state (whether Kenyan, Congolese, or Somali).  They did not 
critique the state as an institution; rather, they critiqued the corrupt officials who held its reigns 
and profited from their roles as politicians rather than serving the people.  For many refugees in 
Nairobi, the possibility of buying resettlement—paying tens of thousands of dollars for a case—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Anthropologists have pointed out the indeterminacy of the ways in which identity papers 
actually work to confer rights and protection (Kelly 2006), and their ambiguous effects as 
simultaneously enabling states to control populations, and to imbue the same populations with 
rights that give them recourse against the state (Gordillo 2006).  While many Nairobi residents 
who possessed refugee identity documents (both from UNHCR and the Kenyan government) 
often decried their uselessness—their powerlessness in the face of changing state policies and 
extortive Kenyan police, or in their inability to authorize crossing international borders or even 
moving within Kenya unencumbered—people such as Mama Immaculée, who lacked 
documentation, highlighted their power.   
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was common knowledge.  This is what the Somali woman I quoted in the previous chapter 
referred to in the most explicit form when she said, “Nowadays, rights are based on money.”  
Who gets resettlement? “People with money. That’s what we’ve seen.”  A Congolese pastor I 
met in Edmonton, Canada, when I made a trip to see friends from Nairobi who had been resettled 
there, put it even more bluntly, placing blame more squarely on UNHCR and its staff: “People 
who pretend to be service providers, they should change their name and just say, ‘We are money 
makers.’  Their staff members are corrupted.  People tell lies, they sell documents, people are 
resettled under different names.” 
Writing about relations between the state and the poor in India, Akhil Gupta writes, “[a] 
discourse of corruption helps construct the state; yet at the same time it can potentially empower 
citizens by marking those activities that infringe on their rights” (Gupta 2014: 109).  If “fraud” 
indexed the mistrust of refugees by international agencies, discourses about corruption in 
international agencies, especially UNHCR, evoked refugees’ mistrust of these institutions and 
their critical evaluation of their workings.  While refugees expressed gratitude to UNHCR in an 
abstract sense for enabling them to stay in Kenya, they talked about the resettlement system as 
opaque, unjust, and corrupt.  For those with resettlement cases, a main complaint was that they 
never knew what was happening with their case—months and years passed with no 
communication.  Those without cases, or with cases that had been stuck for years, highlighted 
the arbitrariness and injustice of how resettlement slots were allocated.  Some refugees 
articulated a preference to be interviewed by white (American and European) foreigners who, 
they believed, were motivated by compassion, as opposed to Kenyan staff who were motivated 
by money.  The identity of their interviewer, many believed, advantaged some and disadvantaged 
others. 
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And yet the most the infamous scandal at Nairobi’s UNHCR office had been perpetrated 
by a high-ranking foreign staff member from Italy, in collaboration with a German hotel owner 
co-conspirator.  Together, they orchestrated a resettlement-for-pay and resettlement-for-sex 
scheme, prostituting women at the German-owned hotel not far from the UNHCR office in 
Westlands (see also Browne 2006; Sandvik 2011:25). A young staff member blew the whistle on 
the scandal in the early 2000s, and much of the staff was fired, and policies were apparently 
revamped to protect against such abuses.  If refugees’ discourses about corruption at UNHCR 
seem too far-fetched to believe, the well-documented and publicized nature of this larger scandal 
might lead one to take them more seirously.   
In recent years, security measures had been enhanced.  While in the early years of 
resettlement from Kenya, refugees did not even have photo IDs, making it relatively easy to 
switch people on cases, now biometric registration including IDs with photos and fingerprints are 
required.  UN registration is cross-referenced with Kenyan national registration records, which 
have excluded from resettlement opportunities at least hundreds of refugees who had illegally 
obtained Kenyan IDs in order to improve the quality of their lives, but who now are considered 
fraudulent applicants to resettlement.  
Nevertheless, histories of stolen cases and corruption are deep in the collective memories 
and discourses of refugee communities in Kenya.  And despite the reported waning of more 
large-scale and systematic corruption, during my fieldwork, refugees continued to criticize more 
subtle forms of favoritism and unfairness.  For example, Mama Immaculée’s claim that the 
tribalistic biases of her Hutu interpreter had ruined her case was not unique.  Banyamulenge 
often complained that none of their community members were hired by UNHCR as interpreters, 
and that they could not fully trust Rwandan and Burundian interpreters—both because they 
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might have prejudices against them (particularly if they were Hutu), and because they may not 
fully understand some of the more nuanced aspects of their speech, or know the places and 
events that they referred to in their accounts.30  While I cannot confirm or verify such claims, 
they are strongly held beliefs within these communities, forming a centerpiece of people’s 
knowledge of a system to which they have limited access and minimal official or insider 
information.    
 
Papers and Words, Evidence and Power 
In downtown Nairobi, the wide avenues are decorated with flags and red, black, white 
and green banners to celebrate Uhuru—Independence—after fifty years.  Uphill, and to the west 
from downtown, the Westlands neighborhood is shaded by canopies of large, old trees.  
Westlands is home to the headquarters of international non-governmental organizations: 
Amnesty International, International Rescue Committee, International Organization for 
Migration, UNHCR.  The world of international humanitarian aid thrives here on Nairobi’s posh 
side, inside new buildings made of glass and steel, guarded by iron gates wrapped in barbed 
wire, lush foliage, and climbing bougainvillea.   
On the ground floor of one such building, behind a glass partition separating UNHCR 
staff from their refugee clients, I sit beside Grace, a Kenyan caseworker—a chic woman with a 
law degree, diamond rings, a stylish suit, and heels.  It is Tuesday—resettlement counseling day.  
Having found their ID numbers posted on paper lists that circulated in neighborhoods on the 
other side of town, refugees from Somalia, Congo, Ethiopia, and elsewhere have lined up outside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The languages of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Banyamulenge people of eastern Congo—
Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, and Kinyamulenge, respectively—are mutually intelligible dialects of the 
same language.  
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the office since early morning.  From behind the glass partition that separates the caseworkers—
both Kenyans and internationals—from their clients, we see a constant flow of people.  It is 
September and, although Operation Usalama Watch, the anti-refugee crackdown, is at a low 
simmer now, Grace is instructing the majority of refugees we meet to go to the camps, where 
their problems can be better addressed, she says.  If you have no money for rent, or are being 
harassed by the police, or your child is sick, that’s not an exceptional problem, Grace tells most 
of the clients that morning.  It doesn’t constitute need for resettlement to a different country. 
That’s a normal problem—all refugees have that problem, she says.  If you can’t pay rent—go to 
the camps, where shelter is provided.  If you’re being harassed by police—go to the camps, 
where the government has authorized you to reside; and so on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: A business in Eastleigh, Nairobi, where lists of ID numbers have been posted by UNHCR alerting people 
to come for an interview, “resettlement counseling,” or to pick up their refugee status determination decisions. 
Official letterhead and stamps authenticate the documents. 2015. Photo by author. 
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Most people, many of whom had waited for months to find their ID number on one of 
several boards on which UNHCR posts its weekly lists, leave disappointed.  There is little they 
can do or say to Grace’s instruction—the thing she herself has been instructed to say under the 
pressure of the Kenyan government, which is trying to remove refugees from the cities 
altogether.  A Somali woman approaches the window behind which I sit with Grace and Jamal, 
the interpreter.  From behind her computer screen, Grace gestures for her to hand over her 
UNHCR identity document, or mandate, and the woman unfolds her paper and slides it through 
the low slit between the desk and the tall window—like a teller’s window at a bank.  Except 
there is no microphone or hole through which either party can project their voice.  Instead, some 
of the clients place their heads on the desk, positioning their ears to the slit in the glass, then turn 
their head to project their voices through space.   
The woman explains that her resettlement case was placed on hold pending the tracing of 
her husband, required for her to take her children over international borders; as well as a Best 
Interest Determination (BID) report for the kids, which had to be done to determine if she was 
the appropriate caretaker, on account of her children’s father’s absence.  She reported that the 
NGO in charge of BIDs had come to interview her and her children in July, about three months 
prior.  Reviewing her record on the computer, Grace told the woman that UNHCR had not 
received their report.  The woman added that she was having medical problems, and Grace told 
her that she should go to the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), UNHCR’s partner 
providing free medical care to documented refugees.   
Responding to Grace’s recommendation, the woman nodded and asked Grace her name, 
adding, “Can you write it?” as she passed a paper through the opening between the desk and 
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window that divided us.  “No!” Grace replied, irritated.  “If I write it, that means I’m referring 
you.  But that’s not how it works.  You just go.”   
“But I can’t keep [remember] your name,” the woman replied.   
“Why? I can keep your name.  You’re Fatuma,” Grace said.   
Looking defeated, Fatuma got up from the chair behind the glass window and 
disappeared from my view.   
* 
Matthew Hull notes the importance that recent scholarship on bureaucratic documents 
has placed on materiality and aesthetic form (Hull 2012:256-7).  In Kenya, the vast majority of 
bureaucratic documents, whether produced by international agencies, the Kenyan government, or 
local NGOs, are written in English.  Despite the fact that many refugees cannot read English, the 
letterhead with familiar logos and acronyms (learned over years, sometimes decades of visits to 
various offices, and from sharing documents among friends and kin), the presence of official 
stamps (so important in Kenyan political and bureaucratic life), as well as original signatures, 
together constitute signs of a document’s authenticity (Gupta 2014:214-33).  Fatuma’s 
interaction chronicled above highlighted Fatuma’s recognition that a personal referral, in contrast 
to the normal procedures in which she had to vouch for her own needs, could be a helpful tool in 
gaining assistance from the organization that Grace recommended she visit.  It also highlighted 
her understanding of the power of writing, not only to help her remember Grace’s name for later, 
but also as a more official and legitimate medium than speech for making a claim—in this case, 
to demonstrate that someone from UNHCR had personally sent her to the office in question.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Michelle Johnson notes the power of written words in African Islamic traditions, such as when 
Mandinga children in Guinea-Bissau are initiated as Muslims when they literally lick written 
verses from the Quran off of their hand (Johnson 2006).  See also Lévi-Strauss’s writing on the 
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The written name, Fatuma and other refugees understood, as a trace of the real person, might act 
as a “referral” exactly in the way Fatuma thought could be effective.   
Understanding the power of documents in this bureaucratic context, refugees kept their 
papers with great care, and sought to employ them in their interactions with state and non-
governmental officials whenever possible.  When I brought Hodan, a Somali woman from 
Ethiopia, to a legal aid organization one day, she carried a large bag filled with her medical files 
from a major Nairobi hospital, and the International Red Cross’ documentation of her torture in 
an Ethiopian prison.  It was clear that these documents were crucial in corroborating her 
narrative, and helped secure her a follow-up appointment.  While I knew many people to be 
turned away from this organization because of a lack of evidence of their claims, Hodan was 
given an appointment for another interview.  The presumed credibility of the Nairobi Hospital 
physicians (as opposed to doctors at small, neighborhood clinics), and of internationally 
recognized NGOs such as the Red Cross, made Hodan appear as a good refugee, a true victim, 
and a worthy recipient of aid.   
In contrast, other people’s attempts to authenticate and legitimize their vulnerability 
through papers and writing backfired when the papers failed to be deemed either authentic or 
produced by a credible source.  While shadowing Grace in resettlement counseling, another 
Somali woman, Luul, sat down behind the window, sliding her UN mandate across the desk 
through the slot between the desk and glass barrier.  Luul told Grace that she had last heard from 
the NGO overseeing her case in February; it was now September.  “That’s not so long,” Grace 
said as she pulled up the woman’s file on her computer.  Grace told the woman that staff from 
the NGO would be coming to UNHCR that day, and that she would remind them about her case.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
power of archives and autographs, which are “the embodied essence of the event” (Lévi-Strauss 
1966: 242). 
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Luul then slid a stapled packet of yellow papers, folded in half, through the slot.  Grace unfolded 
it and glanced at it briefly.  “There’s someone in Eastleigh who writes these letters,” she said.  
“These are form letters, they’re all the same, we don’t want these.  That’s why we need to hear 
from the applicant—we don’t want made-up letters.”   
* 
Gupta writes, “Forgery is a creative, positive act (one forges ahead) that challenges the 
right of the state to authenticate, to adjudicate between the true and the false.”  He adds that 
forgery “can be a subaltern strategy to undermine the authority of state writing” (2014: 227).  
Given the power of papers in both state and non-governmental governance of refugees, refugees 
attempted to harness the power of writing and documentation to support their claims in similar 
ways to the subaltern citizens of Gupta’s work.  At times refugees forged documents, and at 
others they did not so much forge, but rather produced their own texts in an attempt to create a 
parallel economy of documents.  “Brokers,” as people call them in Eastleigh (muqalas in 
Somali), run businesses out of small shops in alleyways and dense market areas where people 
come for advice and assistance.  Among other activities, these businesspeople, who may also 
define their work as a community service, write people’s stories.  One such muqalas, who was 
introduced to me by a friend in Eastleigh who had used his services, called himself “Qalinmal,” 
meaning, in Somali, “milking the pen.”  	  
Qalinmal was an interpreter in multiple senses.  Speaking English as well as his native 
Somali, he bridged the world of the UN, NGOs and embassies, and the world of the Somali 
community that relied on him.  Having worked as an interpreter within several of these 
institutions, he was also a cultural interpreter, translating the rules and systems of these 
institutions for community members seeking help.  He was an interpreter of technological 
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systems and languages, too, assisting people with online programs and e-mail.  And finally, he 
wrote people’s stories.  Whether he wrote people’s own stories, or what resettlement workers call 
“camp stories”—stock stories known to have worked for other people—I do not know.  I suspect 
that he wrote some combination of the two—crafting and perhaps embellishing people’s 
experiences as they narrated them to him in ways he thought would fit into categories that would 
be legible and compelling to institutions, as well as translating people’s stories into written 
English.  Paying for the supposed efficacy of their narrative transformed into paper and typed 
English words, refugees tried to use bureaucratic tools for their own ends.  Despite the fact that 
Luul was likely one among many refugees told that her paper was worthless in the eyes of 
UNHCR, as it was seen as a product of a crooked business enterprise rather than an expression of 
authentic experience, the power of written documents in the refugee aid and resettlement system 
propelled clients to businesses such as Qalinmal’s.   
* 
Gaston Gordillo writes that indigenous people long denied national identity documents in 
Argentina “fetishize” ID papers, viewing them as “potent objects that in and of themselves can 
shape the outcome of social processes”—a dynamic produced by the history of their “profound 
alienation from state-granted citizenship” (Gordillo 2006:163).  For many refugees in Nairobi, 
the power of official documents lies in “the mode of signification” (the document itself) rather 
than “the thing being signified,” as Gordillo writes, quoting Michael Taussig (172).  Yet, despite 
sometimes failed attempts to conjure their power, refugees in Nairobi hardly misrecognized the 
power relations that produce the efficacy of the documents they received from official 
institutions—for example, their UNHCR identity document, or an appointment letter for an 
interview at an embassy.    
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Grace’s refusal of Luul’s papers—her written testimony—and the illegitimacy of such 
papers in the larger market of texts in the refugee aid and resettlement system, both speak to the 
ways in which documents produce and reflect relations of power.  Papers drafted in out-of-site 
corners of the enterprising Somali neighborhood, or the letter that Banyamulenge community 
leaders drafted on behalf of Mama Immaculée, represent refugees’ attempts to lay claim to rights 
and benefits through their own imaginative written work (Peterson 2004)—even though it often 
failed.  Doubt cast upon writing produced within refugee communities versus the legitimacy of 
documents with stamps, signatures and logos of international NGOs and powerful, global North 
governments illustrates the cultural logic that “Western”-style bureaucracies (see Herzfeld 1992) 
work in transparent and systematic ways, and that institutions in eastern African communities are 
the opposite—working through ethnic and kin-based patronage and corruption.  This assumption 
exists despite the fact that these institutions have been shown to be arbitrary, at times corrupt, 
and to operate by intentionally minimizing communication and transparency with their refugee 
clients (Sandvik 2011; Thomson 2012).   
At one level, suspicion of papers contrasts with more conventional and common-sense 
understandings about evidence in bureaucratic contexts (Gupta 2014), and even asylum contexts 
(Fassin and d’Halluin 2005).  From Lorraine Daston and Peter Galiston’s writing on photographs 
in 19th and 20th century scientific atlases (1992), to Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Halluin’s writing 
on “the truth from the body” and medical evidence in French asylum cases (2005), to Gupta’s 
writing on the extreme value placed on written reports and educational certificates in the context 
of Indian bureaucracies (2014), scholars have explored the ways in which materiality—bodies, 
photographs, papers—constitute an elevated level of evidence over speech, in particular (see also 
Bloch 2008).   
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In a country such as Kenya that allows hundreds of thousands of people asylum, papers 
authored by international organizations or “trustworthy” governments (often not the Kenyan 
government) were valuable objects, of which refugees sought to make use.  They sought to take 
control over the means of production of such documents by fashioning them in their own homes 
and neighborhoods.  But these attempts often failed to circumvent the relations of knowledge and 
power operating in this arena (Foucault 1980).  As Len, the NGO director, put it, “The basis of 
pretty much all refugee work is oral testimony… Man with a gun comes to the front door, you 
don’t stop to pick up your passport and national ID papers when you run out the back door.”  
This notion of the “real refugee”—the good refugee—presumes that refugees have fled burning 
villages, unable to bring material evidence with them.  Refugees’ documents are doubted 
because they come from countries whose institutions have been corrupted and destroyed by war; 
because refugees are suspected as criminals or frauds in victims’ clothing; and because real 
refugees should not have had time gather their papers when they ran for their lives.   
Returning to the issue of refugees and intention with which I began this chapter, the kind 
of papers that Qalinmal produces, and that Luul presented in her encounter with Grace, did not 
stand as evidence of the case that she sought to communicate, but rather evinced her as a “bad 
refugee” who had produced a fraudulent text as she attempted to work the system.  “That’s why 
we need to hear from the applicant,” Grace tells Luul, “we don’t want made-up stories.”  
Refugees, in other words, should be left with nothing but words.   
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Spoken Words: Consistency, Credibility, and the Truth Value of a Testimony  
I am sitting at an upscale café in Nairobi’s hilly Spring Valley neighborhood, meeting 
with a US government official over cappuccinos.  We are discussing the use of documents as 
evidence in resettlement cases.  
“I could get a document that says I’m in a polygamous marriage with you and Madonna 
tomorrow!” he says, emphasizing the widespread problem with “document fraud” and the 
reasons that documents are not considered “conclusive evidence” by the US government. On 
another occasion, while interviewing Len in his office, Len pauses, opens up a website on his 
desktop computer, and quickly prints a diploma accrediting me as Dr. Sophia, PhD in Reiki 
Healing.   
Each of these men had clearly made the same point many times before.  “So this is why,” 
Len says, handing me my diploma, “documentation doesn’t work.  So without documentation to 
prove identity, what have you got?  Well, oral testimony, which has got a longstanding legal 
basis as long as you’re able to talk.  Um… you need to be consistent.  If, today, you say you’re 
Dr. Sophia, tomorrow you say you’re Dr. Sophia, on another day, six weeks later, you say you’re 
Dr. Susan, well, wait, hang on … certain basic facts about your identity should be consistent and 
repeated.  If you have—and this gets into a tricky area—if you’ve gone through major life 
events, there’s a broad expectation that you’ll remember the details.  Consistently.  Now, leave 
aside what trauma does to memory… but, um, how do you now figure out, is this a real family.  
Can they actually say the names of each other?  If you and your husband were put in different 
rooms and we interviewed you separately, would you know basic facts about each other?” 
While various technologies have been tried in efforts to verify narratives, including DNA 
testing (Chapter Four), oral testimony is the center of refugees’ claims in the global South, and 
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the evidence upon which refugee status and resettlement cases are adjudicated.  Nevertheless, 
refugees’ testimonies are never taken at face value.  The perceived danger that refugees might be 
war criminals or terrorists, the scarcity of resettlement opportunities, and the understanding of 
refugees’ desperation to access resettlement as a golden ticket to a better life all mean that 
detecting fraudulent narratives is a fundamental part of the work of resettlement on the part of 
UN, NGO, and government officials.  How, then, can the truth value of a testimony be 
measured?   
“Consistency” and “credibility” were the terms most often used to describe the 
assessment of testimonies—both from people working in the refugee field and by refugees 
themselves.  The terms were woven casually into talk about the way resettlement works, or 
stated in written texts as common-sense ideas about truth and falsity.  In other words, 
consistency and credibility stood for truth.  For example, Mama Immaculée’s rejection letter 
from UNHCR read: 
The Office has determined that the information you have provided on these relevant and 
important points of your claim is not credible….  In particular, you were not able to 
provide sufficient detail to support your claim that you are a Congolese national resident 
in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and suffered harm from the mai mai32 on 
account of your ethnicity. 
… it is considered that this is information you could be expected to know and describe in 
greater detail.  … There were substantial inconsistencies within the information you and 
other family members provided in support of your claim.  Specifically, you were not 
consistent with information on your identity, family background, and place of residence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 A name for rebel groups active in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 
	   134	  
and account of flight.  … The office has further determined that there is no reasonable 
possibility that you would face serious threats to life, physical integrity or freedom 
resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order in your 
country of origin [emphasis added]. 
Since, as I have already described, resettlement is a long process that typically involves several 
years and multiple interviews by different agencies—separate units of UNHCR, possibly one or 
more NGOs, and various levels of government (particularly under the US system)—one of the 
primary ways of assessing oral testimonies is to check them against those that were given 
previously.  These multiple narratives span the course of several years, sometimes a decade or 
more.  The narratives are checked against each other, and against the testimonies of family 
members who, it is presumed, should have the same or complementary stories.  The idea that 
stories should be consistent over time, and across the individuals within a family—as Mama 
Immaculée’s letter notes and as Len points out—provides a central mechanism for classifying 
truth versus falsehood in the resettlement system.  Narratives should also be consistent with 
standard information known about the country of origin.  Agencies use country background 
reports to verify the credibility of claims, so that what is believable, or credible, also rests upon 
published information about history, geography, and current events. 
“Consistency” haunts many refugees, who know that they must repeat the same story 
each time they speak to an official, and that their family members have to reproduce the same 
details, as well.  According to refugees and officials, both UNHCR and government employees 
often open their interviews by telling their interviewees that they needed to tell them the truth: “I 
can’t help you if you lie to me,” as one person put it.  At the same time, resettlement staff in both 
Nairobi and the US noted to me that consistency is valued over truth.  Refugees are better off 
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filing away new information that may come to light, or memories they may recall after a first 
interview, so as to avoid producing inconsistencies with their earlier narratives.  In other words, 
although officials know that the relationship between consistency and truth is imperfect, they 
rely on consistency as a tool.  Unlike truth, consistency over time and across members of a 
family is measurable.33 
Officials’ insistence in opening their interviews by telling refugees that they must tell the 
truth speaks to their anxiety about the impossibility of knowing with certainty.  As one UNHCR 
officer put it, “I often think, I wish, when the person got to the resettlement country, I could just 
see what was true and what wasn’t.  Because we never find out. We never know.”  In this sense, 
while consistency may haunt refugees, the imperfect match between consistency and truth 
produces a space for their own power to play with the indeterminacies of narrative.  Unlike 
written documents, which refugees are excluded from producing or utilizing to their own ends, 
refugees may at times be empowered by the role of narrative.  Indeed, refugees told stories about 
themselves and others harnessing narratives’ power to compel officials—in the murky mixture of 
appropriate telling of “true” narratives (Cabot 2013, 2014), but also by intentionally 
embellishing, changing and creating stories to “fit” resettlement categories and expectations 
(James 2015:30).  This is not to say that these refugees were not “really” refugees, or not actually 
deserving of resettlement.  Rather, they were refugees who knew that in order to be 
reincorporated into the rights bestowed by citizenship, and to access the opportunities they knew 
to exist in other parts of the world, they had to make use of existing values and priorities. 
  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Metzner writes on the ways in which urine analysis tests are used in drug courts in a parallel 
way (2016).	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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have made three main points around the topic of fraud.  First, drawing 
on literature about epistemologies and politics that structure asylum and aid for the forcibly 
displaced, I have argued that the discourses around fraud, and around deserving and undeserving 
refugees, often dismiss those who attempt to actively navigate the system.  Mistrust of those 
refugees who appear to intentionally seek aid and resettlement—the “noisy” refugees whose 
intentionality is taken to evince dishonesty—acts to further disempower refugees who are 
already disenfranchised by the institutions to which they are subject.  Second, I argue that while 
officials are centrally concerned with fraud among refugees, refugees similarly mistrust the 
systems to which they are subject.  While both officials and refugees often describe each other as 
untrustworthy, and fear that the other is intentionally hiding information, refugees have little 
leverage through which to compel institutions to communicate transparently.  Finally, I have 
argued that acts labeled “fraudulent” by institutions are often a product of the very mistrust that 
is cultivated by institutions such as UNHCR.  Their own practices of producing barriers to 
information in order to bolster honesty in fact often produce the opposite effects.   
People working in this system were not always unaware of the paradoxes of these 
practices.  For example, Len, who was trained as a lawyer, put it succinctly: 
What recourse does a refugee have to make noise about UNHCR? ... In the US, if you 
have to interact with a complicated legal system, what do you do?  You hire a lawyer!  
What is a lawyer?  A lawyer is simply someone who knows the system really well, and if 
you pay them they’ll take care of things for you.  Now, can refugees bring a lawyer to a 
UNHCR interview?  No.  Can they bring a fixer?  ‘Cause what is a lawyer but a fixer? 
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This will actively get you banned.  If a refugee pays someone to do this stuff, they’re 
going to get accused of fraud. 
Writing about post-war violence in El Salvador, and the erasures of history and social structure 
in narratives about crime and criminals, Moodie (2010) writes about “unknowing” as a particular 
epistemic state.  In a sense, resettlement officials “un-know” the histories and structures that 
produce the ways in which refugees navigate resettlement and aid systems, particularly when 
they name refugees’ tactics “fraudulent.” Yet, as Moodie writes, “unknowing is never complete” 
(201).  Here, Len pulls back the curtain of official unknowing to reveal his skepticism.   
However, despite acknowledging such paradoxes in moments of unofficial conversation, 
the system was largely organized in ways that systematically excluded refugees from the means 
of producing knowledge.  The narrative, alone, stood as refugees’ primary mechanism for 
making their case.  They used this medium against the backdrop of an otherwise limited capacity 
to make claims, voice grievances, and request access to resources and opportunities whose 
allocation was guarded by institutions.   
 In this chapter, I have argued that “fraud” cannot be taken as a self-evident concept as it 
is mobilized in the refugee aid world.  Instead, it must be unpacked in its particular social 
context.  Focusing on mistrust, I have argued that if we listen to refugees, we see that “fraud” 
contains a duality—pointing both to activities perpetrated by refugees, but also, as Len suggests, 
and as Mama Immaculée demonstrates, points back at the institutions themselves.  Hearing 
refugees’ perspectives on institutions such as UNHCR, “fraud” appears to point to what refugees 
understand as these systems’ failures of their obligations to protect and work justly.  In the next 
chapter, I continue to explore fraud, this time considering the work it does in relation to networks 
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of social care in refugees’ lives. As I will go on to show in the second part of the dissertation, 
“the family” is a crucial locus through which ideas about fraud play out.  
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PART II 
 
Seeking Resettlement, Securitizing Resettlement: Kinship and Competing Claims 
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“While modernity is largely defined by a commitment to rational management and immunity to 
family interest, the rhetoric of state is redolent with kinship metaphors.  Those who serve 
familial interests at the expense of larger, communal ones are treated as though they were guilty 
of the political equivalent of incest.”  
 
- Michael Herzfeld, The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Roots of 
Western Bureaucracy 
	  
	  
In January 2014, my friend Abdul’s cousin, Sadiya, was leaving for Australia.  The event, 
as was commonly the case, was met with great excitement, as well as the bittersweetness of 
leaving one’s life and friends behind.  Sadiya came to Abdul’s home with fruit and drinks, and 
they and other young relatives talked late into the night before her departure.  In July, Abdul 
updated me.  Sadiya was now in the midst of a family drama.  She had gone to Australia as the 
supposed wife of her first cousin—her ina-adeer—the son of her father’s brother.  This had been 
arranged by her uncle, and was supported by the family.  Two of the uncle’s sons were too 
young, Abdul told me.  One of his sons was already married.  This left one remaining son who 
could fulfill the role of bringing his cousin—his father’s brother’s daughter—to Australia.   
 But the young man had a girlfriend who he had been seeing for six years, and the couple 
had been preparing for their own marriage.  He had resisted the arrangement to be involved in 
bringing his cousin to Australia, as his girlfriend was upset that their own wedding would have to 
be delayed and was anxious that he was actually being usurped in an arranged marriage.  But the 
couple was told by the family that the whole process would only take a year, and that as soon as 
Sadiya arrived, they would be officially “divorced.” Then they could proceed with their marriage 
as planned.  However, there was a glitch.  When Sadiya arrived, they learned that they would 
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have to wait for at least two years before getting divorced in order for her legal status to be 
permanent.  When I discussed the situation with Abdul much later, he commented on the 
importance of the uncle’s obligation to bring his brother’s daughter, while also praising the 
girlfriend, who had exhibited her good character by allowing her boyfriend to put the 
(patrilineal) family first, rather than allowing her female anxieties and jealousies to get in the 
way.  
 As I have suggested in the previous chapter, refugees’ understanding of the resettlement 
and family sponsorship systems as arbitrary or unjust is fundamental to how they navigate it.  
But the ways in which refugees navigate resettlement and attempt to go abroad more generally 
are also tied up in longer histories (Horst 2006) and social worlds influenced by longstanding 
practices, recent histories of conflict and emerging diasporas, and bureaucratic and governing 
practices that tie people’s lives and imaginations to global mobility.  Telling life stories of two 
Somali refugees, in this chapter I argue that while officials in this system regard one of their 
primary obligations as protecting the integrity of their programs by separating true from false 
claims, thereby identifying correct humanitarian beneficiaries, refugees often have moral 
obligations that supersede official and bureaucratic ideas about truth telling.    
Through the stories of Kauthar and Moha, I consider the social and moral obligations that 
intersect with the moral sentiments that undergird humanitarianism broadly, and fraud itself as a 
moral concept that defines right versus wrong, good versus bad.  As a rare and valuable resource 
and opportunity, third country resettlement is stitched into the fabric of cultural notions about 
moral behavior and obligations to support kin in ways that diminish hierarchical dependence and 
improve the well-being of as many family members as possible.  A resource understood as 
hyper-valuable, conceptualized in at times fantastical ways regarding the kinds of fortune and 
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wellbeing it will bring, resettlement is surrounded by high stakes-feelings and ideas (Horst 
2006).  I argue that the moral claims of assisting relatives can conflict with the priority of truth 
telling, as well as other moral claims that underlie humanitarianism broadly, and this 
humanitarian program in particular.  Ultimately, the moral claims of humanitarianism and the 
moral claims of kinship intersect and shape one another in the global management of displaced 
populations.34   
 
Moral Claims in Humanitarianism and Kinship 
 Scholars have pointed out the ways in which moral sensibilities and claims define and 
drive humanitarian action.  These scholars, in the field of what I would call a critical 
humanitarian studies, have also demonstrated the ways in which these sentiments undergird 
political projects and governing techniques (Fassin 2012; Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Pandolfi 
2010; Tyrrell 2010).  In his book, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, Fassin 
uses two key terms: “moral sentiments”—“the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering 
of others and make us want to remedy them;” and “humanitarian government”—“the deployment 
of moral sentiments in contemporary politics” (2012:1-2).  While the rise of neoliberal 
governance and the influence of NGOs correspond with a more recent period (Greenhouse 
2010), historians also demonstrate that moral sentiments and morally charged discourses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Michael Herzfeld warns that we should not take state bureaucracies’ claims to be free of kin or 
ethnic preference at face value. Rather, he argues that nationalism is rife with symbols of 
kinship, and that these translate into “Western” bureaucracies operating through naturalized ideas 
about membership and exclusion.  Taking Herzfeld’s warning, my point is not that Somali 
refugees exist in a kinship-based society while “modern” bureaucracies do not—but that, 
drawing on Herzfeld, the fixation on “fraudulent families” may also work to produce refugees as 
“non-moderns.”  
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compelling humanitarian and imperial governing projects have roots in older European and US 
histories (Tyrrell 2010; Peterson 2010).  
 In an altogether separate body of literature, Africanist scholars have demonstrated ways 
in which moral claims infuse discourses about political and economic life.  This scholarship 
shows the ways in which ritual and the occult provide languages, idioms, and practices through 
which communities express grievances about moral economies and the distribution of resources, 
relations of power, and the extractive nature of capitalism and colonialism (Austen 1993; Bastian 
2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993, 2002; Lonsdale; J. Shaw n.d.; R. Shaw 1997; White 2000).  
For example, in his book Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust (2013), which puts African (primarily 
Cameroonian) case studies in comparative context, Peter Geschiere writes about witchcraft as 
“the dark side of kinship” (15).  Here, he describes the ways in which witchcraft is 
fundamentally tied to people’s most intimate social circles, and how it articulates with inequality 
at multiple scales.  At the level of Cameroonian villages, he writes,  
Djambe [witchcraft] may be one of the most powerful leveling elements within the 
village, as a constant reminder to overambitious leaders how dangerous it can be to 
disrespect the egalitarian ideology by refusing to share with their relatives” (41).   
But witchcraft is also increasingly imagined on larger and larger scales—witchcraft is 
globalizing:     
In many parts of Africa it is rather the remarkable elasticity of kinship claims—bridging 
completely novel inequalities and distances…that remains quite striking… [E]ven 
African migrants in Europe and America fear the telephone calls from home with their 
endless demands undergirded with hidden threats.  The association of family with 
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witchcraft as a serious threat for migrants far away from home shows the impressive 
stretching capacity of the family witchcraft complex (22).   
My Somali interlocutors, who make up the voices and stories of this chapter, do not speak in an 
idiom of witchcraft, per se.  Yet Geschiere’s work and other Africanist scholarship is helpful in 
pointing out the ways in which equalizing impulses pervade kinship in many African 
communities, and how transgression against this ethic is couched in highly moral terms about 
good and evil.  This is a pervasive pattern in the Somali community, which tends to be expressed 
in language of moral character, culture, and Islam.  
In one sense, then, this chapter concerns both debates within Somali communities, and 
how these debates are reflected onto debates and contestations between refugee communities and 
institutions to which they are subject.  Fassin has discussed the “untouchability” of 
humanitarianism as a moral project that insulates itself from critique through its moral claims 
about the equal sanctity of all human life (2010a, 2010b).  He writes,  
Humanitarian reason, by instituting the equivalence of lives and the equivalence of 
suffering, allows us to continue believing—contrary to the daily evidence of the realities 
that we encounter—in this concept of humanity which presupposes that all human beings 
are of equal value because they belong to one moral community (2012: 252).  
In other words, humanitarian projects allow societies to purport to uphold the equivalence of all 
human life despite the fact that our political and economic systems actively work against this 
ideal.  Ultimately, I argue that centering the competing moral claims between humanitarian 
institutions and refugees themselves—who make different claims about equality—shows 
refugees neither as victims passively resettled and saved, nor as criminals, but rather as active 
agents in the context of their own constrained mobility. 
	   145	  
 
Eastleigh, Trust, Identity, Obligation 
To know about refugees in Nairobi, one has to know about Eastleigh.  As I noted in 
Chapter One, ethnic Somalis are indigenous to Kenya, having long lived in Kenya’s northeastern 
region. Somalis in Kenya often joke that the real Somali-Kenya border is not the officially 
designated one that was drawn by the colonial powers.  Rather, it is over one hundred miles west 
at the bridge over the Tana River that one crosses to enter Garissa, a historically Somali city in 
Kenya’s North Eastern Province.  For historical reasons that precede the arrival of Somali 
refugees in the early 1990s, ethnic Somalis have been positioned as outsiders to the nation during 
the colonial and postcolonial periods despite their indigenous status (Lochery 2012; Mburu 2005; 
Thompson 1995; Turton 1972).  Long before refugees came to Eastleigh during the civil war 
period, Nairobi, and later Eastleigh, were home to a Somali community that was part and parcel 
of the early development of the colonial city.  While Eastleigh had originally been intended by 
the British regime for Indian settlement, poor infrastructure deterred many Indians, and by the 
1930s and ‘40s it was the largest Somali area in Nairobi (Whittaker 2015: 20).  
 Today, Eastleigh looms large in many people’s ideas about Nairobi as a city—locals and 
foreigners alike.  For many Kenyans, the area represents a dangerous enclave of suspicious 
foreigners, for others a vibrant commercial district where goods are sold at prices worth the risks 
associated with traveling there.  For many foreigners from the global North—humanitarians, 
missionaries, development workers—Eastleigh has been a location worthy of help and aid, 
although insecurity and Eastleigh’s increasing association with al-Shabaab since Kenya’s 
military incursion into Somalia starting in 2011 has made it a less desirable locale.  Some 
organizations that had offices there left after the explosion of a matatu (microbus) and the 
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violence between Somalis and non-Somali Kenyans from the neighboring area of Mathare that 
the event precipitated in 2012.  Some refugee-serving NGOs work in or travel to Eastleigh when 
things are considered calm, and others, such as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), have 
small offices on the outskirts of the neighborhood that are staffed by Kenyans rather than 
internationals.  As of 2016, and for several years prior, Eastleigh was the only neighborhood in 
Nairobi that the US State Department mentioned in its travel warning for Kenya.35  Eastleigh has 
also attracted growing attention from scholars, and in 2014, the Nairobi-based British Institute in 
Eastern Africa, a major research center in the region, hosted a two-day conference devoted to the 
neighborhood.   
For many Somalis arriving in Nairobi from Somalia, from the refugee camps, indeed, 
from anywhere in the world, Eastleigh is a home base, if often considered a resting point rather 
than a final destination.  As my friend Moha once said of life there, “It’s like you’re driving to 
Mombasa and your car breaks down on the way. You know you’re heading there, but you just 
haven’t reached yet.”	  	  Eastleigh is a place where Somalis from elsewhere have a phone number 
for an uncle or aunt, a cousin, schoolmate, or neighbor from back home (whether “home” in 
Mogadishu, or “home” in Stockholm) who they can call up, stay with until they find a place or 
move on to the next spot, who will show them where to eat, where to buy a phone, how to 
navigate the city.   
Eastleigh is filled with Somali diasporans.  Certain hotels and restaurants are designed for 
Somali patrons from Europe and North America.  Even wealthy diasporans who may stay in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Travel Warning states, “Avoid travel to the northeastern Kenyan counties of Mandera, 
Wajir and Garissa (including the cities of El Wak, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera and Liboi), the 
coastal counties of Tana River and Lamu, the area of Kilifi county north of Malindi, and the 
Nairobi neighborhood of Eastleigh” (US Department of State 2016 - 
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/kenya-travel-warning.html).  
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more upscale parts of the city come to Eastleigh to visit relatives or to shop.  It was uncanny to 
hear children and teenagers, in particular, speaking English with American accents in Eastleigh.  
Their parents seemed to have no qualms sending them to a place that the government of their 
citizenship considered perilous, a terrorist hotbed.  This always highlighted for me the relative 
meanings of safety and danger, and the ways in which community insiders existed within a dense 
set of cultural codes and social relations that protected them in ways that I could not be protected 
as an outsider. 
 Neil Carrier and Hannah Elliot have written about “trust” as central to Somali discourses 
about Eastleigh—central to the ways in which people talk about themselves and their community 
(Elliot and Carrier 2014).  Eastleigh works through trust, people say; the economy is a trust-
based economy.  In a devoutly Muslim community, there are no interest-based loans in 
accordance with religious prohibition.  Rather, people give money to friends and relatives in 
need; business owners may give customers goods or provide services even when the customer 
can’t pay.  Such practices operate on the basis of an Islamic obligation to assist people in need, 
and a social obligation to assist a wide set of relations.  As Ahmed Sharif, who conducted 
research between Mogadishu and Nairobi, has noted, Somalis’ universes of obligation and 
mutual assistance are also expanded in the diaspora.  A sense of shared identity with fellow 
Somalis emerges in a way that is not present in Somalia.  This shift, Sharif commented, is 
apparent as soon as one touches down at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, and 
Somalis band together to protect one another from the common experience of extortion and 
harassment in a space in which they are suddenly unified by their outsiderness (Sharif, personal 
communication, May 2016).  Broadly, in Eastleigh, a normative presumption prevails that people 
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will pay them back or return the favor at another time, or that someone else will do the same for 
them when they are in need.  If not, at least Allah is counting their charity.   
As my own relationships in Eastleigh grew, I became enmeshed in such codes of conduct, 
as both giver and receiver.  People who became close friends asked me for money when they 
needed it.  Moha needed money from me on occasions, for example.  But when I visited him in 
Canada, he bought me lunch and assured me, when I wondered aloud if my credit card would 
work across my own national border, that he would gladly fill up my gas tank: “No, no, not a bit 
of gas, a whole tank!”  In Eastleigh, a bill at a restaurant was never split, but picked up by 
whoever invited or was in the position to spend money.  Certain friends cooked me sumptuous 
meals, and paid for lunch or tea at restaurants—never mind that I was a supposedly better-off 
American; when I was in Eastleigh, I was the guest, especially for those whose support from 
abroad gave them the luxury of being able to fulfill their role as host.  To refuse would have been 
an affront to our relationship and would suggest that the person was not capable of engaging in 
these standard cultural norms of hospitality.  Time for reciprocity would always present itself at 
another moment—of which all were well aware (see Mauss 1990).  In Eastleigh, having kin and 
friends in common, or coming from the same place in Somalia, for example, can swiftly bind 
people together.  Neighbors often quickly come to rely on one another—sharing food, childcare, 
pooling money for common expenses.  People easily move within Eastleigh’s large, concrete 
apartment buildings, lending and borrowing things as needed—sharing space, goods, time, labor, 
information, and stories.   
But trust has a flip side of which I was often reminded as an outsider and as a woman.  
Social boundaries are heavily policed, especially gendered boundaries.  Behaving appropriately 
as a man or woman, as a married or single person, as a relative within a hierarchically structured 
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network of kin, is paramount.  Moha suggested that the niqab—the face veil that some women 
wear—represented control over women, but only insofar as it indexed its wearers’ protection 
from policing eyes.  Covered from head to toe, their faces obscured by the niqab, some women 
went to prohibited places—for example, clubs or boyfriends’ homes—negotiating the control 
over their access to taboo spaces and activities.  It was also clear, for example, that my visiting 
three male friends, Moha, Ahmed and Issa—about whom I write below—in their home was 
suspicious to some neighbors.  As an unmistakably unrelated woman visiting alone, I was 
crossing social boundaries.  Moreover, as an American, I was possibly up to no good.   
Knowing that members of al-Shabaab reside in Eastleigh, as well as people with a range 
of political ideas about both Kenya and Somalia, while in public, Eastleigh residents whispered 
about sensitive issues.  They used coded language to talk about al-Shabaab and other 
controversial topics.  Even clan names, understood as responsible for so much devastation in the 
country, and which linked people to communities that had killed each other back home, were 
often only alluded to rather than spoken about frankly by the young people with whom I spent 
time.36  The constant police presence, moreover, including the undercover Criminal Investigation 
Department officers, meant that residents were aware of the possibility that they were under 
surveillance.  Gangs made up of Somali youth who harassed the community also kept people on 
the lookout, making them uneasy about moving in certain spaces after dark.  If Kenyans mistrust 
Somalis, Somalis also mistrust Kenyans.  During my fieldwork, refugees occasionally expressed 
their suspicion of Somali-Kenyans who, many said, had infiltrated Eastleigh as government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  While young people I knew resisted discussing clan identities outright, it was also clear that 
the power of these identities had not necessarily faded, just changed, in the face of the civil war.  
For example, one young woman friend told me that her older sister, who was raising her, refused 
to even reveal their clan identity to her.  Nonetheless, her sister had told her it was “the best.”  
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spies.  “If General Aidid’s own son worked for the US government, then who can you trust?”37 
Moha once said to me, stressing the lack of trust amongst Somalis since the war. 
Language around trust and mistrust also evoked moral claims about social obligation and 
loyalty.  Somali-Kenyans working for the government betrayed the trust of their community—
their “tribe” bound by blood and religion.  The bond of the most fundamental relation of 
identity—the patriline—had been corrupted by violence and power, Moha suggested, when 
General Aidid’s son fought against his own father.  When Moha was asked about me—Is she a 
spy?  Do you know where she lives?  Are you now working for the CIA—haha—but really, are 
you?—he was also being warned not to betray the loyalty and trust of his community.  As 
marginalized and targeted minorities in Nairobi and in Kenya more generally, and amidst 
increasingly (real and perceived) inequality between people in Kenya and their kin in “the 
diaspora” or “abroad” (dibadda) (a term used to refer to “the West” rather than outside of 
Somalia but inside East Africa), norms around loyalty and obligation were grafted onto global 
migrations and the heightened inequities they wrought.   
 
One Broken Bone: Aid, Power, and Ties that Wound 
 I met Kauthar through Ibrahim, who worked with me as a research assistant.  One 
evening during Operation Usalama Watch, Ibrahim had been stopped by soldiers on his way 
home from his university classes.  Always scrupulous and exceptionally principled, Ibrahim 
refused to give money to the soldiers.  He was taken to jail, and later deported to the Dadaab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
37 General Aidid was one of the targets of the US military operation in Somalia in the 1994 
Operation Restore Hope.  Moha refers to the fact that General Aidid’s son, who was, at the time, 
in the US Marines, had been utilized as an interpreter in the fight against his father’s army.  For 
Moha, this betrayal of kinship loyalty represents the deterioration of trust caused by the war.   
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camps.  When he returned to Nairobi some weeks later, having renewed his movement pass that 
allowed him to study in Nairobi and arranged his return through a contact at an NGO, he 
introduced me to Farhiyo, a woman he had met in jail.  Farhiyo represented a tougher side of 
Eastleigh with which I had not previously interacted—of people who had lived hard lives, even 
by the standards of many refugees.  Kauthar was a friend of Farhiyo’s—they had known each 
other while living in the Kakuma refugee camp for many years.  Now they were both in Nairobi, 
and looked out for one another.   
 Kauthar had lived a difficult life—“My life was spoiled,” she told me.  Spoiled, first, 
when she was separated from her family during the war, and then by the people who abused and 
exploited her throughout her life.  The refrain of her story—which she repeated again and again 
when I interviewed her in her one-room, Eastleigh apartment shortly before I left Nairobi—was 
that losing her family during the war had left her totally vulnerable, and was, in some ways, 
responsible for all of the suffering she had experienced thereafter.  Kauthar had been a young girl 
in school when the war began in Mogadishu in 1991.  When fighting broke out in her 
neighborhood, her teacher had kept the students inside the school building, waiting for fighting 
to subside.  By the time the students were released, Kauthar returned home to find an abandoned 
house—her family having fled without her.  She would not learn of the whereabouts of any of 
her family members for another twenty-five years.   
 In the aftermath of her separation from her family, Kauthar was brought from Mogadishu 
to Kismayu by neighbors.  There, the father and children of the family with whom she fled 
boarded a crowded boat headed for Mombasa.  Only she, the mother, and grandmother remained.  
A week later they would learn that the boat had sunk and the entire family had drowned.  With 
nowhere to go and no one to take care of her, Kauthar stayed in Kismayu, and later gave birth to 
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two children.  The child’s father and his family were abusive, and Kauthar told me that she did 
not want to recall that period of her life.  Eventually, she escaped with her children to Kenya 
with the help of friends.  In Nairobi, she searched for clanspeople for assistance, but found none, 
which she attributed to the fact that she belonged to the minority Ashraf community. 
For protection and support, she married, and her husband brought her to Kakuma, where 
she had three more children.  In Kakuma, she and her family were identified for resettlement, but 
when things turned sour between Kauthar and her husband, the resettlement case went up in 
smoke.  Her husband decided he wanted to go to the United States with two of their children, and 
leave Kauthar and the other children behind.  He took the two children to Nairobi to try to begin 
a new process, this time through a different system—through sponsorship from his mother who 
lived in the US.  Sitting together in her dark room, her children as well as Farhiyo listening on, 
Kauthar told me, “He knows there are no people or family who can help me and support me, to 
talk to him and say, ‘Why are you doing this to her?’”  	  
 Neighbors in Kakuma told Kauthar where her husband had taken the children, and she 
gathered her other three kids and traveled the 450 miles of rough roads by bus to Nairobi, a city 
she only knew from her brief stay when she had first arrived in Kenya years prior.  When I met 
her in 2014, she had been staying in Nairobi for three years while her now-former husband 
continued to work on and wait for the sponsorship process through his mother.  His family 
supported Kauthar as the mother of their brother’s children, but kept her like a prisoner, she said.  
They gave her so little money that she had to rely on friends to buy clothes.  She couldn’t come 
and go freely.  When I met her, she was desperate for help, which is why she came running from 
her apartment the day she saw me walking with Ibrahim and Farhiyo.  Her daughter, who was 
seven, needed medical attention.  She explained that her husband had claimed that her daughter 
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did not belong to him, and that her husband’s relatives had pushed the girl, causing her to break 
her leg.  She had had an operation, but the bone hadn’t healed properly, and was now protruding 
painfully, preventing her from walking.   
*** 
On a morning in July I accompanied Kauthar to UNHCR to seek medical treatment for 
her daughter.  She had never been to the office, and Ibrahim and I agreed to go with her. It was 
7:30 in the morning and the sky was bright with sunshine when I left the house, unaware that 
Ibrahim had been arrested again the night before and would not be joining us.  Ruth, from whom 
I usually bought a newspaper on the corner, was surprised to see me out so early, as my early 
mornings usually took me through the other side of my neighborhood.  When I had called 
Kauthar from my house, she told me she was already waiting where we had agreed to meet, and 
so I darted through Pangani shopping center—a circular arrangement of shops and kiosks—
through the alleyway behind an Indian sweets shop and down a dirt path until I hit Juja Road, a 
major thoroughfare—a two-lane road often packed with three or four lanes of traffic at busy 
hours.   
Kauthar was waiting for me on the other side of the road next to a gas station and vendors 
selling pineapples and watermelons—some whole, others sliced and packaged in plastic wrap.  
She wore a black abaya and hijab with a denim jacket on top.  Her daughter, whom Kauthar calls 
Star because she dislikes the Somali name her ex-husband gave her, wore a long skirt and a 
large, tan jacket.  Fastened around her head with metal snaps was a navy-blue hood that had been 
detached from a different winter coat.  I was unsure if it served as a hijab, a winter hat for the 
crisp, cold season morning, or both.   
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After a twenty-minute ride, we got off the number six matatu thattook us downtown.  
Kauthar carried her documents in a worn, plastic shopping bag, which she handed to me as Star 
jumped onto her mother’s back, unable to walk, from the steps of the bus.  “UN! UN!” some of 
the matatu touts (a combination of ticket taker and salesman) called out to us.  These touts carry 
Somali women to the UNHCR office in Westlands every day.  They know exactly where these 
women, getting off of matatus from Eastleigh, with their long garments and henna-ed fingernails, 
carrying their purses and plastic bags full of papers underneath their heavy clothes, are heading.   
It is 8:30 am and there is a long line outside the UNHCR doors.  On the lawn in front of 
the office, a navy-clad askari (soldier, in this case, private security guard) approaches me and 
asks what I am doing here.  Focused on mustering a polite but confident tone, I tell him that I am 
here with a woman and her child who are seeking medical assistance.  The askari directs me to 
the front of the line, “Just tell that man there,” he tells me, pointing to another man in blue.  
Kauthar hesitates as the askari tells us to go ahead, “Ingia, ingia, ingia,” – Enter, enter, enter – 
he shouts at her.  “And where are you going?” the second askari asks me, to which I reply that I 
have escorted a friend and must accompany her home at the end of the day.  It’s true that I’ve 
escorted her.  It’s true that she wouldn’t know the way home, though another Somali lady at the 
UN would gladly accompany her back.  But I am also there as an ethnographic observer, and this 
makes me uneasy.  I am in a place that I don’t exactly belong.   
The askari nods me on, and we reach a turnstile.  We hand over our cell phones, and the 
guard hands us a plastic number that corresponds with the metal bin in which he had placed 
them. The uniformed woman on duty checks our bodies, running her hands swiftly over our 
arms, under our armpits, down our sides, and between our legs.  Once inside, we are directed into 
another, smaller waiting area protected by glass that you cannot see into, only out of once on the 
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inside.  From this waiting area lead two narrow hallways with numbered office doors.  Between 
the two hallways is a door with a “Staff Only” sign—a design that allows staff to enter the 
offices from one side, and refugees, when they’re called, to enter from the other.  Four askaris—
three men and one woman—patrol the room.  Some refugees, who the UN designates “clients,” 
have numbers, but those with medical cases seem not to—there are only a few.  I see a 
Congolese man with a missing leg and crutches, his corduroy pants sewn up at the stump.  There 
is an elderly Somali woman with a cane, escorted by a young man.   
UNHCR moved into this building from their old location on an adjacent road only a 
couple of years prior.  I had visited the old building, but had never been inside the equivalent 
space.  This area is well kept.  In the larger waiting area are long benches.  At the back of the 
room are clean restrooms and a small kiosk selling tea.  Inside the smaller room are rows of 
chairs, and a small TV mounted on the wall playing Al Jazeera news.  Posters, like the one I 
described in the previous chapter, seek to “sensitize” refugees about UNHCR rules and 
procedures—mostly warning them about the consequences of fraud and corruption. 
It is just after 8:30, and I ask one of the askaris when the doctor will see people.  He says 
Ten.  Another tells me Eleven.  When another askari comes by, he asks Kauthar what she needs.  
Having lived in Kakuma, where Swahili is the lingua franca, Kauthar speaks Swahili 
comfortably.  “Do you have a mandate?” he asks.  She opens her plastic bag and looks through 
her papers slowly, looking apprehensive, tense.  I suddenly realize, a lump in my stomach, that 
she does not have a mandate from Nairobi, but from Kakuma, which might bar her from getting 
any assistance here.  Inside her plastic bag she has a small purse, and from it she pulls out a 
laminated paper with her thumbprint.  She hands this to me, along with another paper—her 
mandate—which includes a row of passport-style photos of her children.  The askari looks at the 
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papers.  “This is for Kakuma,” he says, reading the larger document.  I stand up from where I am 
sitting, feeling responsible for having brought her all this way, and speak to him in a low voice.  
“You know,” I say, “this woman was called by her husband to come to Nairobi. During 
that time, her daughter fell and broke her leg.  Now she can’t return to Kakuma, but really needs 
assistance.”   
Consciously or not, I am trying to portray her as a dutiful wife and responsible mother—a 
person worthy of help.  The askari asks to see the child’s leg, and Kauthar lifts her skirt 
revealing a long scar and the bone bulging out irregularly.  Speaking to me in English, the askari 
says that she should go to the camp to get treatment, but that he will leave it to the doctor to tell 
us what to do. 
The room is mostly filled with Somali women, who are chatting with each other.  They 
ask about me, and Kauthar tells the women that I am a student, and that my report will help 
refugees.  I take her statement to the women as a meaningful vote of confidence and an act of 
friendship.  Observing Kauthar’s trust in me, the other women waiting to be seen begin telling 
me stories.  It was in these kinds of spaces—waiting with refugees at UNHCR and other 
NGOs—where I learned a great deal about people’s lives and grievances.38   
I talk with some of the women—one of whose mother was in Syracuse, New York, not 
far from my hometown.  Kauthar chats, too.  She gets up, bringing water back for Star and a cup 
of tea for me.  It is Ramadan, and she confides that she needs to sneak a cup of tea out of the 
sight of the other women.  She doesn’t want them to see her, but was desperate.  The askari who 
we had spoken to earlier walks by carrying a crying baby. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 These stories were likely always told within the framework of people observing me as a white 
American lending assistance to another refugee.  How that inflected their way of approaching 
me, and also the ethical conundrum of what my being there suggested to them about what I could 
or could not do to assist them, haunted me everywhere I went.  
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 “Mama ako wapi?” he asks in Swahili—“Where is your mom?”   
Another askari jokes with the women sitting near us.  “Ni Somali Mzungu,” referring to 
me in Swahili as “a white Somali.”   
They laugh and when he passes me asks, this time in Somali, “Maficantahay?”  How are 
you? – these guards having picked up a few phrases by spending their days in the company of 
refugees.  I reply, “Waan ficaanahay,”—I’m fine.   
The odd scene of a Kenyan and Mzungu greeting one another in Somali makes the 
women roar with laughter.  Waiting in these spaces can be monotonous and cruel.  But can also 
be, I learn, a space in which refugees form solidarities and share information.  It is a space where 
ideas about the aid and resettlement apparatus are formed, and about who can and cannot be 
trusted. 
A different woman tells Kauthar that after coming to UNHCR time and time again 
without being assisted, she met a young white woman, who is seeing clients in room eleven.  
Only after seeing this young woman did she receive assistance.  “I need to talk to that woman,” 
Kauthar tells me.  Capitalizing on my presence, she tells me to go and speak to her.  The space of 
the UNHCR offices is heavily fortified with boundaries—who can and cannot go where and 
when is made apparent by doors, windows, glass partitions, and signs.  How can I enter this 
woman’s office uninvited when no one else in the room would dream of it?  That won’t work, I 
tell her.  I might anger or annoy her, and that would not help our cause. 
 Around 11 am, the young white woman—apparently the one working in room eleven—
comes out of the “Staff Only” door.  She is dressed in a white top and navy pencil skirt.  Kauthar 
tells me that she doesn’t want to talk to a black person; she wants to talk to a white person.  
White people want to help, she says.   
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“Go, go, try to talk to that lady,” she urges me.   
I tell her I’m concerned that the woman will be irritated.  A foreigner coming to UNHCR 
and advocating for particular refugees might not be appreciated, I suggest.  The idea of trying to 
gain preferential treatment as a white, English-speaking foreigner, even for Kauthar and Star 
who deserve assistance in my view, makes me cringe, and I fear calling attention to myself might 
earn me a bad reputation.  But my explanation for my resistance does not translate to Kauthar.  
Understandably, gaining her preferential treatment is precisely what I am there for, in her view.  
With the “Staff Only” door open, Kauthar and the woman with family in Syracuse push me, “Go 
in, go in!”  I shake my head.  Kauthar is clearly disappointed.   
“Look,” I tell her, “I’ll go sit by the door.  If I can catch someone’s eye, I’ll try to talk to 
them.”   
An askari appears and tells us that the doctor will be here at Two.  Another, older white 
woman emerges from the door, quickly lifting a cell phone to her ear.  “That woman,” Kauthar 
says, “she works in child protection, someone told me.  If we can talk to her, maybe she’ll help.”  
Minutes later, the same woman makes her way back towards the “Staff Only” door, through the 
now-crowded waiting room.  The woman doesn’t look at us as she moves past. 
“Excuse me,” I say.  She doesn’t turn.   
“Hello!” Kauthar shouts after her in a louder voice.  The woman now turns, surprised.  I 
stand up.   
“Do you happen to know when the doctor might be coming in?” I ask, starting with a 
question that I hope will seem reasonable and innocuous.  Now that the woman has stopped, I 
continue, “I’ve come with this woman and her child, who has a serious injury, and we were 
hoping to see the doctor.”   
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 “Oh,” she says.  “I don’t know, but I believe he may be in a meeting.”  To my surprise, 
she asks to see Star.  Now there is a crowd growing around her.  Kauthar begins to maneuver 
Star, starting to hoist her on her back to bring her to the UNHCR representative.  I tell her to 
wait, as the woman is making her way over.  She takes a look at Star’s leg and tells us that no 
one will be able to treat her here—they’re giving consultations and referrals.   
“You should go to NCCK,” she says. “That’s our partner organization that provides 
medical services.”  Kauthar has never heard of them.   
“Okay, let me get you an address,” she says, disappearing through the “Staff Only” door.  
The whole room is buzzing now.   
Kauthar asks, “Will she give us a paper?  A paper to take to the other place?”  I am afraid 
there will be no written referral, just an address.    
 After a moment, the woman returns to the waiting area, “I just happened to find the 
doctor,” she says, and I feel as if we are in Oz, finally meeting the Wizard.  People crowd around 
her, and she turns to one of the women, telling her, “If you’ve been permitted to come in here, 
then you will receive help, but I can’t assist everyone.”    
The doctor, a Kenyan man, is speaking to me in Swahili, and I tell him that Kauthar 
speaks Swahili, so he should speak to her directly.  Looking at Star’s leg, he tells her that on 
Wednesday morning they will transport Star from the clinic on Fourth Street in Eastleigh to 
Kijabi Hospital—a well-known hospital about an hour outside of the city that specializes in 
bones.	  	   Kauthar tells the doctor, “I need your number,” gesturing to my small Karatasi brand 
notebook, in which I’m writing down his instructions.   
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“Take my number,” she says frantically, “and also hers,” gesturing to me.  The doctor 
takes out his phone and punches the number into his cell phone as she recites the numbers in 
English.   
“And her number,” Kauthar repeats, prompting me to give mine.  She is frenzied.  She 
seems afraid that this opportunity will escape her, as others have.   
The doctor instructs Kauthar to come to the clinic by 5:30 in the morning, and tells me 
that I can call him on Tuesday evening to remind him.  When the doctor leaves, people begin 
writing their numbers in my notebook.  They start handing me papers.  A woman gives me a 
stack of documents written in Swedish, explaining that her son is in Stockholm and she’s trying 
to join him.  I try explaining that I’m just a student – that I actually don’t have a connection to 
UNHCR – that I can’t read Swedish – that I probably can’t help.  But how do I convince people 
that I can’t help, when they just saw how my assistance worked?  When my presence was clearly 
the only reason that Kauthar and Star were attended to out of dozens of people who had been 
waiting there since the early morning?    
I have only confirmed the already strongly held idea that “vulnerability”—at least not 
vulnerability alone—does not gain refugees access to assistance, but that power gains them 
access—power in the form of privileges oriented around race, money, language, as well as social 
networks and capital.  Race and class privilege were not terms that I heard refugees living in 
Nairobi use.  But they are related to ideas that refugees in Nairobi said such as, “The poorest 
people don’t even know how these things work;” or “If we had that money to buy a case, we 
would do it.”  This isn’t to say that vulnerable, and even the “most vulnerable” refugees do not 
benefit from resettlement.  But that is not how the process is typically understood by refugees 
themselves.  Rather, many people—many more than 1 percent—see themselves as genuine 
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applicants whose claims, suffering, and vulnerability is as pressing and genuine as that of most 
others.  Thus, who is resettled and who is not appears to depend on chance—“bahati waye!” 
people would say in Somali, “it’s luck!”—or on power, rather than a fair and systematic ranking 
of deservingness or need.    
 I have told Kauthar’s story to highlight real and perceived national, racial, linguistic, and 
other social hierarchies in accessing humanitarian assistance for refugees, and the acute sense of 
uncertainty surrounding access to aid and resettlement.  I argue that understanding the 
resettlement system to be both arbitrary and unjust, refugees do not perceive their primary ethical 
obligation as following rules of NGOs and governments that appear to be unjustly applied.  
Rather, people’s obligations are wrapped in complex webs of self-preservation and familial 
obligation.  Kauthar narrated her own experience as one of being disadvantaged by her familial 
dislocation.  The loss of her family made her powerless against the abuses of her children’s 
fathers and their families.  Her husband’s divorcing her destroyed one chance at resettlement, 
while his mother’s powerful position in the United States was allowing him another shot at 
resettlement that she worried would allow him to take two of her children away.  He needed her 
to sign for her children’s release, she told me.  What choice did she have?  She said tearfully.  
Perhaps this would afford them a better life.  Kauthar’s articulation of her bad fortune on account 
of this familial breakdown contrasts sharply with this next story, which highlights the fulfillment 
of moral duties to kin as they are woven into the resettlement processes. 
 
Another Broken Bone: Family, Obligation, and Moral Redistribution 
Moha and I are on our way to try to get his alien card from a government employee.  We 
are sitting on the balcony at Hamdi, a Somali restaurant downtown, eating pilau near tables of 
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important Somali men—Moha recognizes some of them as current and former politicians.  A 
blue-and-white awning shades us from the hot afternoon sun as we look out at storefronts on one 
of downtown’s more polished streets.  Moha is agitated about his alien card, which he needs 
immediately now that he has been cleared by the Canadian government.  He only requires this  
one last document to acquire the necessary Exit permit from the Kenyan government so that he 
can leave the country.  But the government official he was put in touch with by his old friend, 
Amina—now in the US—is not returning his calls.  That is why we are at Hamdi eating pilau, 
instead of retrieving his card and returning home. 
It is April 2014, and a lot has happened in the last month.  The Kenyan government 
began a relocation directive for refugees and initiated Operation Usalama Watch, a campaign of 
police and military crackdown involving arrests, document checking and vetting, and 
deportation.  Police have extorted massive amounts of money from Eastleigh residents.  
Refugees (and Somali-Kenyans) are living in fear of nightly raids and the possibility of arrest, 
extortion, and deportation to camps or even Somalia.  Several months prior to the Operation, 
Moha broke his leg on a street near his home—a police chase-down of alleged suspects had sent 
him running, then crashing to the ground.  In the midst of all of this, nearly two years after he 
deposited paperwork at the Canadian Embassy, Moha has been interviewed twice at the 
Embassy, and is now looking forward to leaving the country.   
We finish eating.  Moha looks agitatedly at his phone.  I order a coffee, trying to stay 
energized.  It’s already been a long day.  I ask him how his older sister, Zamzam, feels about him 
leaving Kenya.  He reminds me that the family had originally planned for her to be included in 
the case, before she decided to return to Somalia with her husband.  When they discovered 
Kismayu was too unsafe, they returned to Kenya, but by then it was too late to add them to the 
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case, as the paperwork had already been submitted with only Moha, his cousin Ahmed, and Issa, 
the brother of his uncle’s wife.   
“It’s just missing,” he says.  Of course she will miss him, but that’s normal, he says.   
I have never met Zamzam, who lives in Dadaab with her husband and children.  Moha 
has told me that she treats him like a child, although he is in his twenties—as if she birthed him 
herself, he says.  Their mother was paralyzed when Moha was a child.  “If you saw her while she 
was sitting,” Moha had told me, “it was just like she was a normal person.”  She could use her 
arms and hands, but not her legs.  She had fallen into a well when Moha, the youngest in his 
family of six brothers and one sister, was small.  He was close with his mother—the baby of the 
family.  She took him everywhere.  But Zamzam had been instrumental in raising him, especially 
after his mother was incapacitated by her injury.   
Moha comes from a large family in southern Somalia.  He was born at the beginning of 
the war in a coastal village, south of the port city of Kismayu.  In the ‘90s and early 2000s, his 
family moved between Kismayu and their village.  These days, when he can barely move from 
his home in Eastleigh due to the Operation and relocation directive, when the police come 
knocking every night, when Kenyans call him “al-Shabaab” as a slur (later, he was arrested in 
Eastleigh by undercover cops)—in these days, Moha tells me he dreams of eating fish and 
sleeping on the white sand beach of his village, where he has the right to be, and no one can tell 
him to go anywhere else.   
In reality, sleeping peacefully on his beach in southern Somalia in 2014 is only a dream.  
The region is in crisis. The peaceful village on the Indian Ocean of his childhood decimated by 
war.  News reports from the past few years report dozens killed by US drone strikes in his home 
area.  More recently, the village had been taken by al-Shabaab.  This period, Moha tells me, the 
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year we have known each other—that began with the Westgate Mall attack in September of 
2013, and that now finds us waiting uncertainly for a phone call in the midst of an anti-refugee 
operation—has been the worst of his life.   
Moha had finished high school at the end of 2012. At the time, he had requested that his 
uncle in Canada, who had supported his education and living expenses for several years, send 
him to university.  Moha had been hoping to study biology and become a doctor.  But his uncle, 
Ali, who supports a large number of family members in Kenya and Somalia, had broken down 
his monthly and yearly expenses for Moha—calculating that over fifty percent of his annual 
income went to support family members in Africa.  University tuition for Moha was beyond his 
financial capacity.  
For several years now, Ali and his wife had been working on arranging to sponsor Ali’s 
two nephews, Moha and Ahmed, and his wife’s younger brother, Issa. Unlike the US, which has 
strict family sponsorship rules allowing refugees to sponsor only spouses, unmarried children 
under 21, and parents, in Canada far fewer rules restrict who can be sponsored through the 
refugee program.  Ali had submitted the paperwork in Toronto in 2011, and in June 2012 (Moha 
remembered the exact date) the young men had gone for the first time to the Canadian Embassy 
on Limuru Road—only a few miles from their home in Eastleigh—to file their part of the 
application.  Now, in April  2014, the young men had been interviewed twice at the Embassy and 
anticipated leaving Kenya later that year.  It didn’t make sense, Ali told Moha, for him to begin 
college in Kenya now, when he likely wouldn’t be able to finish his degree before leaving the 
country.  Thus, when I arrived in Nairobi in August of 2013, Moha had grown tired of the 
freedom from his high school regimen that he had so looked forward to the previous year.   
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Meeting Moha 
In the summer of 2012, I had connected with a Somali interpreter from UNHCR, Amina, 
who tutored me in Somali over that summer.  We would meet downtown in the evening after she 
had finished working at the UNHCR office in Westlands.  She was kind enough to accept my 
modest, graduate-student payment and extend her work day three nights a week to help me learn 
kinship terms, greetings, counting—basics.  We would meet in an empty classroom at Mount 
Kenya University on Moi Avenue where she had recently been a student, and there we became 
fast friends.  Between my leaving Nairobi that August and my return one year later, Amina 
herself had been resettled—after many years of waiting—to the US, where she quickly started 
working for a local resettlement agency, and later as a home health aide.  I e-mailed her in San 
Diego in August 2013 when I arrived to begin my dissertation fieldwork; she replied that none of 
her former UNHCR colleagues had responded to her message about tutoring an American PhD 
student, but her friend, Moha, was willing.    
I had hesitated to call Moha at first, having had my heart set on working with a woman.  
This would make life simpler in a community in which men’s and women’s lives were fairly 
segregated (though I would later understand gender relations were more complex in the maze of 
apartments in Eastleigh’s concrete buildings, and through the maze of Internet cables connecting 
countries and continents).  But Amina nudged me a few days after her first e-mail—“Did you get 
my e-mail?”  Copying Moha’s phone number again, she wrote, “He’s a good friend of mine.”   
Later that week, Moha and I met at a popular restaurant near his apartment in Eastleigh, 
which he shared with Ahmed and Issa.  Ahmed and Issa were in college.  At the time, Issa was 
boarding at his campus and only came back to their one-room home on breaks.  Ahmed 
commuted to his college downtown, but was busy studying and organizing a Somali youth 
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association, which had a small space in Eastleigh where he often worked and studied.  Many of 
Moha’s high school colleagues had scattered after graduation.  The Kenyans, many of whom had 
been boarders, had returned to other parts of the country.  Others had begun college and 
university.  Many of the Somalis had gone abroad—from Canada to China to Turkey—whether 
through resettlement and family sponsorship, or on government scholarships to continue their 
studies.  Some of the girls had married men in Europe or North America, and some had gone to 
other countries to wait for resettlement processes—Ethiopia and Uganda, for example, where 
some expected that the process would move more quickly.  Other girls had married and were no 
longer “around”—out and about, but rather at home, now wives and mothers.  Others, like their 
Kenyan colleagues, were continuing their studies in Nairobi or in other parts of the country.  
Moha, on the other hand, was “around,” waiting for his process to come to fruition, with little to 
keep him occupied.  He had a girlfriend, but she was finishing high school, and was therefore 
busy, and plus lived in another neighborhood.  This left Moha with plenty of time to help 
relatives and neighbors who needed assistance with their own resettlement and family 
sponsorship processes—translating documents, making phone calls, accompanying people who 
spoke neither Swahili nor English to various offices; and also to hang around with an American 
anthropologist.  
It was immediately apparent to me why Amina had connected me to Moha.  Or at least it 
was apparent that we would get along.  Growing up between a coastal village, a major Somali 
city, and the capitals of Uganda and Kenya, Moha had developed an eclectic and cosmpolitan 
view of the world.  Passionate about his homeland, he often spoke like a nationalist and a 
hawk—seeing war with neighboring countries as a solution to Somalia’s sovereignty problems 
once the country was back on its feet.  Yet on social issues, he was not conservative by the 
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standards of the community.  In principle, he supported girls’ and women’s rights.  He spoke 
with admiration of young women activists of his generation who had captured public attention—
people like Malala Yousafzai, and the young Somali activist, Ilwad Elman.  He would talk 
passionately about FGM—using the global rights terminology for female circumcision, talking 
about personhood, the family and sexuality—initially much to my surprise.   
The three young men—Moha, Ahmed, and Issa—whom I got to know over about fifteen 
months until Moha and Issa left the country, leaving Ahmed behind, were deeply engaged in 
Somali, Kenyan, and world politics.  They loved to debate, and often disagreed.  Moha and Issa 
were often at odds, with Ahmed mediating.  Moha was considered the younger, hot-headed one, 
and the other two often took more diplomatic views.  “If Issa says this is a door, I will say it’s a 
window!” Moha would say, laughing about their constant disagreements.  In the afternoon, when 
I would meet him for our language lesson on the second-floor restaurant above shops selling 
women’s clothes, perfume and jewelry, Moha would often tell me that the three had been up all 
night debating.  Whether it was Somali federalism and the best path for power sharing, Assad’s 
Syria, the banning of a book in Eastleigh shops, or various principles of Islamic law, through 
years of discussion and debate, reading and watching the news, formal education, as well as 
listening to positions stated at the mosques and debated in tea shops and markets, the three were 
well versed in the art of argument, and held strong opinions.  Issa, in particular, could talk at 
incredible length, boring his opponents into submission by using an extraordinary level of detail 
and breathing infrequently.  “The professor,” his friends called him teasingly.   
When Moha broke his leg, I began coming to his house for Somali lessons, as the flights 
of concrete stairs of his apartment building, and the crowded and uneven, often flooded streets of 
Eastleigh were inaccessible on crutches.  There, in his home, I began meeting his friends, as well 
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as getting to know Ahmed and Issa, and listening to and participating in their debates.  Moha was 
deeply interested in partaking in public conversations.  He occasionally wrote in questions to be 
read on air on the famous Kenyan TV journalist Julie Gichuru’s show, Africa Leadership 
Dialogues.  He always attended events and talks to which I invited him on the other side of town 
at places like Amnesty International.  Amidst a particularly lively round of debate in their one-
room home, Moha would declare, “All we’re lacking is the media!” pointing out that their 
discussions were worthy of circulation beyond the walls of the small apartment.   
Moha’s worldview had been shaped by a complicated set of life experiences and 
exposure to a wide range of people and places.  Growing up relatively independently, in three 
countries, a village, four cities, and a refugee camp, he had a wide range of influences and 
curiosity about the world.   
 
Leaving Somalia 
As a child in southern Somalia, Moha heard the name “Nairobi” occasionally.  From time 
to time he would hear that his uncle Abdiqani, the father of Ahmed, was in Nairobi for business.  
At the time, as a young boy educated at madrasa, Moha was unaware that Nairobi was in a 
different country, where people spoke different languages, looked different, and practiced 
different religions.  He knew it only as another city within the realm of travel for people in his 
social world.  Moha grew up during the war, but almost never talked about the war in the context 
of his own life to me.  If he discussed violence, he did not frame it as a product of the war as a 
particular event.  Rather, the nearly two-and-a-half decades of civil conflict were simply the way 
things were, the normal conditions of life in Somalia.  Only once did he relay a story of the 
murder of one of his uncles, who was killed in front of his uncle’s own son, who later went 
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crazy.  Even when he told me that one of his brothers had been shot and killed, he did not 
describe it as part of a war, per se—just life in Somalia as he knew it.  Once, when I asked him 
why he was surprised when he saw a Kenyan soldier for the first time—hadn’t he seen soldiers 
in Somalia?—he said that in Somalia everyone had a gun—but they were not dressed in uniform, 
just as normal people.   
When Moha was about ten, his family decided that his uncle, Abdiqani, Ahmed’s father, 
would bring Moha to Nairobi to seek medical attention for a bone problem he had had since 
birth.  When I recorded Moha in 2014, he told the story this way: 
“Just a week before my departure is when dad told me that Abdiqani was coming, and 
we’ll be going to Nairobi.  And the Nairobi I have in mind is like, I don’t even know if it looks 
like the sky. I just used to hear, ‘Oh Abdiqani is in Nairobi, Abdiqani is in Nairobi.’ I never even 
knew if it was part of Somalia, or whether it was anywhere else.  We traveled.  I remember it 
was morning.  Very early in the morning.  We never passed Kismayu.  It was my first time to 
travel with a car.” 
“Had you traveled by bus before, or never a vehicle?”  
“By boat.  It was my first time to travel by car.  It was very unusual to me.  Then  
the problem was, on our way, during the journey, I vomited.  The road was sooo rough.  Then I 
vomited very badly.  We were four.  One was the driver, the uncle, I, and one was a soldier.  
There’s no peace in the country, so if there is something, maybe a roadblock, we needed 
someone.  Then we traveled, we traveled, we came to a place called Badhaadhe.  It’s part of 
Somalia.  We rested there.  My clothes had to be washed.  We had to rest there.  Have lunch.”   
Moha snapped his fingers, emphasizing their onward motion. 
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“We departed again.  At six evening we were at the border of Kenya.  This place called 
Hulugho.  Then Hulugho, what I remember was that the guy [soldier] was carrying a gun.  In any 
case to defend us.  Then, what they did, they had to bury the gun somewhere, before we reached, 
a very short distance from the border, we buried the gun somewhere, so the Kenyans don’t catch 
us with that.  So then we entered the border as civilians.  Then the Kenyan soldiers came.  For 
me, I’m very young.  Then they asked some questions to the uncle.  For me I was wondering, 
this looked like a movie to me.  The other thing that really made me wonder was when I saw the 
Kenyans.  Because I believed that all the people that exist around the world are only Somalis.… 
We talked, they talked, everything was okay, we entered.”   
“In Hulugho, we stayed with someone who the uncle knew.  I started asking some  
questions. ‘Uncle, who are these guys?’  He told me, ‘We’re in Kenya.’  I said, ‘Kenya?’  
‘Yeah.’  Then I just kept quiet, still having some questions, like, ‘What is Kenya?’ but I couldn’t 
ask far more.  I just kept quiet, kept quiet.  Then later I asked, ‘Who are these guys?’  He said, 
‘These are Kenyans.’  I said, ‘I have never seen people looking like this.’  He laughed.  He said, 
‘Oh, you’ll see them more.’   
In the morning, again we got another ticket, to Garissa.  At around four, we came to 
Garissa.  In Garissa, things were normal.  It just looked like Somalia.  I also had another question 
there.  We had a hotel.  Then the hotel had a balcony.  I stood there.  I started watching the city.  
Cars were moving, very busily.  Then I asked, ‘What are these cars moving like this?’  Then he 
said, ‘This country is very peaceful.  People are just running their duties.’  ‘Oh,’ I said, ‘Okay.  I 
see.’   
Moha snapped his fingers again. 
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“In the morning again, we had to travel to Nairobi.  That’s when I realized that now 
we’re in a different world.  Completely.  Everywhere I look, I don’t see the people I knew, the 
faces.  Now things look very different.  I’m wondering!  So many questions now in my mind.  In 
Nairobi, I remember some cousins came to see me, the son of So-and-So.  They only know the 
dad, but no one knows me.  ‘The son of So-and-So was brought for medical.’” 
Moha was taken to Kijabi Hospital, the same hospital where Star was treated ten years 
later, where he would stay for a week.  Following his treatment, Moha and his uncle stayed in a 
hostel in Eastleigh for several months.  About six months after his treatment, his uncle had to 
leave for business, traveling to Mombasa, Tanzania, and Uganda.   
“Before, his aim was for me to be treated in Nairobi and then sent back to Somalia.   
When he went to Uganda, he decided that I and his son should go for studies.  He liked it there.  
Then he came back and asked me, ‘Mohamed, do you want to go back to Somalia?’  I said, 
‘Yes!’ I was missing the family so much…  Then he started discussing with the young aunt [in 
Seattle].  ‘How do you see if I bring Ahmed, and Mohamed is already here, and they go together 
for studies?’ She said, ‘It’s very good.’  For him, he had the idea, but financing was these people 
who were outside [of Africa].  He couldn’t just make his own decisions, because he was not 
someone who could just be around all the time – he was traveling.  He had to inform these 
people so they can at least know where we are.  He was like, ‘What could this young boy be 
doing in a country that is so violent?’  Everyone’s carrying a gun.  Even people of my age were 
carrying a gun.  So, he said, ‘Let him be at least safe from that.’  Later on he told me, ‘You’re 
not going back, you’ll go to school.’  Then the preparation of bringing Ahmed started.”   
Abdiqani brought Moha and Ahmed to Kampala, where they lived with the family of a 
Somali man who drove a commercial truck that Abdiqani owned.  He hired a Ugandan tutor to 
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teach the boys English for three months until they had enough basic skills to begin school.  
While the truck driver was on the road, his young wife looked after the two boys.  Moha 
described the relationship as one of frequent conflict.  The boys were stubborn and noisy, and 
she had no control over them.  Furious one day, she threatened to poison them.  After that, they 
refused to eat the food that she cooked, and over time, they left the house altogether and lived on 
their own.  They ate at an elderly Somali woman’s small restaurant, to whom Abdiqani sent 
money for their meals and other necessities.  He sent their school fees to a sheik he knew and 
trusted.  The boys made friends with their schoolmates and quickly learned both Luganda and 
English.  They socialized not only with their Somali peers, but also with Ugandans, who became 
close friends.  Without the oversight of their parents or close relatives, they experienced a world 
with fewer boundaries.   
 
A Family Matter 
Abdiqani has six siblings.  He is actually Moha’s cousin; their fathers are brothers.  But 
Moha, the last born of his family, is a year younger than Ahmed, who is the first born of 
Abdiqani’s children, so he calls Abdiqani “uncle” on account of his age.  Moha’s father’s 
siblings all remain in Somalia, as do his mother’s.  But Abdiqani’s siblings are spread out all 
over the world: from Seattle to Stockholm to Toronto.  Only Abdiqani remained on the 
continent—traveling on business between Somalia and East Africa.  Abdiqani and his siblings 
had plans for Moha and Ahmed to leave, too.  They would be the next generation—raised in 
Africa with particular kinds of values and identities, but destined for “the West,” where they 
could build the family, and carry on the obligation to assist relatives back home.  It became clear 
to me, more and more as their long-awaited journey drew closer, that their relatives abroad could 
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not sustain them forever, and that it would now be up to them, two capable and educated young 
men, to sustain others.   
 Over the years that Moha and Ahmed lived in Kampala, several plans were raised and 
abandoned.  When they were still young, the extended family considered that they could leave 
for the US as the sons of the truck driver and his wife, who had a resettlement case.  Moha 
explained that ultimately his family was uncomfortable with them going to the US at such a 
young age.  They should stay in Africa among the Somali community, where they would have 
the influence of the mosque and Muslim society, and leave later, once they had strong cultural 
and religious values.  About seven years after they had first arrived in Kampala, another uncle—
one of Abdiqani’s younger brothers who was living in Europe—traveled to Nairobi to marry.  
Their aunt in Seattle, a mother of five and a force to be reckoned with, had never been 
comfortable with the two boys living so independently in Kampala.   
“I got a call one day at school,” Moha told me.  “It was the aunt.  She told me, ‘Pack your 
things, you’re going to Nairobi.’”   
 The boys finished the school year, and traveled to Kenya.  Ahmed had never been to 
Nairobi, and Moha had not been there since he had left the hostel in Eastleigh where he had 
recovered from his surgery seven years before.  That was a different lifetime—before they had 
gone to school, before they had learned to speak and think in two other languages, and before 
Moha’s mother had passed away in Somalia without his seeing her.  By the time they left 
Uganda, Moha’s Luganda was so good that he could practically pass as a Ugandan boy, telling 
the border guards on his way out of the country that he was just visiting Kenya on holiday.  His 
Luganda was so good, he would tell me, that when he met Ugandans in Eastleigh, they insisted 
that his mother must be Ugandan.  He shocked people by telling them which part of the country 
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they were from by listening to their accents, and always made friends with the Ugandan ladies 
who worked as maids or in small restaurants.   
 Now, with their young uncle in nearby Nairobi, Moha and Ahmed were sent to live with 
him and his new wife.  But the boys, now teenagers, had become accustomed to living on their 
own, and struggled to take orders from their new guardian, who they saw more as a peer—barely 
older than themselves.  After several months, they told their relatives at the command centers in 
North America that they could no longer live with their young uncle. 
“Then the aunt, and the uncle in Canada, decided for us that we should go to the camps.  
They told us, ‘You know, go to the camps, we’re doing some programs for you guys.  It is easier 
for someone to come [to North America] from the camps.’  Then we were interested in going to 
Canada.  They told us that it’s just a matter of two months.  But two months turned into eight 
months.  I had never been to the camps before.” 
 “What did you think the camps would be like before you went there?” 
“The camp, the word ‘camp,’ the camp, the word we use in the Somali language  
gives you an explanation that that place is not good.  ‘Xerada’ is like ‘camp,’ refugee camps, so 
xerada is like ‘fence,’ so you’re in a prison which has an open roof.  You see?  So, you can 
understand.” 
“We arrived there.  We had relatives there.  We lived with them a couple of weeks.  Then 
my sister came.  Then, when the sister came, we lived with her.  They [she and her husband] 
were supposed to be part of the program to be taken to Canada, but because the process was 
taking so long, they couldn’t wait.  They moved back to Kismayu.  That was when I saw my 
sister after eight years.  When we came, we went to the UN to register ourselves.  We got the 
ration card number, we were fully registered.  Then my sister and her husband moved back to 
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Kismayu.  Then we remained there, both of us, I and Ahmed there, in that same house.  Alone.  
Again.  Then later on we decided we’d leave.  We called Ahmed’s dad.  We said, ‘We cannot be 
here any more.’  They told us we had to stay, but later on they agreed.” 
 “So day to day, you woke up and what did you do?” 
“You woke up and just walked around.  There was nothing to do.  Nothing to do.   
You fetch water.  You fetch water.  You fetch water, go and collect firewood.  Yeah.  That’s a 
life which we were not used to.  The temperature is like forty degrees Celsius.  You drink like a 
whole jerry can of water in an hour.  We even got sick!  Very demoralized to be in the camps.” 
 “Sick like how?” 
 “Mentally, disappointed.  We couldn’t be there.  You lose appetite, cannot eat, you  
don’t even talk.  You’re just depressed.”    
 Returning to Nairobi, the boys insisted they live alone, “We never wanted anyone 
directing us.  We just wanted a free life,” Moha said.   
Ahmed’s father, Abdiqani, refused, but Ali, their younger uncle in Canada, a doctor, 
agreed to take on their living and schooling expenses.  From near and far, the traveling Abdiqani 
and his siblings weighed in on the boys’ lives.  Their aunt in Seattle urged for their attending a 
boarding school outside of Nairobi (common in Kenya, even for the working class).  But they 
refused, and enrolled at Eastleigh High School near the room they rented in one of Eastleigh’s 
concrete apartment buildings.  Now registered as refugees, Moha and Ahmed knew the goal was 
to leave Kenya, though Moha would spend the next six years there, and Ahmed seven.  
  While in Nairobi, several ideas about leaving the country percolated within the family.  
Someone had suggested they go to Egypt.  Another had a plan to bring them to Sweden.  But 
none of these ultimately came to fruition.  At one point, an aunt suggested they travel to Syria, as 
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the resettlement process would move faster from there on account of the civil war.  “They 
wanted to make us into real refugees!” Moha exclaimed of this plan, distinguishing between the 
relative stability of their lives and refugees fleeing the catastrophic violence in Syria.  While the 
goal of having the boys access resettlement from the camps had not panned out, a new idea 
emerged at the time Ahmed was finishing high school. 
 “When Ahmed finished, he was supposed to go to China for university, to do medical 
[training].  Then Ali called [from Canada] and said, ‘Calculate, make the budget and see.’  When 
we did it was very expensive for the uncle to pay for that.  This is when the process was arising.  
Then [Ali] said, ‘Instead of now doing this, if Ahmed goes to China, he needs accommodations 
for himself.  Mohamed is again finishing next year, and he cannot just be around here, he has to 
go somewhere, too.  And this money, I cannot afford.’  Then he said, ‘What if I sponsor them so 
they come to Canada and start university here?  With loans there are so many ways.’  Ahmed’s 
dad said, ‘That can be very good if you do that.’  Then he said, ‘Okay,’ then that is how the 
process of Canada started.” 
  In our recorded conversation that I cite here, on a day some months prior to his 
departure, and in many other stories he told me, Moha narrated his life through stories about the 
ways in which his relatives from around the world had shaped his life with focused intention.  
Moha’s father could not provide the medical care and educational opportunities outside of 
Somalia that other relatives could.  But Abdiqani, and the flock of six aunts and uncles spread 
throughout the world, had taken Moha’s future into their hands.  Their investment in Moha and 
Ahmed—through the boys’ education and eventually bringing them to Canada—was part of 
fulfilling their obligations as the members of a family who were in a position to assist their kin.   
*** 
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 Throughout my fieldwork I organized several focus groups with young, English-speaking 
Somalis who were Moha’s friends and acquaintances.  At the time, most of them were either 
finishing high school in Nairobi, or had recently finished and were trying to figure out what to do 
next.  Most had relatives abroad, and many were trying or had tried to go abroad in one way or 
another.  In our discussions, the participants spoke about the nature of resettlement in the context 
of family obligation.  Sowdo, a sharp young woman who grew up in Kakuma and was now 
finishing high school in Nairobi, told a story of a distantly related aunt in Norway who refused to 
help her own sister and niece, who were also Sowdo’s relatives and who lived nearby.  Sowdo 
described this refusal as a deep moral failing, contrasting it with her own “good” assistance of 
her brother in Somalia:    
“When I send money to my brother—every month I send money—and I tell him, ‘How 
are you doing?  How’s your life?  Is everything good?’  That’s helping, and the person I’m 
helping will feel good.  [He’ll say], ‘At the end of the day, I have my sister.  I don’t need 
anybody.’  But, what if I send the money and the month is about to be over, and she [the aunt in 
Norway] doesn’t even ask how they are?  There are some people, when they get money, they 
help more people.  They give them jobs.  They change the lives of many.  And some, they want 
to rule the lives of many.  What if she sponsored her sister to [go to] Norway?  [Then] she 
wouldn’t be needed.  Her sister would get a good job, would get a house.  She would be an 
individual.  That’s what she doesn’t want.  She wants people to say, ‘Oh, Khadija helps her sister 
every day.’ Maybe that’s what she wants. That’s how I think. You know, if she was a good 
sister, she could have sponsored her sister. To Norway, to live a life just like her.  You know, be 
an individual, instead of sending money to her.” 
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In her remarks, Sowdo illuminates a great deal about notions of good and bad assistance, 
good and bad relatives, and the position of sponsorship, or facilitating resettlement more broadly, 
within the Somali community.  Sowdo distinguishes between assistance that maintains a division 
in power between a patron and client, and assistance that raises up the assisted to a level by 
which they are “an individual” and no longer “need anybody.”  In her account of the “good” way 
that she sends money to her brother each month, her social kindness alleviates a sense of bad 
dependence.  Her brother can say, “I have my sister.  I don’t need anybody.”  This is because, as 
far as she imagines, she gives with generosity and good will.  Her support does not create a 
feeling of dependence and a morally and socially problematic hierarchy between the siblings.  
By contrast, her aunt in Norway maintains control over her sister and niece through assistance, 
and produces dependence that she could alleviate if she so chose—or, at least, Sowdo imagines 
so.  Sowdo articulates her aunt’s refusal to sponsor her own sister and niece as bad assistance: 
one that maintains control over their lives for her own benefit—her pride and reputation—and 
denies them real life improvement.   
Sponsorship, through family reunification or otherwise facilitating resettlement (like the 
story I opened the chapter with about the family bringing their niece to Australia), thus plays a 
unique role.  It is necessarily embedded in cultural ideas about the morality of familial obligation 
and the ills of inequality in a world of growing disparity.  This kind of sponsorship becomes the 
best and most moral form of fulfilling family obligation because it limits morally and socially 
problematic dependence while raising people up to an equal standard, whereby they can support 
themselves and eventually others.  Despite a physical absence in the lives of Moha and Ahmed 
that would be considered to be neglect by many in the United States, for example, Moha tells his 
life’s story as a story of a distinctly “good family.” 
	   179	  
Conclusion: A Moral Economy of Resettlement and Competing Moral Regimes 
In addition to understanding refugee resettlement and family reunification as a 
humanitarian program linked to humanitarian moral claims, we must also understand these 
programs as critical resources for transnational refugee families, or networks of social obligation 
and care.  Around these programs, deeply felt moral ideas about responsibility, obligation and 
redistribution turn.  In “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty, and Civic Virtue in 
Kikuyu Political Thought” (1992), John Lonsdale argued that that Mau Mau was not a failed 
nationalist movement, but an expression of internal debates about changing economies wrought 
by colonialism, including wage labor and changing “patterns of power and property” (351-52).  
“Material change,” he wrote, “is a moral issue” (352).  Here, I am stretching the term “moral 
economy” beyond its more common use to discuss capitalist and non-capitalist societies (see 
Austen 1993), and rather using it to consider the ways in which moral claims about the 
distribution of resources more broadly emerge in the face of sponsorship and transnational 
financial remittances.  These are practices of familial obligation that have arisen from the global 
migrations wrought by refugee resettlement, which is itself part of a humanitarian cultural logic 
and moral framework.   
Considering Lonsdale and other scholars who have written about moral economies and 
changing material conditions (Scott 1976; Thompson 1971), we might consider the ways in 
which resettlement both shapes and is shaped by moral debates within refugee communities and 
familial networks, such as those that underlie Sowdo’s comments.39  More specifically, Lonsdale 
argues that Kikuyus of the Mau Mau period in Kenya during the 1950s distinguished between 
“laborious civic virtue and barren sorcery among men of means”—“virtuous wealth was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The other side of those debates will become more apparent in Chapter 5, about refugees in the 
United States.	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encumbered with public debt; immoral wealth had no known social ties” (440).  Likewise, 
Somali discourse around wealth and inequality in the age of refugee resettlement—passage to the 
global North for the one per cent—is fraught with moral claims surrounding the obligations of 
the more fortunate to assist the less.  These claims run parallel to the moral ethos of a securitized 
humanitarianism oriented around notions of truth telling and vulnerability.   
In 1990, 850,000 Somalis lived outside of Somalia, the majority of whom resided in three 
neighboring countries with indigenous Somali populations—Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.  As 
of 2015, that number had increased by 136%, with two million Somalis residing outside the 
country, nearly a quarter of whom live in Europe and North America (Connor and Krogstad 
2016).  For Somalis, twenty-five years of civil war and a particular regime of humanitarian 
governance have ushered in an era of global diaspora (Abdi 2015; Besteman 2016; Kusow 2007) 
that has wrought unprecedented material inequalities—real and imagined (Horst 2006; Lindley 
2010).   
The two narratives in this chapter highlight the very different lives of two Somali 
refugees living in Eastleigh.  Kauthar represents a person marginalized and exploited because of 
her lack of family support, as well as her gender and minority status.  By contrast, Moha 
represents a person sustained, supported and empowered by his transnational family connections, 
as well as being a young man and a member of a powerful clan, despite facing many challenges 
as a refugee.  I recount Kauthar’s story to demonstrate that refugees understand aid and 
resettlement in a fundamentally different way from how representatives articulated it in official 
discourses.  The idea that aid and resettlement are transparent and follow systematic priorities 
contrasts with the understanding of resettlement by people such as Kauthar.  Her experience, 
rather, is one of continuous disappointment, and the continuous presentation of evidence 
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suggesting that these resources require power and privilege to access, and not the opposite: The 
least vulnerable, rather than the most, succeed.  Someone lacking social networks with influence 
within her community, Kauther and others asserted, is less likely to gain access to these powerful 
institutions.  This was only confirmed by our day together at UNHCR.  
Moha’s transnational family, by contrast, enabled him to bypass UNHCR resettlement, 
and access transnational mobility and life in “the West” through their sponsorship. His uncle, a 
Somali-Canadian with a white-collar job and an advanced degree, had hired a lawyer to assist the 
family with the process.  Also important, Moha’s fluent English enabled him to read documents 
and communicate directly with the Canadian officials.  Moha himself was more confident than 
Kauther that the system would work for him, but not because he thought it worked justly for 
everyone.  Central to Moha’s story is the importance of his transnational family that had 
overseen his and his cousin Ahmed’s lives from their childhoods—ferrying them out of Somalia, 
supporting their education and living expenses, dispensing guidance—even from great distances.  
This kind of material support was the kind of “good assistance” by “good relatives” that Sowdo 
described.  The gifts of education and mobility that the family had bestowed upon the two young 
men meant that when they arrived in Canada, they would then be responsible for assisting kin 
back home.  
Refugees’ social relations and moral obligations orient their engagements with the 
resettlement system in ways that may contradict or run along a different track from the moral 
framework central to this humanitarian practice.  Notions of fraud, therefore (discussed in the 
previous chapter) also illuminate the ways in which the resettlement assemblage controls not 
only regimes of truth but also moral regimes. The stories of Kauthar, and Moha, as well as 
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Sowdo’s more explicit commentary on moral social relations among kin and obligations vis-à-vis 
resettlement, point to an alternative moral framework.   
In my conversations with resettlement staff, they often acknowledged the ethics of 
people’s decisions to break rules or to knowingly present information that would conflict with 
their interviewer’s understanding of the truth—for example, presenting a niece as a daughter; 
presenting oneself as 20 years old (a minor) instead of 25 (an adult); presenting a spouse as 
deceased when they were really alive; presenting one’s fear and vulnerability in ways that would 
“fit” into the categories believed to be prioritized.  Staff members often articulated this 
understanding by saying, “I would probably do the same thing if I were in their shoes, but…”  
However, in my conversations, a more official moral discourse countered this more relativistic 
approach. The relativistic approach, if accepted completely, would make their work untenable 
since the work relies on—if not absolute notions of truth—then officially accepted ideas about 
truth and falsity that determine how resettlement and aid are distributed.  
Len once described resettlement and aid work as “triage”: In order to help the most 
people who are the most in need and can most benefit from assistance, the agencies must be able 
to assess who fits in priority categories.  Since the system incentivizes refugees representing 
themselves in ways that “fit” these categories (as I have argued in Chapter 2), determining who 
is lying and who is telling the truth is a necessary task.  Many people I spoke to talked about 
fraud as hurting refugees.  As a former United States RSC (Resettlement Support Center) staff 
member put it, lying “hurts the integrity of the program, and then people who may really need 
the benefit don’t get it.”  My point is not to undermine this logic.  Rather, I aim to point out that 
this is a particular moral logic that at all times intersects with the ways in which resettlement has 
been woven into the fabric of refugees’ social and cultural lives.  Moha and Sowdo demonstrate 
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ways in which humanitarian work is braided into already-existing networks of social obligation, 
and cultural ideas about “good kin” and moral social relations, that people also articulated 
through Islamic ideals.  Kauthar does so, as well, but by pointing out their absence.  
Considered alongside Kauthar and Moha’s stories, and Sowdo’s pointed articulation 
about the responsibility to facilitate resettlement for kin, we can understand fraud as a term 
around which moral debates congeal—within refugee communities, and between refugee 
communities and humanitarian institutions.  In the context of extreme global inequality, of which 
refugees in Kenya are well aware, assistance of kin ignores the distinctions that institutions seek 
to impose between worthy and unworthy refugees, and illuminates “aspiration to overcome 
categorical subordination” in a global system (Ferguson 2006:20).  Assistance of kin, including 
through “stretching the truth” (Scott 1985:184) and so-called sham marriages, for example, is a 
refusal of one moral framework, and the insistence on abiding by a more familiar one whose pull 
emanates from far more intimate sources.  Perhaps a greater reckoning with this fact would help 
humanitarian organizations to structure their work in ways that could further their goals, working 
with rather than against certain community ideals.  Perhaps it would mean its total re-thinking.  
Ultimately, these debates demonstrate the centrality of kinship and the family to the intersections 
of cultural logics that animate humanitarian aid on one hand, and that animate the communities 
subject to humanitarian governance.  
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Chapter 4 
 
DNA, Securing Borders, and Shaping Transnational Communities  
 
 
“A fundamental principle of refugee protection, the unity of the family, derives directly from the 
universally recognized right to family life.” 
 
“ Be aware of the possibility of fraud where internal consistency is lacking (especially with 
respect to the narrative and family composition)”  
 
- UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011 
 
 
 Somali-British writer Nadifa Mohamed’s novel, The Orchard of Lost Souls, tells the story 
of an orphaned girl, a woman who deserts the Somali army after the death of her lover, and a 
paralyzed widow who is traumatized by the death of her only child.  The three characters—
unified by their marked social dislocation—are brought together when war erupts in Somaliland 
in 1987.40  At the end of the novel the three characters flee together by truck across the Ethiopian 
border.  In the final scene, the orphan, Deqo, waits at a UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) tent to be 
registered.   The novel concludes as a UN worker addresses Deqo, “‘Who did you come with?’ 
Deqo pauses for a second to explain the situation, but then tells the lie her heart wants to tell.  
‘My mother and grandmother.’”  Mohamed’s final lines read, “[Deqo] is back in her familiar 
world; the war and all that time in Hargeisa just a complicated trial to achieve what she has 
always wanted: a family, however makeshift” (Mohamed 2013:333-34).   
For the orphaned girl, the “familiar” world is not the world of the orphanage and the 
streets that she has always known, but the world of “family”—social ties that Mohamed deems 
necessary for physical and psychic survival.  It is a “makeshift” family, as Mohamed calls it, 
which she maps onto a normative, biological family (daughter, mother, grandmother) when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Somaliland is the former British colony that unified with Italian Somalia at independence.  The 
two regions of the Republic of Somalia remain unified, but tenuously.   
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presented with the bureaucratic system of UN registration.  When Deqo crosses the border and is 
registered by a surrogate government, the UN, she is produced as a new kind of subject—not 
only a refugee, but also a member of a presumed biological family.  Her kinship with the two 
women is made official through the bureaucratic ritual of documenting related people as a family 
unit.   
This chapter begins where Mohamed’s novel ends—taking as a starting point the 
complexity of social ties, the diverse familial formations that emerge through not only long-
standing practices, but also more recent forces of political violence and displacement in 
postcolonial Africa.  The chapter takes on the ways in which those formations intersect with 
humanitarian programs and policies.  What happens to Deqo and her “makeshift family” after 
registering at the refugee camp?  Here, I chart forms of solidarity and belonging among Somali 
and Congolese refugees in Nairobi, and the ways in which life in the aftermath of war intersect 
with government and NGO categories and policies that take the family as a central category in 
governing and resettling refugees.   
*** 
As I note in the Introduction, in 2008, the US government suspended its Refugee Family 
Reunification Program after a DNA testing pilot program showed that over 80% of cases were 
“fraudulent”—having at least one member who was not a biological daughter or son, and thus 
not genuinely “family” according to the program’s guidelines.  After being suspended for four 
years, the Program was reinstated with DNA testing as a permanent component.  In this chapter, 
I argue that by using DNA testing to verify kinship claims, the US Refugee Family Reunification 
Program paradoxically divides families, or networks of social care and obligation, at the same 
time that it purports to unify families and keep them intact.  The process of enforcing a 
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biogenetic nuclear family always risks disrupting families constituted by both longstanding 
practices of identity and obligation among more expansive networks of kin, and families forged 
in the crucible of war and flight.   
Anthropologists and historians have long demonstrated the ways in which kinship in 
African societies exceed the boundaries of the nuclear, biogenetic family (Alber 2003; Cassanelli 
1982; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Evans-Pritchard 1951; Etienne 1979; Giblin 2005; Goody 
2007; Gottlieb 2009; Lewis 1994; Lonsdale 1992; Notermans 2004; Radcliffe-Brown and Forde 
1950; Talle 2004; Vaughan 1983).  Even Evans-Pritchard, who was interested in lineage as a 
rule-bound system governing small-scale societies, demonstrated that these systems were 
maintained through creative practices that extended their literal boundaries—for example, in his 
writing on “ghost marriage,” “woman marriage,” and the adoption of ethnic outsiders into 
lineages (1951).    
Since the decline of structural-functionalist anthropology, the study of descent systems 
has not disappeared but, rather, been theorized as embedded in larger historical and political 
processes (Guyer 1981; Shipton 1995).  Recent scholarship on Africa has further conceptualized 
kinship through strategic and creative articulations of familial bonds in light of various forms of 
insecurity in colonial, postcolonial and neoliberal landscapes—related to structural adjustment 
and economic insecurity, HIV/AIDs, political conflict, and migration (Besteman 1995; de Boeck 
2001; Ellison 2009; Gale 2007; Giblin 2005; Glassman 1995; Hunter 2010; Lal 2010; Piot 2010; 
Utas 2005; White 1990).   
Since David Schneider argued that biogenetic substance is a cultural symbol, “biology,” 
“genetics,” and “substance” have become central to anthropologists conceptualizing familial 
bonds in sociocultural anthropology (Carsten 1995, 2004; Gailey 2000; Hargreaves 2006; 
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Héritier-Augé 1989; Simpson 2001).  In the recent proliferation of kinship studies about the post-
industrialized global North, genetic science (Marks 2001; Rapp et al. 2001), new reproductive 
technologies (Carsten 2004; Edwards and Strathern 2000; Finkler 2005; Thompson 2001), and 
transnational adoption (Anagnost 1999; Eng 2010; Kim 2010; Volkman 2005) have provided 
new domains of ethnographic inquiry for investigating kinship as both analytical category and 
social practice.  Some of these anthropological studies have demonstrated the limitations of 
“kinship” as a concept, but they have all highlighted the expanding possibilities of relatedness in 
light of new technologies, policies, social identities, and transnational connections. 
The use of DNA testing in sub-Saharan Africa in refugee resettlement and family 
reunification contexts invites these relatively separate bodies of literature to be brought into 
conversation.  The US policy that places great emphasis on “the family” in humanitarian work, 
and that employs DNA testing to define and verify familial relations, provides a case through 
which to examine the work that genetic science performs.  It also allows us to consider the ways 
in which people respond to scientific knowledge and incorporate it into their own, prior forms of 
knowledge.  With this context in mind, the second aim of the chapter is to understand the ways in 
which a definition of family that is fundamentally premised upon a biogenetic nuclear family, 
and enforced by DNA technology, helps to produce an acceptable subject for resettlement to the 
United States.  I ask: Why is “the family” of particular concern and anxiety within this process?  
What is the relationship between the non-nuclear family and the “bad refugee,” or even the 
terrorist?  How do rules around family composition inform the resettlement of particular kinds of 
subjects, and contribute to a national security project?  The terms “fraud” and “family 
composition fraud” gloss a wide range of practices and arrangements that may cause officials to 
doubt the legitimacy of a family unit, or that may result in DNA tests to discrediting relations.  
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For example, it may point to the relation between an orphan and their adoptive family.  It might 
also point to a family with a resettlement case that has been paid to take an unrelated child with 
them.  By deeming any family that fails to match this bureaucratic definition as fraudulent, the 
idea of a “fraudulent family” unburdens institutions of the impossible moral and epistemological 
problem of deciding which relationships are genuine and deserving of preservation.  Moreover, 
by using the nuclear, biogenetic family as its standard, the US government produces resettlement 
subjects that are acceptable and desirable according to mainstream US norms.  Family as a 
scientifically testable entity produces and re-produces the socially acceptable family unit in the 
new society.    
I begin by telling a story of DNA testing through the perspective of US officials.  I then 
turn to the intersecting lives of several Banyamulenge Congolese refugees in Nairobi, 
highlighting their practices of mutual care, solidarity and self-preservation.  I examine their 
experiences with the resettlement process as it shapes their social networks.  Next, drawing on 
focus group discussions with Somali youth, I explore ways in which DNA testing and the norm 
of the nuclear family trouble social life.  Young Somalis explain that DNA testing can both 
disrupt possibilities for families to remain together, and threaten to expose destructive family 
secrets, unsettling social relations in multiple ways.  Finally, the narrative of a Somali woman 
who came to the US from Kenya in the 1990s illuminates ways in which families have changed 
in light of the recent uses of DNA testing.  Both the Banyamulenge and Somali communities 
evoke the ways in which longstanding ideas about descent intersect with far more flexible 
arrangements that may also be longstanding, but are certainly informed by the specific conditions 
of war and statelessness, and the refugee resettlement system itself.  Ultimately, I consider how 
humanitarian family policies produce particular kinds of subjects for resettlement.  These 
	   189	  
policies, I argue, fortify normative social boundaries (of which the family is constitutive) in 
places such as the United States, and fortify national borders from immigration perceived as 
dangerous.  In this sense, contests over kinship are central to the competing claims between 
refugees, and governments and NGOs.  Certain kinds of social bonds are deemed acceptable or 
desirable, while US government policies make marginal those that fail to conform to a 
biogenetic, nuclear family ideal.  
 
Enforcing the Nuclear, Biogenetic Family 
 
 As I sat in John’s impressive office in the US Refugee Support Center’s (RSC) new 
building, and as he handed me a folder full of pamphlets, it was clear that I was getting a well-
rehearsed presentation for visitors.  Nonetheless, John, a young staff member from the US, had 
taken the time to give me a tour of the building, including the high-tech library system in which 
thousands of refugees’ case files were stored and easily retrieved via individual tracking 
devices—all kept in a fire-proof, flood-proof room on the building’s ground floor due to the 
weight of the papers (“as heavy as an African elephant” John and the Kenyan librarian joked).  
On another floor, John pointed out a room storing the large server that backs up RSC’s files in 
Washington and at the US embassy several miles away; and on another, a large open space with 
small cubicles in which field staff worked quietly on computers.  When I mentioned my interest 
in DNA testing, John brought me to see the safe in which DNA kits are stored under lock and 
key.  The safe, about my height, was kept in the office of Leah, who worked in the “P3” or 
Family Reunification Program—which had only recently been re-opened after its four-year 
suspension.  John explained that once the “anchor relative” in the US sent their DNA kit, it 
would be kept here.  Leah or one of her team members would then accompany a physician from 
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the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to conduct the DNA test for the family 
members in Nairobi, or elsewhere in Africa.  The kit would then be sent to an accredited lab back 
in the United States.  The results would be used as one step in granting the anchor’s family 
members access to resettlement in the US—or denying it.   
The United States has three resettlement priorities.  Priority One: individual cases 
referred by UNHCR or an NGO; Priority Two: communities identified by the US government as 
being of special humanitarian concern;41 and Priority Three: family reunification.  The Family 
Reunification Program allows people from specified countries who arrived in the United States 
as refugees to apply for family members to join them within five years of their arrival.   The 
eligible family members include a legal spouse, unmarried children under the age of 21, and 
parents.42 Such family members, in places such as Kenya, do not have to go through the UN 
screening process, but go through the US government’s screening.  Once their family member in 
the US applies for them, if the application is initially approved, they are interviewed first by the 
US RSC, and later by Homeland Security.   
 While the UN and the US government are willing to accommodate some “non-
normative” family scenarios in Priority One cases, particularly involving minors, US government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Historically, these have included Vietnamese, Cubans, people from the former Soviet Republics, 
the Somali Bantu minority, and recently Congolese (Martin 2005: 26).  These populations are often 
not only considered to be of humanitarian concern, but also geopolitical significance to the US 
government. 
 
42 In 2016, refugees from 24 countries could apply for family reunification through the P3 program.  
That refugees cannot apply for their adult children, but adults can apply for their elderly parents 
suggests that the aims of the program are not only family unity, but also the protection of dependents.  
Adult children are considered independent, while elderly parents of adults are considered vulnerable.   
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policy is much stricter in the Family Reunification Program.43 In addition to proving biological 
parenthood, and the genuine and legal nature of a marriage, the applicant must have named 
everyone for whom they are applying in their UN and US interviews before coming to the United 
States.  One of the outcomes is that people who have lived together and relied on one another for 
long periods of time can be disbanded by the program when some but not all family members are 
eligible for reunification with the “anchor” in the United States.    
In this sense, DNA testing circumscribes complex social lives, confining identities and 
practices that exist through extensive networks of assistance and feelings of obligation (as well 
as instrumental decision making) into bureaucratically manageable and morally legitimate boxes 
such as the legally married couple, or the single parent (usually mother) and her biological 
children.  This concept of the family and its enforceability with DNA testing enables the US 
government to draw a line—protecting US borders from an influx of refugees who could apply 
for more and more extended kin, potentially overwhelming the United States with African 
refugees.  The “truth” revealed in the results of DNA tests and their perceived scientific 
objectivity is linked to the “systems of power which produce and sustain it”—the political 
imperative to protect borders (Foucault 1972: 133).  In addition to appealing to the control of 
numbers of refugees coming to the United States, DNA testing filters and shapes the particular 
subjects that arrive on US shores—controlling not only demographics, but also a cultural subject, 
of which “the family” is central. 
 
How DNA Works, Culturally: Genetics, Testability, and Security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In Priority One cases, minors must have resided with the family prior to their flight from their 
homeland.  Therefore, families that are “recombined” in locations of asylum often do not meet the 
criteria for resettlement together.   
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I am talking to Len in his small office at the NGO where he serves as country director 
about his time at RSC.  About twenty years prior, Len had been a recent law school graduate.  
Disillusioned, he came to Nairobi seeking an opportunity.  He was first hired by the fledgling US 
resettlement program in East Africa, and later became a high-ranking staff member.  Len had 
been a director at RSC when the Family Reunification Program came under scrutiny, and had 
been tasked with facilitating the DNA testing pilot program under the State Department’s 
directive.    
Len is a pragmatist.  In our conversations, he often articulated the complexities of the 
situations he faced, but also the need for practical decision-making despite dilemmas that could 
paralyze one from taking action.  He was critical of the system in which he worked—he once 
suggested that resettlement should be done purely through a lottery system, since any refugee 
could conceivably “merit” resettlement, while enormous resources are spent identifying the most 
vulnerable.  But, he also felt the system accomplished important goals to which he was 
dedicated.   
In his office, Len and I are sitting at a round table next to his desk.  He describes the 
DNA program as practical and perhaps even inevitable—the result of poor security practices up 
to that point, and resistance on the part of the domestic resettlement agencies to implementing 
basic measures such as requiring photo IDs for refugees, for which he and others had advocated 
for many years.  In some ways, Len suggested that the DNA pilot program was an “I told you 
so” moment—perhaps unfortunate, but, in part, the result of sentimental and naïve domestic US 
agencies having ignored the on-the-ground knowledge of the Africa-based staff.  Len tells me,  
A new guy [State Department Refugee Coordinator] came in and he looked [the Family 
Reunification Program] over and he talked to his boss a couple times and said, ‘Look, 
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I’m hearing that the process is thoroughly corrupt.’ ‘Yeah yeah yeah, it’s okay,’ [his boss 
says].  And he’s like ‘You know what, if something goes wrong, and’—now this is a few 
years post-9/11—‘what happens to my career if I’m the guy who sent a terrorist to the 
States?’….  So the Ref Cord wrote a memo and sent it to his boss saying, ‘Hey, I’m 
receiving multiple reports, they do seem credible.  I don’t have any evidence, but this is 
an area of real concern.’  So he has now covered his ass.  And it’s his job to do that; it’s 
his job to see that we’re sending a good group of people over.  And so Washington sat on 
it for about a year.  But because it was formal, they couldn’t ignore it.… As best I 
understand it, they said, ‘Ok, how do we actually test it?’ Family reunion: DNA.  So they 
anted up quite a bit of money and tasked RSC and said, ‘Okay, draw something up, 
guys.’  And it was literally, like, ‘We don’t know anything about DNA, can you give us a 
proposal?’ And I was like, ‘Okay, that’s kind of fun, cause I’m kind of a science-y geek.’  
So, we looked at various sampling methods, and decided, let’s just do everyone who is 
scheduled this week.  Let’s not try to randomize or anything, let’s just do it for everyone. 
Len explains that when they looked at the numbers that came back from the State Department, 
they excluded some of the “fraudulent” results; for example, if a child turned out to be the 
biological child of the wife but not the husband.  But despite such attempts to make the data 
more accurately reflect what they were trying to find—fraud defined, at least at the time, as 
intentional efforts to mislead officials about the nature of a relationship—the numbers were 
overwhelming.   Len says,  
Still, the number of cases that had at least one fraudulent person on it was staggering.  
Now here’s the thing: if we are a real family unit, we all know that that one person on our 
case is not who they say they are.  We know that that’s not our brother or sister, and it’s 
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in fact our cousin or someone who paid their way onto a case.  We know that, so that one 
person on the case actually implicates everyone on the case.  Short of young children… 
I’ve never been able to find any logical way to say that I accept that sort of thing.   
As Len articulated it, DNA testing demonstrates two things.  First, it tests kinship relations, 
which are central to the claim, since every dependent’s case rests on their relation to the primary 
applicant.  (A primary applicant deemed eligible for resettlement automatically passes that status 
to their biological children (and spouse), but not to their cousins, nieces and nephews, or other 
family members).  Second, Len sees the DNA test as detecting lies, or “fraud.” Relations 
presented in one way by the applicants that are found to be something else—for example, a child 
found not to be a biologically related child—reveal deception, and the applicants to be liars.   
The pilot program that Len oversaw, which began with 500 mostly Somali and Ethiopian 
refugees in Nairobi, and its reported results of an over 80% rate of fraud led to the complete 
suspension of the Family Reunification Program for four years.44  When the program was 
reinstituted in 2012, DNA testing was included as a permanent and required component.45  The 
initial DNA testing pilot program, and the current use of DNA testing in the program, 
demonstrates the intersecting cultural logics of humanitarianism and security, compassion and 
uncertainty, and notions of “good” and “bad” subjects in refugee resettlement in the decades 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In a document titled “Fraud in the Refugee Family Reunification (Priority Three) Program,” the 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (under the State Department) reported: “We 
were…only able to confirm all claimed biological relationships in fewer than 20% of cases (family 
units).  In the remaining cases, at least one negative result (fraudulent relationship) was identified, or 
the individuals refused to be tested” (PRM 2008).   
 
45 The cost of the tests ($440 for the first test, and $220 for each additional family member) are born 
by the anchor relative in the United States.  When the test results are positive, the anchor relative can 
apply for reimbursement.  A negative result from one or more family members disqualifies the 
person both from bringing their family to the US and from reimbursement, a policy apparently meant 
to discourage people from trying their luck at sponsoring family members who would not pass the 
DNA test.   
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following 9/11.  The use of DNA testing, along with other requirements that I discussed in 
Chapter 2, demonstrates that truth-telling is considered an essential condition and a nearly 
unassailable moral good within this system.  It also tells us about the ways in which “the family” 
has become a central site for anxieties about undeserving people, or even criminals and terrorists, 
taking advantage of humanitarian programs and refugee resettlement, in particular.   
Why is the family unit at the heart of this anxiety? “Family composition fraud” is of 
central concern, Len says, because it is easy to perpetrate, and because it is testable.  Technology 
that reveals the “truth” of family composition through genetic science (i.e. DNA testing)—a truth 
that is consistent with normative US conceptions of the family that, as David Schneider wrote, 
dictate that kinship is “whatever the biogenetic relationship is” (Schneider 1968: 23; see also 
Helmreich 2001: 130)—puts family at the center of twenty-first century fears about refugees.  
Uncovering “fraud” is thus a matter of protecting the “integrity of the program,” as it was 
described to me on several occasions.  Moreover, a lie about family composition indicates, as 
Len expressed it, an unscrupulous character and the possibility that beneath the lie could be 
other, even more insidious lies.  Such a lie is an index of something larger, which the US 
Refugee Coordinator implied when he said that allowing family composition fraud could allow 
“a terrorist into the States.”  
I argue that the family unit also exists as a site of intense scrutiny precisely because it is a 
site of intense care and concern within a humanitarian framework.  Since families, and keeping 
families together, is of central importance to the goals of both UNHCR and the US Refugee 
Admissions Program, posturing as a “genuine” family is met with moral anxiety as it disrupts the 
aim of resettling the “right” refugees—those who are honest, comply with rules, are genuinely 
vulnerable, and compose the culturally and bureaucratically appropriate social unit for entry into 
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the United States.  The scientific testability of the family—given the “authority and hold that 
science is granted…in defining and naturalizing the modalities of human relations” (Franklin and 
McKinnon 2001: 15)—re-produces the biogenetic nuclear family as the natural and genuine 
familial unit.  In the process of using DNA to verify family claims, the family is produced as 
whatever is testable—a truth derived “from the body” by expert scientific knowledge (Fassin and 
d’Halluin 2005; see also Ticktin 2011).  The outcome of the tests instantiates biogenetic families 
as “real” and others as “fraudulent.”   
What are the effects of this use of genetic science in the context of social networks in 
refugee camps and precarious urban neighborhoods where refugees (such as the characters in 
Nadifa Mohamed’s novel) are attempting to re-make their lives?  In the remainder of this 
chapter, I draw on both Congolese and Somali stories of and commentaries on social life to 
illuminate how the testable, biogenetic, nuclear family shapes refugees’ lives, transnational 
migrations, and diasporic communities.   
 
Post-War Kinship, Sociality, and Care 
Although I had had a longstanding interest in refugees, it was learning about the 
introduction of DNA testing into the US Refugee Family Reunification Program, early in my 
career as a PhD student, that first piqued my interest in the nature of kinship and contests over 
truth and relatedness in refugee programs.  I became interested in understanding how using DNA 
testing to verify kinship claims would come to bear on families as they attempt to access 
resettlement and reunification programs.  How was the biogenetic, nuclear definition of family 
shaping people’s lives and attempts to create stability and opportunity in a place such as Nairobi? 
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How was the US policy producing or shaping the families that would be allowed across US 
borders, and in the process shaping certain kinds of transnational families?  
The DNA policy, and the underlying norm of using the biogenetic nuclear family as a 
basis for family composition, have reverberated in multiple ways—both constraining and 
(perhaps less often) advancing refugees’ aims.  My research pointed me toward some of the 
predicaments that these policies pose for refugees, and the ways that family reunification and 
family fragmentation are produced at the intersection of two different aims: protecting refugees, 
and protecting the inviolability of the resettlement system.  Here, I narrate the intersecting stories 
of several Banyamulenge Congolese refugees as they made decisions about how to protect 
themselves and care for others.  In doing so, I seek to outline some of the basic structures of life 
as refugees on which family policies come to bear.  Some aspects are specific to the 
Banyamulenge community.  But other aspects—such as cohabitating with and caring for people 
outside of the nuclear family—are shared by many of the communities living as refugees in 
Kenya.   
Jacqueline and Chantal were living together in a small, one-room home when I met them 
in 2014.  They lived in one of the poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of Nairobi—cut through 
by one main road, paved but potholed.  The neighborhood is crisscrossed by dusty paths lined 
with small shops selling basic goods—flour, soap, milk, rice, cooking oil.  From outdoor stalls 
along the road, women sell tomatoes—three for ten shillings, small purple onions, potatoes, large 
watery avocados, bananas, grapes, mangoes.  Men hawk spare electronic parts.  On the main 
road, guys selling plastic-wrapped CDs blast music from their boom boxes.  Tin-shack 
barbershops advertise kinyozi—barber—with painted silhouettes of men with cropped hair.  
Pulsing matatu micro-buses bump across the dug-out road.  Women braiding hair stand over 
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their clients in plastic chairs—you can see them through a parted curtain hanging over the open 
doorway.  Next to them are used shoes, and inexpensive women’s clothing stretched over wide-
hipped, wire mannequins.  Here on the edges of Nairobi, the city turns into fields.  It becomes 
grassy, and the cinderblock apartment buildings, some half-constructed—pasture and acacia trees 
along the highway and in the distance—remind you that the city is a growing thing, spreading 
into the savannah at a rapid pace. 
Like many Banyamulenge, Jacqueline and Chantal had each arrived in Kenya several 
years before, after months of moving within Congo—finally crossing into Uganda, then busing 
across Kenya’s western border.  Both had arrived without family members or close friends.  The 
women were in their late twenties and unmarried.  I was first introduced to Jacqueline and 
Chantal by two young men, Richard and Aimable, who were about to leave for the United States.  
Since Chantal arrived in 2009, she had spent two or three of those years living with Richard and 
Aimable, who were 12 and 16 when she met them.  Living with them was Chantal’s cousin, who 
later disappeared—a terrifying event for Chantal, who reported the disappearance to both the 
police and an NGO.  Her cousin was never found. 
Jacqueline, who arrived a mere month after Chantal, had at first sought shelter in a 
Kenyan church, and later in the home of a Congolese pastor.  When the pastor’s house filled up 
with other, recently arrived young people, he sent Jacqueline to live with an older man who was 
waiting to join his family in the United States.  When he tried to rape her, Jacqueline left his 
house and stayed with three young men.  This situation turned out just as bad.  She began staying 
out late at night so that she could avoid being at the house with any of them alone, only returning 
after dark when all three men were at home together.   
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Luckily, Jacqueline had a friend from church, Mama Mugisha, who would help her out of 
her bad situation.  The mother of young children, Mama Mugisha had gone to college and had 
worked as a primary school teacher.   Her husband, Jean, was also well educated, and both had 
been imprisoned in Congo—part of the government’s targeting of the Banyamulenge 
community.46  
I met with Mama Mugisha and Jean in their home not far from where Jacqueline and 
Chantal lived, on the grassy outskirts of the neighborhood, where one occasionally see cows 
moving along the paths, but still not far from the main road.  No money for electricity during the 
day, the house was dark, except for the light that came through the open door and window.  A 
research assistant, Annette, and I chatted with Mama Mugisha while we waited for Jean to come 
home.  He finally arrived, dressed in neat slacks and a shirt, a backpack slung over his shoulder 
in which he kept the kitenge material that he had been hawking near the Kenyatta University 
campus a couple of miles away on Thika Highway.   
Mama Mugisha was pregnant with another child when I met them, and Jean declared—
contrary to community standards of large families—that this would be their last.  Mama Mugisha 
and the kids had arrived in Kenya after Jean had.  Once they were reunited, she had had 
difficulty adjusting to life, Jean explained to us.  Mama Mugisha and Jacqueline had become 
friends at church.  Knowing the challenges Jacqueline was facing, Mama Mugisha invited her to 
move in with her family.  At the same time, Mama Mugisha and Jean were raising their own 
three children, as well as Mama Mugisha’s niece, Aline—the daughter of her older brother.  
Soon after Mama Mugisha and Jean had married in Congo, Mama Mugisha’s brother, the father 
of several other children, brought Aline, aged seven, to live with them, as they had the means to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Chapter 2 on targeting of Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo.   
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raise her and send her to school.  Raising a niece, nephew or grandchild is a common practice in 
eastern Congo, and the couple had raised Aline as their own daughter.   In Nairobi, they were 
identified for resettlement, and explained their family situation to the UNHCR.   Because Aline 
was not their biological child, UNHCR had to complete a Best Interest Determination (BID) 
report on her behalf to determine whether or not they would allow her to be resettled with her 
aunt and uncle.   Since Jean and Mama Mugisha reported that they had no knowledge of the 
whereabouts of Aline’s biological parents, or whether or not they were alive, UNHCR would 
also have to attempt to trace those parents.  This protocol is meant to obstruct child trafficking, 
and to prevent a child or biological parents from later making a claim to be reunited—in effect 
enforcing the notion that there can be only one set of parents per child.   
In the midst of waiting for their case to move through the slow machinery of the UNHCR 
bureaucracy, in 2012, Mama Mugisha and Jean found Aline’s parents in Nairobi—at church, 
where the parents had been brought by another family shortly after arriving.  They hadn’t seen 
one another since Mama Mugisha’s brother had brought Aline to their home to stay.   In a 
population of only an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people (Prunier 2008: 52), many of whom have 
been fleeing continuously over several years as conflict persists in Eastern Congo, it was not 
uncommon for people to be reunited with family members who had no idea of each other’s 
whereabouts.47  Now that they had found Aline’s biological parents, UNHCR sent the family 
through a new set of bureaucratic processes to determine what to do next.   
When they found Aline’s parents, Mama Mugisha told me, they felt compelled to tell 
UNHCR at least in part for pragmatic reasons—because tracing her parents would delay their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Throughout my research, I frequently learned of people finding one another—both in person, and 
occasionally through social media.  I knew one young man who learned of his mother and sister 
living in Europe through Facebook.  Another young man had fled alone believing his entire family 
had been killed.  Years later his siblings arrived in Nairobi, having also believed that he was dead.	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case.  UNHCR brought the families—Aline and both sets of parents—to one of its partner 
NGOs, which would conduct a new BID to assess the best course of action.  At the NGO, Mama 
Mugisha explained to me, a staff member asked Aline, who was then thirteen, what she wanted 
to do.  Aline’s biological mother had told her that she could decide—that they would be fine with 
whatever she chose.   Jean and Mama Mugisha suggested to her that she remain on their case, 
and when her parents got a resettlement opportunity, they would all “continue life together.”  
Jean described Aline telling the interviewers, “Yes, these are my parents, they gave birth to me, 
but these are the people I’ve grown with.  And I want to stay with them.  If my parents get a 
chance to be resettled, we’ll be reunited.”  The family was sent back to UNHCR, who informed 
them that Aline would not be able to go to the United States with Jean and Mama Mugisha.   
Mama Mugisha continued, “Now she comes here [to our house] when she has holidays.  
… It was hard for us.  We had raised her for quite some time.  But the UN refused to keep her 
here.  They insisted she be reunited [go to live] with her parents.  And also, for our case, we 
didn’t want it to stall while they looked for her parents.”  
“Did you see her as your own child?” I asked. 
Jean replied, “Now it has changed, but before it would have been us who would have 
married her off.  We took her to school.  But when her parents came, now they’re going to do 
those things.  But when she comes here [to our house], she also feels at home – she was raised 
here [with us].”   
Mama Mugisha added, “We were the ones that would provide for her.  But after her 
parents came, now we rarely see her.  She has other parents.”  
“Was it hard to explain to her?  Did she understand?” I asked.   
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Jean replied that he understood UNHCR’s reasons.  But, he said, “When she was taken, 
she had done all the interviews with us, she was looking forward to a better life.  She had also 
been waiting all that time.  Now her parents don’t even have a mandate [UN identity document].  
So that’s a strain on the child’s mind.”  Now thinking about the family’s friend, Jacqueline, Jean 
continued, “There was a time when we were living with a young lady.  She was sewing.  We 
agreed to help one another.  When we went to do the interview at the UN they refused her, even 
though she had her alien [government refugee ID] and mandate [UN ID].  We pleaded and 
pleaded.  But they said to her, ‘You can work for yourself.’  Even now, she hasn’t gotten a 
resettlement interview.  Those people who are single, they tell them they can just look after 
themselves.” 
At the time, I did not realize who the young woman was to whom Jean was referring.   It 
was only after I asked if their friend would be willing to talk to me that I learned that she was 
Jacqueline, who I already knew.  Interviewing her in her home one day, Jacqueline described 
Jean as a kind person—the only person who had really helped her, she said.  Jean, who did 
occasional work as an interpreter at an organization and peddled kitenge fabric, helped 
Jacqueline financially—finding money for her to travel to Kakuma to get her government ID 
card (as they were not being issued in Nairobi at the time), and helping her with small expenses.  
Jacqueline said that Jean had tried to get her included on their resettlement case, but, as he had 
also explained, the UNHCR doesn’t see women like Jacqueline as meriting resettlement.  Not a 
minor, despite being on her own, in the triage of allocating resettlement opportunities, the UN 
had rejected the claim that she was a dependent of Jean and Mama Mugisha.  Seeing her as 
capable of looking after herself, they did not deem her as meriting her own, individual 
resettlement case, either. 
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Eventually, Jacqueline left Mama Mugisha and Jean’s house.  She met Chantal at church, 
and the two young women realized that they were first cousins.  Jacqueline described what I call 
“genealogical introductions” that help people to find their relations: “They might say, ‘You look 
like So-and-So,’ and you will say, ‘No, I don’t know them.’  But then they tell you, ‘Yes, your 
grandfather was So-and-So, he went here, that’s why you don’t know these people, but your 
grandfather was their brother,’ and so on.”  Indeed, Jacqueline and Chantal had not known each 
other in Congo.  Their mothers were sisters, they said, but had gone to different places to marry, 
and the two young women had never met before they each came to Nairobi.  Jacqueline and 
Chantal’s finding each other had been good luck, but they were living precariously with no stable 
income.  They had some occasional money from selling kitenge, but were in constant fear 
wrought by experiences of harassment and a deep knowledge of what it means to be women 
without stable social support both in Congo and in impoverished Nairobi neighborhoods where 
crime is an everyday occurrence, and inter-ethnic conflict among Congolese refugees still lashes 
out in frightening ways.  In addition to the social worlds that they had lost in Congo, they were 
struggling to find a stable situation in Nairobi—an uncertain refuge.   
 
Lineage, Ethnic Solidarity, and the Biogenetic in a Space of Uncertain Refuge 
Banyamulenge in Nairobi use “genealogical introductions,” such as the one Jacqueline 
described, as a way of finding solidarity and possible cooperation, often in desperate situations.  
While these introductions used to be made for marriage purposes and incest avoidance, the need 
of “telling ourselves,” as Jean put it, or knowing one’s people within a genealogical scope is now 
embedded in a different set of structural forces.  Those genealogical ties are appealed to in order 
to find opportunities for mutual assistance amidst displacement, an anti-refugee state, financial 
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insecurity, grief and trauma, and the stress of frustrated attempts to access resources theoretically 
provided by the UN and NGOs—resources for which most refugees believe their suffering 
qualifies them, but which are elusive.   
In A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century 
Tanzania, historian James Giblin emphasizes the importance of social networks that extend 
beyond kin by blood or marriage—such as neighbors (2006: 86)—arguing that a family could 
also include “‘any particular friends on whom he may rely for help in time of need,’ and who 
will similarly look to him for aid” (63).  Anthropologists writing on strategic marriages in 
refugee camps (Gale 2007), or a neoliberal discourse of “choosing” families for economic 
reasons in Ethiopia (Ellison 2009), describe ways in which practices forged in the context of 
contemporary forms of insecurity expand upon longstanding, normative kinship structures and 
systems.   In her study of Congolese refugees in Uganda, Christina Clark-Kazak writes about the 
flexibility of  “widespread child exchange and ‘fostering’ with kin or pseudo-kin” typical in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and among eastern Congolese refugees, which “does not fit 
within conceptualizations of family and household promoted in refugee policy and 
programming” (2011: 104). 
For Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi, a community comprised of people struggling to 
survive in a place where they have no previous social ties, in which most have lost the majority 
of their wealth in the form of livestock and land, and have limited access to any livelihood 
activities let alone formal employment, co-ethnic and expansive kin ties are crucial for forging 
relations of assistance.  These kin ties are located on a genealogical map, but the genealogical 
“distance” need not determine possibilities for solidarity and care.  People locate connections 
through customary “genealogical introductions” in places like churches or the UNHCR 
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headquarters—spaces of co-ethnic networking in a city that serves as a meeting place for people 
flung across the region by ongoing violence.  Jean and Mama Mugisha described the flexibility 
of kin networks, though within a genealogical framework, as they explained what the clan 
(umurara in Kinyamulenge) means.  Consulting with Mama Mugisha first, Jean enumerated the 
principles around which the clan is unified:  
If you build a house on a hill, and then your children build their house there, and  
their children, then you’ve built a village together, and you are a clan.  Second, if you live 
together, you care for each other, you feel like you are one.  Third, if you want to marry, 
and you don’t have enough cows, some other relatives will give you cows.  Fourth, if 
there is a rule in the family, the rule is followed by all. 
While clan is also rooted in a shared, original forefather, for whom the clan is named, 
Jean’s comments were oriented around territory as well as descent; co-residence and attendant 
feelings produced within a home; obligation as well as reproduction; and shared codes of 
conduct.  Others told me—and not only Banyamulenge, but also Rwandans and other 
Congolese—that people can become kin through living together and sharing food.  The nature of 
social relations that are at once importantly rooted in a blood-based idiom, yet expand well 
beyond the nuclear family (and potentially beyond easily traceable genealogical relations), 
evokes the “wealth-in-people” concept that Africanist scholars have developed to describe the 
importance of expansive social networks in many African societies (Guyer and Belinga 1995).  
Classic ethnographies, such as Evans-Pritchard’s study of Dinka who were incorporated into 
Nuer lineages, also demonstrated the co-existence of lineage-based social structures and social 
ties that exist beyond biological parentage (Evans-Pritchard 1940).   
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The conflict in Congo disrupted families in dramatic and tragic ways.  Spaces of asylum 
such as the peri-urban neighborhoods where Banyamulenge families have settled in Nairobi 
since the mid-2000s are sites in which people attempt to re-make their lives.  Some young people 
marry, despite vastly diminished resources for requisite bridewealth payments and wedding 
ceremonies.  Still, families and clans come together to pool resources in order to rent a large 
church, buy crates of sodas for hundreds of attendees, hire a videographer to document the 
ceremony for relatives in faraway places, and rent a white gown for the bride.  At these weddings 
and other community events, men in sharp suits and women in technicolor kitenge dresses give a 
different impression from the one I had while sitting in the darkness of spare, concrete-floor 
homes listening to people such as Jacqueline speak with anguish and frustration.  Banyamulenge 
often came to Nairobi not knowing if family members were dead or alive.  People who had lost 
the families with whom they lived prior to leaving Congo share apartments—often using real or 
suspected kinship connections, or using an idiom or pattern of kinship relations and communal 
solidarity through which to forge mutually protective and sustaining bonds, as when Chantal 
lived with Aimable and Richard; when Jacqueline lived with Mama Mugisha and Jean; and when 
Chantal and Jacqueline moved in together.48   
The lineage-based notion of kinship and “tribe” in the Banyamulenge community is at the 
core of making and re-making households and mutual assistance, and what obligates a struggling 
young person or family to put up strangers in their house.  Yet, differently positioned people in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  The idiom of kinship can also be dangerous.  For example, the three young men trying to sleep 
with Jacqueline, each telling her she should “marry” them since they already lived together (a 
euphemism for sex, where sex without marriage is taboo).  In the absence of a cultural 
framework for a single woman to live with single, marriageable men, the idiom of kinship 
becomes oppressive, and a search for social stability can lead to greater precarity rather than less.  
Kinship can sustain, but patriarchal kinship and inequality among men and women endangers 
women’s wellbeing, too (Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako 1997).   	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the community are differently incorporated into kinship structures and norms.  Nevertheless, 
such genealogical solidarities upon which people make and re-make their lives in Nairobi are 
necessary for understanding how everyday survival and sociality intersects with UN and 
government policies in the programs that these same people so desperately attempt to access.   
 
 
 
A Somali Critique of the Assessment of Kinship: DNA and Destructive Revelations  
Because Somalis had been part of the original DNA pilot program in 2008, and because, 
as a community, they had been taking part in the US Family Reunification Program for so many 
years, many Somalis knew much more about the resettlement process, and about DNA testing, 
than refugees that had arrived more recently, such as the Banyamulenge community.  But as I 
conducted my research in Nairobi and later in Columbus, Ohio, I learned that DNA testing was a 
challenging topic to address not only because it could expose lies, omissions or partial truths that 
people had told to the UN or governments.  DNA testing was also troubling because it could 
expose things that were even more traumatic and taboo.  While skirting rules for the sake of 
one’s family was a sensitive topic (particularly in discussions with an outsider, such as myself), 
perhaps even more fraught was discussing family relations that were not what they appeared.   
  We are back at my friend Moha’s apartment in late 2014.  The security operation, 
Usalama Watch, has died down.  My tiny Toyota Starlet, which I bought in the aftermath of the 
second grenade exploded on one of my bus routes, is too dinky to traverse the construction on 
Eastleigh’s torn-up and flooded roads.  Often I just walk.  Today, however, I have a large bag 
full of glass bottles of Fanta, Sprite, and Coke, so I take a taxi.  Moha and I have organized a 
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focus group.  I’ve designed some questions and asked Moha to invite both young men and 
women.  He has corralled some friends.  When I meet with Moha, I don’t usually cover my head.  
I know he finds the idea of posing as Muslim worse—more distasteful—and possibly more 
dangerous than walking around without a hijab.  But not everyone agrees.  Since I don’t know 
with whom I’ll be meeting, I drape a fuchsia scarf over my head and after some waiting, because 
it’s Sunday, I finally find one of the neighborhood taxi drivers to take me across Juja Road to 
Eastleigh. 
 Moha’s home is one room in a three-bedroom apartment in one of Eastleigh’s packed, 
concrete apartment buildings.  In it are three beds, for himself, his cousin Ahmed, and in-law 
Issa; a desk with a desktop computer; and an office chair on wheels.  There is also a green plastic 
hamper with clothes in it, and a clothing rack on which hang a few items of the young men’s 
clothes.  Sitting in the desk chair, I am reading my questions aloud to Moha, who is eager to hear 
them, when a young man comes in, striding, bouncing.  He unbuttons his shirt and picks up a 
green prayer rug that is folded on the desk, laying it on the floor.  I think he is going to pray, but 
he spreads his shirt on it, pressing it with a heavy iron as he speaks animatedly.  A young boy, 
maybe one-and-a-half, toddles in through the half-open door, moving around the room, pulling 
the lid from the laundry basket, walking dangerously close to the hot iron.   
Soon, the other participants arrive.  They sprawl out on the three beds.  Moha has 
collected friends who live in the building.  Farxiyo and Khadro are sisters, and Najiib is their 
cousin.  Farxiyo and Khadro’s mother is in the Dadaab refugee camp, while they live in Nairobi 
on their own.  Moha has also called his friend Hassan.  Issa, Moha’s uncle’s wife’s brother, joins 
us, too.  The group ranges in age from 21 to 28.  Most have lived in various places—between 
camps, Northeastern Kenya, and Nairobi; and between different countries on the continent.  
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Other than Issa, they were all born outside of Somalia or left when they were young children.  
They speak Somali, Swahili, and English—even Issa, who has only been in Kenya for a few 
years.   
The group, in a familiar place with friends and family, has no trouble digging in to my 
questions.  They discuss how the war and resettlement have changed Somali families.  They 
shout over one another, illustrating their points with stories and jokes.  Najiib, imagining a 
hypothetical (Somali) wife in the US, shouts, “When I come home from work, she’ll tell me, 
‘What you provided, cook it!’” Everyone laughs.  “I don’t know how to do this stuff!” he 
exclaims, to which his cousin, Khadro, replies, “Google it!”   
I ask the group if UNHCR and resettlement governments (like the US) define “family” in 
the same way that the Somali community does, and if DNA testing has an effect.      
Najib: We are cousins.  Gesturing to Farxiyo and Khadro.  So if we are tested, they’ll 
look the same, but they’ll discriminate against me.  They’ll let them go, and I’ll stay here.   
Farxiyo: There are a lot of kids who a mom adopted during that time, and we don’t have 
any system of formal adoption.  You’re just running, you see a child, you have sympathy and 
you take that child.  When the mom came to Dadaab, she won’t say, ‘This isn’t my child’ – she 
doesn’t want the child to feel negatively.  So if resettlement comes and they’re carrying the 
names of those parents, if you tell the UN the truth they won’t believe and will cancel the case.  
So people don’t say anything.   
Najiib:  They say, “child trafficking!”   
Farxiyo: Once DNA comes, they won’t accept [the case].  And then you have to tell the 
child. 
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Khadro: Also, DNA brings disbelief between the husband and the wife.  Say there are 
five kids, and two are not from the husband.  Then big problems will come.  That’s why people 
fear DNA.   
Farxiyo:  Yes, and some women are raped and get pregnant.  Maybe she herself even 
didn’t know.  Even my mom adopted two kids – two boys – they were Somali Bantus.  After 
Mom and Dad separated, and Mom moved, they found some relatives and went to live with 
them.  Now they’re in Kakuma.  But the boys saw Dad once in Kakuma, and they were asking 
about Mom.   
Sophia:  How long were they with your family? 
Farxiyo: Looking at Khadro.  Five years.  They were very malnourished when mom 
found them.  After they recognized our father [in Kakuma] they asked, ‘Where’s Mom?’  So they 
communicate with her.  Now they’re waiting for a flight.  They could be on our mandate… 
Najiib:  This kind of thing brings mental problems to people. 
Farxiyo:  With DNA, problems come. 
Najiib:  People even become street boys because of it.  [Laughter].   
Farxiyo: They should have a consultation first – separately – and be able to disclose any 
secret.   
Najiib: The man may even lose confidence.  It’s like the wife is saying, “My man was not 
able to satisfy me.”   
Hassan:  If it is true, though, it’s very helpful.  It can make the case quicker.   
Najiib: But there are more problems than benefits.   
Farxiyo: It’s only good if it works for them.  In the camps, people pray DNA won’t be 
taken.   
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Three weeks later, I was back at Moha’s for another focus group.  We agreed that the first 
had gone well.  Moha was pleased I had thought to bring sodas—it had given the event a 
cheerful feeling.  By our next focus group it was Ramadan, so no soda.  I probably should not 
have tried to organize an event during Ramadan at all, I later realized.  The young women were 
busy cooking Iftar (the break-fast meal), and everyone was tired.  Again, the group was 
composed of young men and women who lived in Eastleigh.  The four—Samiiro, Khadijo, 
Jabriil, and Abdirahman— were between the ages of 19 and 23.  Abdirahman lived with his 
brother, while his parents and other siblings were in Somalia.  Jabriil lived with cousins—the 
sons of his father’s brother—while his parents and ten siblings were also in Somalia.  Samiiro’s 
parents were divorced, and she lived in Nairobi with her mother and siblings, while her father 
resided in the United States.  Khadijo’s parents were also divorced, with her mother in the US 
and her father in the Middle East.  She lived with her grandmother and her grandmother’s 
children.  She calls her grandmother “mom” and refers to her grandparents’ children as “sisters 
and brothers.”  
As we discussed the issue of families in the context of war and displacement, Samiiro 
brought up the issue of DNA testing before I had a chance to raise it.  The group was discussing 
the psychological impact of resettlement on young people who begin making plans for the future, 
but who are continuously disappointed as the process is delayed without explanation.  It was 
clear that they were speaking from experience.   
Samiiro: Another problem comes if DNA shows that a child isn’t a man’s. 
Khadijo: You might even come to know that someone isn’t your father.  
There is a silence.  Abdirahman admonishes the group that the topic is inappropriate to 
discuss with me—someone who will be writing about what they say.    
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Samiiro: What are you talking about? Why can’t that be discussed?  It’s something that 
happens!  
Abdirahman: That shouldn’t be discussed here.  Are you getting me?  
Jabriil: Yeah, yeah.   
Abdirahman: Are you getting me?  
Khadijo: Yes, I’m getting.   
Samiiro, who first broached the subject, was the only person who did not reply in the 
affirmative.  I put down my pen, explaining that I was aware of the DNA testing issue.  I have 
been concerned, I say, trying to convey that I have thought about DNA testing and its 
consequences before, that if people’s families don’t fit the UN or government definitions of 
family, it could cause problems.  Abdirahman sighs.   
Abdirahman: Disaster.  Look, if you have an uncle or something who is like your father, 
then when DNA comes, that will ruin it – that’s what we’re talking about.  The DNA thing came 
up because they knew some families were lying.    
Samiiro: They were applying for other people, who aren’t their family.  They made up, 
‘This is my child.’ But if you say that the person is not your child but you’re caring for them, it 
can work.   
Khadijo: But they’ll say that you can’t be responsible for that other child. 
Jabriil: The problem is that then the child is going to feel different. 
Samiiro: Yes, and you’ve been raised by those parents the whole time.   
Jabriil: The agencies know this, though.   
Abdirahman: But if you say that it’s another [not biologically related] child, they won’t 
allow. 
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 Moha, who had been quiet, mentioned child trafficking—one of the stated rationales for 
UN and government vigilance over family composition.   
Samiiro: If you have documents – adoption documents – then it’s not a problem.  If you 
can prove…. 
Jabriil: Do we have those documents? 
Abdirahman: We don’t go by documents, we go by tribe.  ‘This is my fifty grand cousin.’  
Sophia: So do these institutions and Somalis understand ‘family’ in the same way? 
Abdirahman: No, no, absolutely not.  They don’t.  Family to us is different than Western 
culture.  My aunt’s son is like my brother.  My grandmother is like my mom.  My uncle is like 
my father.  Even your second cousin is your brother. 
Samiiro: Anyone who is your mom’s friend is your aunt. 
Abdirahman: Like my father, he adopted three cousins at a young age to educate them.  
They become part of the family.  They identify with the family.  You will move with them.  
That’s where DNA comes. 
Samiiro: It’s cruel.   
Jabriil: The main point is that when a family lies, that brings problems. 
Abdirahman: It’s not exactly lying. 
Jabriil: But hiding it. 
Abdirahman: But also the person doesn’t want to be called out. 
Khadijo: Like I call my grandmother and grandfather, ‘Mom and Dad,’ and I call their 
kids, who are my aunt and uncle, as my sisters and brothers.   
Moha: So they’re close in age to you? 
Khadijo: Even if they’re not!  I want them to say I’m their sister.  I don’t want them to  
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introduce me in another way.  We were all supposed to be taken abroad as a family.  There was 
no DNA at that time, but we failed something.  Now my mom [in the US] is trying to take me, 
but the problem is that when she went she never said she had another daughter.  So DNA may 
help.   
Abdirahman: Well DNA let me down.   
Sophia: Would you be willing to say how DNA affected your case?   
Abdirahman: I had a case and DNA made it fail.  
Samiiro: But how did it?! 
Abdirahman explained that he was living with his aunt and the rest of her family.  They 
were supposed to go to Sweden together.   
Abdirahman: I was never told in the interview that there would be DNA.  Later, we 
learned that DNA would come, so we just pulled out of the process.  So they went to Sweden.  
Now we just communicate by phone.   
Abdirahman did not elaborate more, but his voice betrayed his hurt.  He did not elaborate 
on the fact that in order to save their own case and not be caught in a “lie” or “not exactly lying,” 
in his own terms, the family had to reveal to the Swedish officials that Abdirahman was not a 
“full” member of the family, by the government’s standards.49  The policy’s work of defining 
Abdirahman as not fully part also made him not fully part in a dramatic way—separating him 
from the family with whom he lived and on whom he relied. 
In these conversations, what seemed to trouble everyone the most was not being caught 
in a “lie” or a “not exactly lie.” In addition to the separation of families, the young people in the 
focus groups expressed that most troubling was the exposure of relations that were not as they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Other than the US, countries such as Sweden and Finland also use DNA testing to verify 
kinship claims.  	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had outwardly appeared: the revelation of a woman’s infidelity, or rape, or one that exposed a 
“fatherless” child, or that marked one sibling as separate and excluded them from the rest.  
Naming the cousin, the niece, or the orphan as one’s child or sibling seeks to negate distinction.  
Calling the mother and father of the house “hooyo” (mother) and “aabo” (father), the child is re-
classified as of the family (reer).   
Using kinship terms, and carrying the name of a father and grandfather (as in Somali 
naming conventions) naturalize and publicly mark one’s belonging to a patriline.  The family is a 
smaller unit within concentric circles of sub-clans, or lineages.  These clan and sub-clan 
identities are central forms of identity and belonging.  Even if many young Somalis in places 
such as Nairobi understood clan (qabil) as a destructive institution given its manipulation in the 
civil war, many also discussed the “good side” of clan—which involves mutual assistance and 
support.  The “glue” of relationality that holds kin together within these social units, and which 
can be traced through the names of grandfathers, is deeply felt—positioning an individual in a 
web of kin that has real social consequences.   
Moha once told me a story of a young man who had been taken in as an orphan by his 
parents when he was very young.  He was extremely close with his father, and his father loved 
him very much.  When the father became ill, his wife told him that he should tell their son that he 
was not their son by birth before he died, but the father could not bring himself to break his son’s 
heart.  When the father died, because the community’s religious leaders knew the son’s origins, 
they followed the letter of the law and said that the son would not receive an inheritance equal to 
that of his brothers.  The son was distraught, refusing to believe that he was not the person he 
had always believed he was.   
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People who spoke to me about DNA testing emphasized the resulting feelings.  Najiib 
said, “This kind of thing brings mental problems to people.”  Hassan said, “The problem is that 
then, the child is going to feel different.”  Both Abdirahman and Khadijo, who lived with 
“extended” families, and whose resettlement cases had been rejected, described not wanting to 
be “called out,” and needing to be publicly seen as part of the family with which they lived.  
There are various scenarios that lead DNA testing to disrupt a case—from parents who 
themselves are oblivious that a child is not biologically the father’s, to those who know but have 
never told the child, to a child who knows that they are not the biological child of their parents 
but for whom it is important to be seen as an equal member of the family.   
While interviewing Moha one day, he told me, 
“Somalis, they hate one thing.  There’s something called ‘wecel.’ It’s like, a kid without a 
father.  An unfathered kid.”  
“Why do they hate it?” I asked. 
“Ayayay, they hate it.  It’s a shame.  You can’t call that man who raised you a father.  To 
be born as wecel, without father, your mother being impregnated without being married—that’s 
the one that is a shame.  It’s like inheriting shame.”  
“What is their clan?” I asked. 
“They have no clan.  You’ll just be photocopied onto the mother’s clan.”  
“Why do you say ‘photocopied?’” 
“It’s like something which is not true.  It’s not the original one.  The wecel causes a very 
big problem.”  
In Moha’s statement, a child without a known (or publicly acknowledged) father is 
shameful because she or he represents a social transgression on the part of their mother.  But the 
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“fatherless child” is also a social problem because she or he cannot be placed correctly within a 
lineage.  The story of the young man after his father’s death, and Moha’s comments on the 
wecel, provide insight into the fear with which people see DNA testing—something that can 
expose a destructive and taboo secret, and unravel people’s whole social universe.  “People pray 
DNA won’t be taken,” Farxiyo says.  It is no wonder, then, that of the thousands of family 
reunification applications filed in Columbus, Ohio, over three years since the program had re-
opened, not a single case had been denied on account of the DNA results.  The lack of cases 
denied on account of DNA suggests many people are not filing for family members on account 
of fears, suspicions, or certainty that people who see themselves as “real family” can never be 
reunited.    
 
The Changing Transnational Family: Refugee Families before and after DNA Testing 
 
Len, the former US Resettlement Support Center (RSC) staff member and current NGO 
director, told me that when he was working on resettlement for the US government back in the 
mid-1990s in the Utanga Refugee Camp on the Kenyan coast, there was never an empty spot.  
Every member of the family was present when the resettlement case came through, often years 
after it began.  The families were always large.  Why?  Because if you had a son or daughter or 
spouse who was missing or dead or had traveled elsewhere, you would fill the spot—either with 
another relative or with someone who could pay to be on your case, Len said.  If you had a niece 
or nephew or cousin, people commonly claimed them as a son or a daughter.   
My friend Habiba came to the United States as the daughter of her biological uncle. In 
the course of my research in Columbus, Ohio, I saw Habiba daily, working at a desk beside her 
at one of the local resettlement agencies.  Habiba talked about her family often.  Her sister had 
	   218	  
gone back to Somalia for a short time and complained about the food.  Her father had gone back 
for good—an older man, he wanted to be there to contribute something while he still could.  Her 
mother visited him but lived in the States.  Her siblings lived in various cities around the US.  
She talked about her husband and her young kids—the funny things the children would say.  It 
was hard to get Habiba for an interview during work hours, as she had little downtime.  But one 
Friday afternoon we escaped in her mini-van to a Tim Horton’s.  Over coffee and donuts, Habiba 
talked candidly about her memories of leaving Somalia as a child, and about the struggles of 
supporting family back home.   
 Like many, Habiba has two families: the mother and father, whom she refers to regularly 
as “mom and dad,” with whom she fled Somalia, who brought her to the United States and who 
raised her since she was six; and her biological mother and father in Somalia, whom she hadn’t 
mentioned to me until that day.  Habiba and her family initially fled to Kenya.  Relatively well 
off, they lived in Nairobi, bypassing the camps.  Several years later, they were resettled to the 
United States.  Now that Habiba had informed me about her family, she switched back and forth 
between referring to her mother as “my mom,” “my aunt,” and “my uncle’s wife”—beginning 
with “my uncle’s wife” and shifting to “my mom” as the story progressed—presumably as her 
young self began to think of her that way as time passed.   
 I asked Habiba, “In your resettlement case, did the fact that you weren’t the biological 
child of your parents ever come up?”  
 Habiba replied, “It was never mentioned.  I mean – my [last] name ‘Omar’ is my 
[maternal] grandfather’s name.  And even when I came to the US, and got citizenship I never 
changed it.  It didn’t matter to me if it was that grandfather or this grandfather – I mean, my real 
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name should be ‘Jamaal’ but I really don’t care.  And my parents raised me as their own – really 
and truly – and there was no DNA at that time, so there was no need of telling stories.” 
 Taking her lead, I asked, “Can DNA testing harm families?” 
“Of course,” Habiba answered.  “Other families raise kids for many reasons.  When 
people come to [our agency] I hear all the time, ‘I’m leaving my brother’s son or daughter, or 
daughter of my best friend who died.’  It’s not fair.  Is it fair? Sometimes no.  Children who have 
no place to go – and I’m one of those.  My uncle said I’m his daughter.  If he hadn’t, I don’t 
know if I would be here.  In the US, your family is that – your family.  The others are your 
relatives.  In Somali culture, family is beyond your own family.  I know many people who wish 
they could raise their brother’s or sister’s kids.  Would they lie?  Some would if they could.  In 
war, people do things that are so wrong, but for so many different reasons.” 
I told Habiba about a young woman I knew in Eastleigh.  I met Halwo, age 16, through 
my friend Moha.  Halwo’s uncle and his three children were waiting to be reunited with his wife, 
Halwo’s aunt, in Europe.  Halwo was helping her uncle—the husband of her mother’s sister by 
cooking and taking care of the kids.  When they finally left for Europe, Halwo was left behind.  
The last I had heard, she had headed for Mombasa, where she had relatives.  Habiba’s head was 
turned to the side.  She was looking out at something in her mind, seemingly lost in thought or 
memory.   
“If I weren’t part of the process, what would I do?” she wondered aloud.  “How would I 
support myself?  And you’re a child – imagine feeling left out.  Once they’re gone, it’s like 
living on the streets.”  She seemed to be considering her young self and Halwo at once.   
The implementation of DNA testing as an anti-fraud measure in the US Refugee Family 
Reunification Program, and the standard of the biogenetic nuclear family in refugee resettlement 
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more broadly, has had profound effects on the lives of refugees in East Africa.  DNA testing is 
difficult to subvert.  If over 80% of families tested in the DNA pilot program in 2008 had at least 
one “fraudulent” member, as the US government reported, things have certainly changed.  Sara, 
who also worked at the resettlement agency in Columbus, and who was involved in running the 
Family Reunification Program once it re-started in 2012, reported that of the thousands of cases 
they had submitted, as of July of 2015, not one had been rejected on account of DNA (though 
many had been rejected for other reasons).50 The kind of flexibility of family composition that 
had been allowed (if unintentionally) in earlier years, has largely come to an end.  As Habiba 
reflected, and as other refugee advocates also expressed, the reunification program can have the 
consequence of separating families and units of social care, leaving people such as Halwo, and 
Jacqueline and Chantal, without the networks of protection on which they once relied.  Family 
reunification programs can have the paradoxical effect of disrupting the families and social ties 
that emerge from both longstanding social practices and the necessary “makeshift” ties that 
emerge out of war and exile (see Gale 2007; Murphy 2003; Utas 2005).   
 
Conclusion: Borders of Family and Nation 
My aim in this chapter has been to convey some of the ways in which DNA technology 
and the logic that underlies it reverberate within refugees’ lives—shaping the contours of family 
life and reunion, but also of separation and disruption.  The disconnect between the policy 
definition of family on one hand, and sociality and networks of social care in the two 
communities in which I conducted fieldwork, is not a relation of opposites: a biogenetic 
definition of family based on shared genetic substance versus a concept of kin based on “choice” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  A common reason for rejection is when the anchor relative did not report a child in their 
original interviews, in which case, even DNA testing would not be sufficient.	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(Weston 1991) or even the denial of biological parenthood, as seen in some West African 
contexts (Alber 2003).  Rather, DNA testing and the biogenetic nuclear family intersect with 
Somali and Congolese ideas about family that are themselves deeply rooted in genealogies and 
blood metaphors (Lewis 1994).  But norms of identity and obligation extend along an extensive, 
multiplying chain of genealogical tracing—with members both explicitly located within that 
chain, and others implicitly assumed to exist there.   
“Do we share something?” Moha once asked a friend.   
“Maybe on the mother’s side,” his friend replied.   
“No, no, not on the mother’s side.  I think the big clan,” Moha said, referring to the large, 
patrilineal clan to which he belonged, and to which he imagined his friend also belonged as he 
considered his friend’s birthplace.   
Anthony Giddens writes,  
The family is an object of political struggle around the world.  There are few countries in 
the world where there isn’t intense discussion about sexual equality, the regulation of 
sexuality and the future of the family….  Politicians and pressure groups will suggest that 
if only family policy were modified…solutions to our problems could readily be found 
(2000:70).   
Many of the most heated and entrenched political debates in the United States engage the family 
in fundamental ways: Debates about same-sex marriage seek to define the meaning of the family; 
debates about gun control circle around the right and need to protect the family (whether 
protecting with guns or by limiting guns); debates about abortion seek to define how birth and 
“family planning” may be controlled by human choice and medical technology; debates about 
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social services often engage the question of well-being at the level of the family as much as the 
individual or community, where the family stands as a microcosm of the nation.   
“The family” in US public debates now indexes first and foremost the nuclear family, 
regardless of how well this model matches the actual social practices of cohabitation, financial 
obligation, feelings, and labors of care.  This model of the family, premised on “an ideology of 
conjugal love and companionship,” as sociologist Judith Stacey writes, has come to exist in an 
American cultural imaginary as normal and timeless, despite the fact that it arose in the 19th 
century (Stacey 1998:8-9).  Nostalgia for this model of the family has been central to 
conservative political discourses since the 1960s (ibid.:10-15).  Elizabeth Povinelli (2005) argues 
that a discourse of the sovereign, loving “conjugal couple” stands as a symbol of “choice,” and 
even of civilization itself—in opposition to kinship in the “genealogical society,” in which 
sociality is understood to be based on inheritance and social constraint.  Hardt and Negri note 
that fewer Americans are “involved in the nuclear family,” and yet “discourses and practices of 
‘family values’ seem to be everywhere across the social field”—“the institutions work even 
though they are breaking down” (Hardt and Negri 2000:197).  Perhaps one reason that projects 
like the US Refugee Family Reunification Program rely on such a definition is that, as Stacey 
argues, “no singular family structure or ideology has arisen to supplant” it (Stacey 1998:17).  
The revolutionary project of marriage equality via the legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
expands and changes kinship by including previously unrecognized couples within the definition 
of marriage.  On the other hand, the political movement to recognize all couples through legal 
marriage also affirms the hegemony of the “conjugal couple,” the legal institution of marriage, 
and the nuclear family by demonstrating the ways in which these institutions allow individuals 
equal rights and full social and cultural citizenship.    
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Just as deeply-rooted as cultural discourses that hold the nuclear family as the family, 
biology and genetics are also central to the cultural logics of “American kinship” (Schneider 
1980).  Pointing out the symbolic nature of biology, David Schneider argued against taking for 
granted biological reproduction as the scientific basis for family.  Instead, he argued that the 
biological facts of sexual reproduction are particular symbols of family and its attendant cultural 
meanings—“love” and “diffuse, enduring solidarity” (Schneider 1980:116).  Feminist scholars 
such as Gayle Rubin also critiqued the Eurocentrism and biologism of kinship as a concept in the 
1970s (Franklin and McKinnon 2001: 3).  More recent works on kinship have pointed out that 
even in the context of changing reproductive technologies and familial practices, the centrality of 
genetics in US cultural conceptions of relatedness has not wavered (Finkler 2005; Rapp et. al. 
2001; Thompson 2001).    
Thus, DNA testing in refugee resettlement draws from, but also extends and calcifies, 
normative cultural conceptions and practices in the United States.  In this sense, the biogenetic 
nuclear family is a central mold in the machinery through which refugees pass when they cross 
the US border.  National security against terrorists and national security against unsuitable 
refugee subjects are intertwined imperatives, in which the image of a safe and acceptable border 
crosser exists within a verifiable, stable and culturally acceptable model of a family—not 
polygynous (common in Somali society), and not comprised of questionably, unverifiably 
attached individuals.   
In the course of my research, officials reported that, among other problems, DNA testing 
was meant to remedy a perceived problem of unstable families and abandoned minors.  Before 
the use of DNA testing, when a family that had been paid to take an unrelated child on their case 
arrived in the US, the child could end up abandoned, due to conflict or neglect, I was told.  While 
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DNA testing was designed, in part, to guard against family breakdown in the US, in this chapter I 
have shown that it can create family breakdown in refugee-sending places such as Nairobi.  DNA 
testing facilitates the resettlement of stable families that mirror American values, and that won’t 
create a burden on the US welfare, foster care, law enforcement, or court systems.  UNHCR and 
NGOs are concerned about “protection issues” created by minors who are left behind when their 
caregivers resettle without them.  But ultimately, for the US government, the greatest priority is 
to ensure that the people resettled in the United States are “genuine” families, for which the 
nuclear, biogenetic family is the standard.  Refugees such as Jean and Mama Mugisha and 
Abdirahman’s aunt learn that presenting more complicated, non-nuclear families will diminish 
their chances for resettlement.  In this way, resettlement policies in effect produce nuclear 
families and alter existing social lives. 
Finally, why does the US Refugee Coordinator who initiated the DNA testing program 
imagine what I’ve called “the fraudulent family”—the family that doesn’t abide by the rules of 
family definition and hides its transgression—as intersecting with terror? “What happens to my 
career if I’m the guy who sent a terrorist to the States?” Len reports him as saying, as he 
considers fraud in the Family Reunification Program a few years after 9/11.  For governments, 
the family is a powerful institution—capable of producing desirable and undesirable effects.  
Kinship can be stabilizing or destabilizing to a hegemonic social order, and certain kinds of 
kinship have been discursively linked to terror.   
In March 2016, the New York Times published a short documentary entitled, “The 
Outsize Role of Brothers in Terrorist Plots:” “Two of the suspected bombers in Brussels shared a 
mission, an ideology, and a bloodline,” the documentary opens.  “They were brothers.  Among a 
unique band of brothers who have carried out high profile acts of terror since 9/11.” 
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So what is it about brothers in terror? Sometimes they radicalize together, amplifying 
their own ideas.  Sometimes one radicalizes the other, who finds it difficult to resist.  
Sometimes it’s just about family respect, not ideology.  For security officials, brothers 
can be virtually impossible to track….  wire tapping doesn’t get you very far if brothers 
live under the same roof (Al-Hlou 2016).   
Junaid Rana argues that both migrants and terror suspects are at times understood “through the 
notion of fictive kin,” in which “leaders of terror cells become like fathers, as do the benefactors 
of migrants who enter into paternalistic relationships in their transnational social networks” 
(2011:72).  These forms of kinship are understood through a civilizational lens in which certain 
kinds of social relations are mapped onto “the racialized Muslim migrant” (ibid.:72) and a notion 
of “Islamic peril” (50).  
The unfamiliar family, exhibiting “unsuitable” bonds, US refugee policies suggests, can 
pose a dangerous threat.  Despite the lack of attention to family and kinship in studies of security 
and humanitarianism, the perception of “the family” as a potential site of anti-social solidarity or 
danger, as well as its capacity to stand as the ideal of the nation in miniature, makes it a crucial 
object of study within these fields.  Moreover, as the epigraphs of this chapter demonstrate, “the 
family” is of central importance to refugee resettlement and its humanitarian aims, 
conceptualized in a universalizing human rights discourse.  It is, in part, for this reason that the 
family is also a site of intense scrutiny.  The perceived manipulation of the family by refugees 
disrupts the humanitarian work of selecting correct beneficiaries: “real families.” “Fraudulent 
families” unsettle the special care placed on the family as an institution and human right in need 
of protection. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Resettlement from the Other Side 
 
 
I am sitting at a Somali restaurant on Morse Road in Columbus, Ohio, with Dahir, who arrived in 
Columbus in 2013.  Dahir and his mother and five siblings had begun their resettlement case 
from the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya in 2007.  The case remained pending for five years, 
until they were called for another interview in 2012.  Because Dahir and his brother were twenty-
two and twenty-three years old by that time—no longer minors—their cases were separated from 
that of their mother and younger siblings.  The two young men’s cases were accepted, and Dahir 
arrived only a week after his brother; but now, two years later, his mother and siblings are still in 
Kakuma.   
Like a handful of young people I met in Kenya who grew up in refugee camps, Dahir 
ended up working for an international organization in Kakuma, acting as a liaison between the 
NGO and his community, and as a representative to donor communities.  Probably in part 
because of his ability to take advantage of these opportunities for both income and social capital 
in Kakuma, and his global connectedness via international NGOs, he had high hopes for life in 
the US—hopes that have been frustrated over the past two years.  Dahir tells me: 
The biggest problem was that the money I received was so little, but I had to sit down 
with my brother and still cut a budget out of our budget to send Mom and kids to keep 
them alive.  Because we did not come united.  I’m living in this country for two years.  I 
always ask ORA [Ohio Refugee Assistance]51 and they don’t give me information.  Same 
as the RSC [US Resettlement Support Center].  Both are telling me, ‘Your mom is on 
hold.’  ‘What’s ‘on hold?’  Can you please give me an explanation?!’  They say, ‘We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 A pseudonym.  
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don’t know that.  Just be patient.’  I’ve been patient for two years now.  They tell me, 
‘Not our problems.  It’s immigration, Homeland Security, the government – to make sure 
the case is clean.’  I ask them, ‘Okay, what are the security challenges that this case can 
have?!  What are the security challenges can a mother of fifty years old, who’s sick!’  
Our hands our tied.  Our lives are not complete without our family. 
In this chapter, I examine a different node in the transnational pathways of refugee resettlement.  
The US is not an endpoint along a route—but, rather, one of several points that connect far-flung 
families, diasporic communities, and the now highly politicized, transnational humanitarian 
process of refugee resettlement between East Africa and the Horn of Africa, North America and 
beyond.  In this chapter, I follow linkages between refugees in the US and their families abroad, 
viewing resettlement as part of many refugees’ ongoing relationships with government security 
and transnational bureaucracies, as they manage new and familiar forms of uncertainty while 
waiting for children, spouses, and parents to join them.  
In what follows, I examine two mechanisms by which Somali refugees enact their 
obligations to their families and social networks in Africa: sponsorship through programs such as 
the US Refugee Family Reunification Program, and sending financial remittances—about 1.3 
billion dollars annually from the diaspora to Somalia (Oxfam 2015:1), and more to African 
countries in which Somalis are living as refugees.  These are practices that maintain refugees’ 
position within the viewfinder of what Nicholas De Genova calls “the Homeland Security State” 
(2007).  In doing so, I argue that the family must be incorporated into our understanding of the 
ways in which the War on Terror operates and intersects with diverse social worlds.  As I’ve 
argued throughout this dissertation, the family is a central symbol and social category through 
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which refugees and resettlement agencies articulate and navigate competing claims within this 
system.  
Important work on Africa has dealt with African perceptions of global inequality (Piot 
2010), the disadvantaged position of Africa in networks of globalization (Ferguson 2006).  
Related work has focused on the global South more broadly vis-à-vis “the migration fantasy” 
that casts the US as “a land of endless possibility” (Rana 2011:7).  The buufis—a Somali term 
meaning the “hope, longing, desire or dream to go for resettlement” and “the madness that at 
times occurs when the dream…is shattered” (Horst 2006:163)—which Cindy Horst described in 
Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps, and about which I also learned in Nairobi about a decade later—
poignantly illustrates how people in the global South have an “acute awareness of a privileged 
‘first class’ world” (Ferguson 2006:166).  While James Ferguson argues that these same people 
have “increasing social and economic disconnection from” that world, in the case of refugee 
resettlement, the promise of taking part in the “first class” feast is an ever-present possibility, 
held just out of reach—until it is not, or not exactly.   
 Instead of considering “the African” imagining life across the world in Europe or North 
America, in this chapter I consider the people who have arrived—the less than 1 percent of 
refugees globally who have been granted resettlement in the global North—but whose particular 
relationship to structures of global inequality have only partially changed.  Once resettled in the 
US or Europe, refugees from places such as Somalia and DR Congo often remain entrenched in 
racialized global hierarchies and systems of security and surveillance, while also taking 
advantage of new opportunities and resources, and contributing to their new communities.  As 
Didier Fassin writes of the governmentality of immigration, “[I]mmigrants embody the 
articulation of borders and boundaries….  They cross borders to settle in a new society and 
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discover boundaries through the differential treatment to which they are submitted” (Fassin 
2011:215).  Somalis, in particular, remain entwined in a global “Homeland Security State” on 
account of their new government’s relationship to their Muslim names and identities, and on 
account of their often now even more heightened social obligations to their families living in 
places such as Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.  “It’s our turn now,” I often heard people say when 
commenting on the support they received from relatives before they came to the US, and the 
support they now owed to relatives in Africa.  These modes of enacting family ties—the regular 
remitting of money to family in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, and the sponsoring of family 
members through the Refugee Family Reunification Program (and others)—keep both new 
Americans and US citizens consciously subject to state supervision.  As I highlighted in Chapter 
3, in particular, the sense that Somalis abroad are morally obligated, and often strongly desire to 
support relatives in places such as Kenya and Somalia requires that they continue to engage with 
US and transnational security and bureaucracy.  The day-to-day experience of remitting money, 
and dealing with the protracted process of sponsoring family members through Family 
Reunification and other visa programs, often keeps people fixed in anxious anticipation, waiting 
for a resolution to disjointed social worlds.   
 
Returning/Arriving 
 I touch down at 1 am in Syracuse, NY, the closest airport to my hometown.  My mom is 
smiling, almost laughing, perhaps with relief, as she stands on a desolate carpet, under the 
fluorescent lights of the nearly abandoned building. In the months ahead, I would witness many 
airport family reunions, with relieved and overjoyed parents and children who had waited much 
longer, and without assurance that they would see one another again.  My own privilege was 
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perhaps never so apparent to me as when it came to my mobility relative to the refugees with 
whom I was working.  My little blue US passport afforded me the ability to travel with ease in 
Nairobi, the East African region, and globally—a mobility that fundamentally enabled the multi-
sited research that comprises this dissertation.  This fact was not lost on my interlocutors.  
In mid-March, I shouldn’t be surprised by the snowstorm, but I am.  I’ve left ever-sunny 
Nairobi.  Wrapped in golden rays for nearly 365 days a year, while living there it was hard to 
imagine anything else—not the endless blankets of gray across the ground and sky that the Great 
Lakes push over central New York, making your eyelids feel heavy for six months a year.  My 
mom at the wheel of her Toyota, we crawl along Route 92 and then inch along Route 20, white 
fuzz amplified by the headlights.  A week later, I drive to Columbus, Ohio, a city I have never 
visited, and where I have made a few contacts ahead of time, but know no one beyond a phone 
call or e-mail.    
 Talking with an American friend in Nairobi some months earlier, I had described my 
uncertainty about whether or not my research in the US would be fruitful.  I was not really 
looking forward to leaving Nairobi after nineteen months.  My research was going well—though 
I could not imagine maintaining the strenuous pace and emotional toll of fieldwork indefinitely.  
But I had a wonderful apartment, a car, friends I loved.  Yet, I explained, since I was studying a 
transnational process, it made sense to go examine that process from the other side—didn’t it?   
 Why Columbus?  many people have asked me.  Columbus has the second largest Somali 
community in the United States, and a large and growing Congolese community, as well, I 
explain.  It has at least a dozen large institutional and grassroots organizations working with 
refugees, including three resettlement agencies, each of which brings new refugees to central 
Ohio every week, nearly every day.  But perhaps the more immediate reason was Marissa 
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Thompson.  I had first talked to Marissa soon after my arrival in Nairobi.  Upon first discussing 
my interest in the Family Reunification Program with Len, the director of an NGO in Nairobi, 
Len mentioned Marissa’s name.  Later, Leah at the US Ressettlement Support Center (RSC) 
mentioned Marissa, too.  The resettlement agency that Marissa directed in Columbus was well 
known and, as the director, she was known by people working in resettlement as someone who 
processed P3 (Family Reunification) applications for many clients, accounting for a substantial 
number of the P3 applications received by the RSC in Nairobi, which directs resettlement for 
most of the continent.  
 After being introduced to Marissa by Len over e-mail, we spoke over Skype about the 
Family Reunification Program, its suspension, and its re-opening the previous year.  I had gotten 
a sense of her as generous, deeply knowledgeable, and concerned about changes to the P3 
program, including the introduction of DNA testing.  So, when I found out I had received 
funding to continue my research, I decided to contact her about spending time at her 
organization.  Marissa kindly obliged and, unlike my experiences in Nairobi, where access to 
organizations—particularly UNHCR and the US government—was highly restricted, the doors 
of the resettlement agency that I dub Ohio Refugee Assistance (ORA) were open.    
From upstate New York I drove west across the flattening I-90, along the sometimes 
visible lake—flat and gray—past Buffalo, Erie, Cleveland, where snow was still drifting down.  
Then south on I-71 and, nearly eight hours later, into the parking lot of my new home base.  The 
organization had arranged an apartment for me in one of the buildings where they regularly rent 
homes for newly arrived refugees.  The Somali-American caseworker, Ikran, who had arranged 
the apartment, had left for the day, leaving the keys to my new home with a colleague, Sara.  I 
was surprised to hear Ikran was gone, as we had been in close contact about my arrival.  But 
	   232	  
soon I would realize that the case workers do not control their own time—they are jugglers, 
constantly trouble-shooting, managing the appointments, schedules and needs of their many 
clients.  Delayed flights, missed doctors’ appointments, a sudden need for a ride to a job 
interview, a long-awaited document needing to be delivered—resettlement caseworkers are the 
harried guides for every new refugee in the United States, especially for those without existing 
ties in the United States.  The caseworker is the tie—responsible for picking up new refugees at 
the airport, providing their first meals, finding them a home, furnishing it, getting them a Social 
Security card, applying for their government benefits, enrolling children in school, setting them 
up with mandated English language training, teaching them how to use public transportation and 
how to navigate a grocery store in their new city, and linking them with job counselors, among 
some of their most immediate tasks that must be done within the first three months of a refugee’s 
arrival—after which point, the newcomers are on their own.  
While the US Refugee Admissions Program abroad—where resettlement candidates are 
screened and interviewed—is overseen by the State Department and Homeland Security, the 
domestic side of resettlement is run through a public-private partnership between the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (Administration for Families and Children), a State 
Refugee coordinator under the Department of Jobs and Family Services, and a network of mostly 
religiously-affiliated, charitable, non-profit organizations.52  These national non-profit agencies 
are umbrella organizations that manage the placement of refugees within their hundreds of 
affiliate organizations across the nation (many of which, like ORA, are not religiously affiliated) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 These agencies, called VOLAGs, short for “Voluntary Agencies,” include Church World 
Services, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Ethiopian Community Development Council, HIAS, 
International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants, United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, and World Relief.  
	   233	  
that do the nitty-gritty labor of assisting refugees with the bare necessities of beginning a life in 
the United States.   
In addition to some of the activities I’ve described above, under the new requirements of 
the Family Reunification (P3) Program, all P3 applications (referred to at ORA as an “AOR”—
Affidavit of Relation) must be filled out and filed by a resettlement agency.  Given Marissa’s 
long tenure in the field, as well as her legal background, ORA serves as the major location for 
refugees to file an AOR in the city.  Many of the ORA staff devoted much of their time to the P3 
program, even though there is no specific funding stream that supported the hours of meetings 
with clients and filing P3 paperwork.  On Monday afternoons at 2 pm, Marissa held an open-
door, first-come/first-served, P3 consultation session, at which any person wanting to file a 
family reunification application could discuss their case with her.  Usually, at the time during 
which I conducted research at ORA, Marissa was able to see everyone who had come to see her 
on a given afternoon—up to five or six separate cases.  Clients waited downstairs, some arriving 
around 1 pm, others arriving in the morning because that was when they were able to get a ride.  
The receptionist, Selena, a recent college graduate, would hand each client a laminated card with 
a number as they arrived.   
Marissa’s policy was to file any claim that fit within the basic requirements of the 
program.  When did you arrive in the United States?  What was your status when you arrived?  
Who is the family member you’re applying for?  Where do they live?  Are they registered by 
UNHCR?  Do you have a birth certificate? And so on.  If the person met the minimum eligibility 
requirements, she would send them to Sara to set up an appointment to come back, at which 
point Sara would fill out the online application form.  If they were not eligible, Marissa would 
tell them, “Come back when your daughter registers with UNHCR,” or, “As long as your 
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husband is in Somalia, he is not eligible for this program” (as the family member must be a 
refugee, and thus, by definition, living outside of their home country).  Depending on the 
person’s situation, the possibility for eligibility could be considerably more complex, such as, 
“Since you didn’t disclose your marriage when you left the country, the only way you could 
apply for your husband is if you go back and get married again so you can present a marriage 
certificate dated after your arrival here.”  If the person would at no point be eligible through the 
P3 program, Marissa would tell them about other options, about which they could consult with 
one of the ORA’s immigration lawyers on staff.53   
In addition to Marissa, and Sara, who meets with the client to fill out the complicated 
forms, there is Liban–a Somali-American who came to Columbus in the mid-1990s, when there 
were only a couple hundred Somalis living there.  A soft-spoken man, Liban has been working 
for ORA since its early days—first as a volunteer, and later as a full-time staff member.  A good 
match for his low-key personality, Liban was tasked with the often-challenging activity of 
fielding inquiries about the status of P3 (AOR) applications.  On Tuesdays, clients would come 
to meet with Liban about their questions and concerns involving a process about which they may 
have heard nothing from the US government for months or years—and about which they were 
often hearing considerable urging from their family members abroad.   
*** 
Unlike neighboring cities that make up the Rust Belt region, the diversified economy of 
Columbus, with the state capital and government jobs, the flagship state university, and several 
corporate headquarters—for example, Nationwide Insurance, and American Electric Power—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Once people gain citizenship, five years after their arrival at minimum, they may apply for 
family members through other visa programs that do not require their family members to be 
refugees.    
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allowed the city to weather the Great Recession better than many cities of its size (Glinton 2016).   
With a population of 850,000 and a metropolitan area of almost 2 million, in 2015 Columbus had 
the 7th lowest unemployment rate among major metropolitan areas in the US (4.1%) as compared 
to the state of Ohio at 4.9% and the national average of 5.3% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015a; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015b).  Its polished downtown, many charming neighborhoods with 
older, well-kept homes, and buzzing businesses in nearly every neighborhood I visited give one a 
sense of its healthy economy.   
Columbus is home to large refugees communities from a number of countries.  In 2015, 
the largest communities continuing to arrive were Somali, Iraqi, and Nepali Bhutanese.  As part 
of the US government’s plan to resettle 5,000 Congolese refugees over 5 years, refugees from 
various eastern Congolese communities were also arriving in substantial numbers.  While no 
precise figures exist, estimates of the Somali population in Columbus range from 10,000 to 
80,000.  As of the 2012-13 school year, Somali was the third most common home language of K-
12 students in the Columbus metropolitan area (Dachenbach 2015).  As elsewhere in the 
diaspora, the Somali community has constructed its own cultural landscape in a new place.  Two 
Somali shopping malls and several Somali restaurants contribute to the built diaspora along 
Morse. Rd. and Cleveland Avenue in Columbus’ Northland area.  Though if you didn’t know to 
look for them, they could easily blend invisibly into these strips typical of mid-sized Midwestern 
cities flanked with fast food chains, discount stores, and coin-operated Laundromats.   
A few Somalis came to Ohio in the 1980s, before the civil war, often as university 
students.  When the civil war began in 1991, others came, attracted by the low cost of living and, 
increasingly, family ties and growing Somali language services—resettlement caseworkers, 
hospital interpretation, and other public services translated into Somali such as at the Ohio 
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Bureau of Motor Vehicles in Franklin County and the Office of Social Security, among others.  
People such as Liban, for example, who was among the first Somali refugees to arrive in 
Columbus, had been prompted to come by a friend who was a student at Ohio University, in 
nearby Athens.  Columbus’ reputation soon grew within the community.  People who were first 
settled in either more expensive places such as California and Virginia, or in places with fewer 
Somalis and support for Somali communities, came, and still come, to Columbus.   
Except for Family Reunification Cases, refugees who come to the United States through 
the resettlement program (other than Family Reunification cases) do not choose their new home 
city.  Rather, cases are allotted to different cities based on the capacity and capabilities of local 
resettlement agencies.  Because of Columbus’ history of serving Somali populations, Somalis are 
regularly sent to Columbus.  But those who are not initially resettled in a city with a large Somali 
community often come to Columbus later.  The availability of low-skilled jobs, particularly in 
factories and warehouses, has enabled refugees who don’t speak English to begin jobs quickly 
upon arriving.54  While issues such as inadequate public transportation, insufficient affordable 
housing, and the instability of warehouse and factory jobs pose major challenges, Columbus is 
still perceived by many Somalis as a relatively comfortable place to live, given the large Somali 
community and the relatively low cost of living.   
Just south of a two-mile stretch of Morse Road are large apartment complexes with two- 
and three-story brick buildings flanked by large, concrete parking lots and encircled by strips of 
green grass.  As few management companies will sign rental agreements with people who have 
no rental or employment history in this country, resettlement organizations in Columbus must 
house all of their clients in a small number of low-cost apartment buildings in this area run by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Many Somali women in Columbus, particularly new arrivals, first work in “pick and pack” 
jobs at warehouses, where they are responsible for locating and packing items for shipment. 	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management companies that have agreed to rent to newly-arrived refugees.  Although refugees 
live in various parts of the city, the Northland area is a major hub.  As of 2015, some of these 
apartment complexes seemed to be occupied entirely by Somali, Bhutanese, Congolese, 
Rwandan, and Burundian families newly arrived in the US.  Unlike in Nairobi, where I had no 
formal affiliation with an NGO, in Columbus, I was officially an ORA volunteer and intern, with 
a badge, e-mail address, laptop, and (sometimes shared) desk.  But much of the work took place 
outside of the office.  Accompanying caseworkers, particularly Ikran, a young Somali woman, 
and the first Congolese family settled by ORA for whom I acted as a Swahili interpreter, allowed 
me to follow a slice of people’s lives—from their arrival at the airport, to enrolling in school, to 
hunting for a job, and so on.    
My own apartment was located in a small, two-story brick building—probably built in 
the 1980s. The two apartments above mine were rented by a large Somali family that consisted 
of a married woman and man, his mother, and their seven children.  In an adjacent building lived 
three more Somali families.  Two families—one of which had come from Kenya, the other from 
Ethiopia—rented the top floor apartments.  The two basement apartments were rented by a large 
family consisting of a mother and her children who had come from Kenya, until the apartments 
flooded after a long week of heavy rain.  In the summer, which made up the majority of my 
research in Columbus, the front stoops and yards were used daily by the Somali residents to 
lounge and visit.  The kids often played outside in the evening, sometimes with neighboring kids 
from other buildings or houses on the street.  It was in my capacity as both a volunteer member 
of the ORA staff, and as a neighbor that I came to know that a majority of the people I met—
people who had been in Columbus anywhere from an hour to five years, or so—were struggling 
to meet expectations of their family members “back home.”  Far from being disconnected from 
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family members in far-away places, if anything, a certain type of connection was heightened 
through people’s new obligation to send money, and to navigate a new set of bureaucratic 
processes as they attempted to bring anxious and, at times, desperate family members to the 
United States.  Looking back on my notes from Nairobi, I found that in January of 2014, just a 
bit over a year after the re-opening of the Family Reunification Program, a staff member at the 
US Resettlement Support Center reported that 1,562 cases had been opened during that time, 
accounting for nearly 6,000 individuals waiting to come to the United States through the 
Program.  In this process, people having come to the US as refugees after years of waiting in 
camps and precarious urban neighborhoods begin to wait again.     
 
Fulfilling Obligations, from the Other Side  
One morning I drove my twenty-year-old neighbor, Abdi, to the grocery store to buy a 
money order so he could pay the electric bill for the apartment he shared with his parents and 
brother.  Chatting in the car, now three months after his family’s arrival, he told me that his 
sister’s husband back in Kenya had asked them to send money.  His father, an elderly man, 
replied to his son-in-law, “There’s no money here!  There’s no money unless you work!  We’re 
really suffering, can you send some money here?”  Abdi laughed—the idea of anyone in the 
United States asking someone in a refugee camp for money was absurd—and yet, somehow, was 
the new reality of his family’s life.  The pressure to send money home is intense (Lindley 2010).  
Desperation in camps fuels unrealistic ideas about life abroad, and money sent home reinforces 
the notion of a place where “you just pick money up off the ground,” as one neighbor described 
her relative’s ideas about where she now lived, and worked as a maid at a Holiday Inn.  In 
Chapter Three, I recounted the way Somali youth in Nairobi articulated their feelings that their 
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relatives abroad—in Europe and North America—had a social and moral obligation to support 
them.  The feeling of obligation among those who have gone abroad may be equally potent, but 
is now troubled by the experience that they are not in a land of plenty that many anticipated, but 
instead face serious financial hardship in the beginning of life in the US. The conflict between 
people’s families’ expectations and their financial and everyday realities was a pervasive theme 
in my conversations with newly arrived refugees in Columbus.  Many people lamented their 
relatives’ unrealistic expectations, while also remarking upon the sense of disconnection they 
themselves experienced when they arrived, as their own expectations of financial security and 
even prosperity were shattered.   
ORA’s policy was to hold the federally granted “welcome money” on behalf of their 
client—$1,125 per person—using it to pay the family or individual’s apartment deposit and first 
month’s rent, to take them grocery shopping, and then pay bills and another month or two of 
rent, if money remains.  Occasionally, conflict ensued over the money: refugees, particularly 
those who have lived in precarious and corrupt social settings, wanted to hold onto the money 
themselves.  “Why don’t we give it to them?”  Ikran said to me one day, “Because they’ll send 
everything home and have nowhere to sleep!”  A Somali-American job counselor at ORA, 
Abdul, likewise told me that he advised his clients to send just $20 home each month.  But Abdul 
reported that people were apalled by this advice, exclaiming, “$20?! That’s shameful!’”  
One day I had accompanied a Somali case worker, Asad, and a Congolese family, for 
whom I was acting as a Swahili interpreter, to the Franklin County Office of Jobs and Family 
Services where they needed to apply for government benefits.  In the waiting room, I chatted 
with a young Somali man, Warsame, a student who was working as an interpreter over the 
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summer.  He had come from Kenya several years prior, and we talked about Nairobi, and 
Kenyan politics.  Discussing his family, Warsame was candid about money issues, telling me,   
“Yeah, my dad is old school.  He gets social security, and he sends 80% of it back home 
to his nephews and nieces.  Even if he doesn’t have enough.  We tell him, ‘Dad, you need that 
money.’  But he just sends it.  Then he asks us for money.”   
“Why do you think people have that practice?” I asked. “Why do people feel so strongly 
the obligation to help people back home?”    
“Long time ago, we were nomads.  So everyone in the family lived together – people 
didn’t live separately – they lived all together in one place, so any money was shared by 
everyone.  So my dad would never see his brother’s kids as separate.”  
“He sees them as his own sons?” I asked.   
“Yes, definitely.  My dad even sends his tax refunds.  Like me, if I get $2,000 [refunded] 
from taxes, I save that.  But my dad?  No, he wouldn’t even think of saving it.  There’s no 
saving.  My dad has been here for six years, but if you look at his bank account, you wouldn’t 
believe it.  There’s nothing.   But on the other hand, he doesn’t help his own sons [in Ohio].  
Like my younger brother, he’s seventeen, sometimes he needs something – cause he’s still 
young.  But my dad thinks, ‘If you’re here, you’re okay, you don’t need to be helped.’  And also 
it’s the name. Your name is enhanced by helping. Or at least not ruined by not helping.”  
“So, you value maintaining the social relationships by supporting relatives over your own 
needs and wants.”  
“Yes definitely,” Warsame replied. “Like my dad, he always tells us, When I die, keep 
helping them.”   
“So do you send money back to Kenya? Or Somalia?”  
	   241	  
“No, I don’t send money.  I tell people I’m a student, and working, I can’t send anything 
now.  And you know, you could have been supporting someone for years, and years, and years, 
and then you stop for two months and it’s like you’re dead to them!”  
Later, in the car, I asked Asad, “Does this ever create conflicts in families, if you can’t 
fulfill someone’s expectations of what you should be sending them?”  “ 
Oh yes, definitely,” he replied.  “Yes, like for Eid.55  For Eid, you want to give your 
children something nice – they have to have something to enjoy.  But if you tell the relatives 
back home, ‘I don’t have money to send you, my kids need Eid,’ they tell you, ‘You’re selfish!  
You’re lying!’  They don’t believe that you don’t have enough money.”   
Habiba, who came to the US as a teenager, puts this in stark terms, as well.  Asking her 
when she began supporting her biological parents in Somalia, she replied:  
“As soon as I came to the US.  I got a job at Wendy’s after about three months.  I was 
making $70/week.  It was $4.25/hour – I worked part-time.  Saturday and Sunday I worked the 
full day, and Friday after school.  I thought I had to be responsible.  My mom never called and 
asked for money.  My dad didn’t call and ask.  When I came to America my goal was to go to 
school, get a job, and maybe bring my family.  But then there was the reality check – I can’t 
bring anyone.56  Most Somali people support other people.  They can’t save money – you will be 
here poor forever.  There’s always a mom who needs an operation, a cousin who is getting 
married, someone who’s sick.  With the little coming in each month, you’re carrying other 
people.  Because someone carried you, and now it’s your turn.”  Ultimately, the powerful social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The Eid holiday that concludes the month of fasting for Ramadan usually includes a large feast 
as well as gifts or special outings for kids.   
 
56 As I discuss in Chapter 4, Habiba could not sponsor her nuclear family to come to the United 
States because she came as if she were the daughter of her abti, her mother’s brother.  
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obligation to send money is part of the mechanism that produces strong transnational family ties. 
But that system simultaneously subjects Somalis to the watch of the US government as it 
tightens its grip on transnational money transfers, especially in communities who are sending 
money back to a country with terrorist groups high on US government radar—such as Somalia’s 
al-Shabaab.  
Because of the collapse of Somalia’s formal banking industry, the obligation of assisting 
people back home takes place through the Somali xawaala system.  Xawaala, or money transfer 
organizations (MTOs), deposit customers’ money in the account of a US bank, which wires the 
money to another bank, often in Dubai.  An agent travels with the money to Somalia and 
distributes it to other xawaala offices across the country, where Somali nationals can collect it.  
In recent years, however, the xawaala system has come under scrutiny because of fears about 
money transferred to Somalia supporting terrorist and criminal activities.  In February 2015, the 
last US bank that worked with Somalia MTOs, Merchants Bank of California, stated they would 
close all Somali MTO accounts—ostensibly cutting off a major part of the flow of the 1.3 billion 
dollars that moves from the Somali diaspora to the homeland each year, on account of new US 
Treasury Department regulations (Oxfam 2015; Reckard and White 2015).   
In the spring and summer of 2015, when I was conducting research in Columbus, I went 
to a xawaala office in one of Columbus’ Somali malls, hoping to transfer some money to a friend 
in Kenya, and also to see how the process worked.  Two Somali men standing outside the 
office—perhaps one or both of them owners of the business—informed me that they were no 
longer in operation due to the recent changes.  If I was sending money to Kenya, they said, I 
could use a new mobile app that connected directly to Kenya’s mobile money transfer system, 
Mpesa.  This, it turned out, worked well.  But there was no such option for Somalia, which, as 
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LA Times reporters write, “has no connections to the international banking system or to such 
services as Moneygram and Western Union” (Reckard and White 2015).  When the former 
Prime Minster of Somalia, Abdiweli Sheik Ahmed, came to speak in Columbus in the summer of 
2015, he devoted his entire talk at the Ohio State University to this topic, impressing on the 
audience the life-saving importance of keeping the xawaala system going.   
People were panicking, my friend Habiba told me.  This was their link to their families 
back home, who they knew were counting on them, sometimes for basic necessities: “You know, 
when the Dahabshil57 [xawaala] closed, it was a horror.  We were panicking!  We thought of 
using Western Union, but there’s no Western Union in Somalia…You would think people back 
home were panicking, but we were panicking.”  The xawaala system represents one of the 
Somali diaspora’s creative modes of producing a globally connected, diasporic society, and using 
the benefits of legal residency and citizenship elsewhere to support a homeland that has been in 
political and economic turmoil for twenty-five years.  The shutdown of xawaala demonstrates 
the vulnerability not only of nationals from countries with Islamist terror groups to War on 
Terror policies, but also of US citizens’ with links to those countries—and the ties between them.   
 
Waiting, from the Other Side 
 In the spring and summer of 2015, nearly every Monday Marissa’s hour-long open office 
consultations were filled with people coming to begin the process of sponsoring a family 
member.  On Tuesdays, Liban’s office was filled with people checking on their cases, and 
throughout the week Sara had several appointments to fill out the Affidavits of Relation (AOR) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Dahabshil is the name of the largest xawaala company in the world.  Their corporate 
headquarters is in Columbus, and they have offices in places from Dodge City, Kansas to cities 
and towns throughout eastern Africa.	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to be sent to ORA’s national affiliates and then to Washington, D.C.  This was considerably 
more calm than when the Refugee Family Reunification Program had re-opened in 2012—when, 
for a month, people were sleeping in ORA’s parking lot overnight to make sure they were able to 
fill out the paperwork the next day, and when Sara and three other staff members devoted almost 
40 hours per week to filling out AOR forms to make up for the nearly four years when the 
program had been closed.58   
In Marissa’s office, at least half of the people who had come for a consultation were 
ineligible to bring the family member they were hoping to bring.  At my shared intern desk in the 
corner, I would see people coming in with letters from Homeland Security’s Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, requesting specific kinds of evidence.  One day, a woman who had 
applied for her husband came to the office with a letter requesting a death certificate for her first 
husband.  The letter stated that in an early interview in Kenya, she had claimed that her husband 
died in 1991.  But in her paperwork applying for her second husband, she wrote that her first 
marriage ended in 2000.  I had no idea what accounted for the discrepancy, but the woman said 
she had no way to procure a death certificate.  If her first husband had died in 1991, at the start of 
the civil war, the idea that she would have gotten a death certificate then, or would be able to 
procure one now, seemed rather absurd.  The letter stated that without it, her case would likely be 
cancelled.   
At times, Marissa would have me work with a client to prepare their application—
assembling, for example, printouts of Facebook or WhatsApp conversations between a young 
wife and husband, as proof of the genuineness of the relationship.  Often embarrassed that a staff 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  As described in Chapter 4, in 2008 the US government suspended the Refugee Family 
Reunification Program, after a DNA testing pilot program demonstrated high levels of fraud, 
according to Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), under the State 
Department.	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member (who was often equally embarrassed) would have to translate their conversations with 
their husbands into English, such young women were acutely aware of themselves as surveilled 
subjects, including the most intimate and seemingly private corners of their lives—their personal 
exchanges with their spouses over their personal cell phones.    
 Sitting in the office, following around Ikran—a Somali caseworker—and hanging around 
with my neighbors, it was soon clear that almost everyone was waiting for someone.  Many were 
waiting for decisions about their P3 or other family visa cases.  Others were waiting because 
their families (as they defined them) had been separated by UNHCR or the US government 
based on the premise that nuclear families would be on a single case, while “extended” kin, 
including children over the age of 21, would be “linked”—meaning that they were considered 
one unit, but could receive different final decisions, or depart at different times.  Abdi’s family, 
my neighbors, who arrived in Columbus from Kenya only days after I did, and whom I had 
greeted at the airport when I accompanied Ikran to collect them, had an adult daughter, along 
with her children, who they desperately wanted to join them.  In the apartment next to theirs, a 
woman who lived with her daughter and sick husband was desperately hoping to be reunited 
with her two children from a first marriage, as well as her niece—the daughter of her deceased 
brother.  Another woman was waiting for her young daughter, who was being cared for by the 
woman’s mother in Dadaab, and who had not been there at the time that she began her 
resettlement case with her two other children.  To be waiting for someone seemed more common 
than not among Somali refugees living in the Northland neighborhood of Columbus, and 
particularly among those who regularly interacted with ORA—recent arrivals, and of course 
those who were actively pursuing a case submitted by ORA staff.   
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 Sara, who filled out the AOR forms for clients, suggested I talk with Dahir—about whom 
I write in the opening of this chapter—who was waiting for his sick mother and younger siblings 
to come to Ohio.  His persistence and frustration had made an impact on Sara—in part because 
of the sheer frequency of his trips to ORA to make complaints, but also, I suspected, because the 
frustration he expressed was both uncommonly intense but also entirely reasonable.  Abdi had 
touched a chord with Sara, even though his complaints were directed towards problems that, for 
the most part, she felt powerless to change. 
 It was difficult to find a time to meet with Dahir, as he was driving a truck between 
Columbus and Indianapolis six days a week.  Sundays were for sleeping, laundry, and talking to 
family back in Kakuma.  We finally found a day—he would meet me for lunch when he woke 
up, before starting his shift in the afternoon.  I left the office to meet Dahir at a Somali restaurant 
where some of the Somali ORA staff members had once worked in the kitchen—a staple of the 
local Somali community.  The restaurant is casual with tile floors, simple tables and a long 
counter up front where you pay and pick up to-go orders.  A drive-through window offers the 
ultimate American convenience, and patrons drive up to get their lunch or to pick up large orders 
of aromatic rice and meat in aluminum trays for parties or big family dinners.  Inside, a partition 
divides the men’s seating area from the area for women, families, or mixed-gender diners such as 
Dahir and me—just like restaurants in Eastleigh.  Largely catering to the Somali community that 
lives in the Northland area around Morse Road and Cleveland Avenue, people know each other 
here and when I come with friends from ORA we are usually greeted by name by the staff and 
other patrons.   
On this day, loud jazz music plays in the background.  We order pasta and goat meat, but 
Dahir’s lunch is untouched as he talks animatedly.  Having assisted a Canadian anthropologist in 
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Kakuma, he seems relaxed, even pleased to talk, and encourages me to record him.  When he 
explains that he has to find money each month for his mother, as well as his own daily expenses, 
I ask him how much he sends back.  Dahir answers: 
“Quite a lot of money.  We send back $1,000 a month, sincerely.  I pay $500 per month, 
my brother pays $500 per month.  My mom has diabetes, [high] blood pressure, she was treated 
for cancer.  So all that, in Kakuma refugee camp, they don’t get enough assistance for medical.  
And food and all that stuff.  I have to take my siblings to school—pay for their school.  That’s 
why my dreams ended.  My dream was to get further education—to do finance and accounting, 
or political science as an activist.  So those all—shattered.  Because I had to work full time, 
seven days a week, sixty hours a week to make sure that they are living a sustainable life.  Work 
overtime, work overtime, contribute, buy a car, went to DMV, did the exam, got my permit, did 
the road test.  Same [for] my brother.  We help each other.  Some of the challenges that we had, 
like driving, we solved that one.  The second challenge was a job; now we are working.  The 
third challenge was getting a paycheck—we’re living paycheck to paycheck, we can’t save 
money.  I probably cannot save money while my mom is dying, when she needs quick medical 
assistance.  My siblings need something to eat.  They need to go to school.  They need to look at 
their future.  As a breadwinner, both me and my brother, we were already resettled to the United 
States of America.  So my mom doesn’t have help [at home], so the only help that she waits for 
from God is from me and my brother.  We have to contribute money to make her life look more 
decent, more healthful, and that’s why after two years we are still facing that challenge.” 
“Someone who has a bright future in front of him—wants to be a young entrepreneur or 
businessman, or an activist—can’t go to college.  I can’t go to college because this small amount 
of money that I’m getting to sustain myself—pay my bills, my insurance, car, my fuel, my rent 
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and all that—I have to work extra hours to cover the bills of my mom.  Why is it that two of us, 
who came here to the United States of America, successfully, nothing was asked?  Our process 
was quick, from the beginning!  Finished medical [screening], six months later, [when] my 
medical [certification] was still good for one month – snaps his fingers – my brother came, I 
came, and we expected that our mom and siblings would follow us not more than six months.  
It’s now about three years now.” 
“So this is the biggest challenge.  Our hands are tied.  We cannot…our lives are not 
complete without our family.  And family to me, my mom is the only person that we look up to 
her right now.  My dad died of the same challenges.  He had cancer.  He never had medical 
assistance, no one had sent him money, no one took him to hospital, and that’s why we are 
working six days a week to try to get enough money to make sure she is getting assistance and 
treatment.  That’s the thing she needs to have.  And at least basic things like food, going to 
school [for the kids], clothing and all that.  She doesn’t need much.  But that’s the problem—the 
biggest problem is: My mind is in Kenya; my body is in America.  You know what I’m saying?  
I always think of her.  Right now I’m a truck driver, but sometimes my job is a risk because 
sometimes I’m thinking too much of my mom.  Sometimes you are on the road, they can call you 
and say, ‘Hey, Dahir, your mom is sick.  She’s been in the hospital for a week and no one was 
helping her.’  You know what I’m saying? She was taking care by herself!  Okay, we met the 
financial expectation but she cannot get the care that we used to give her.  We used to take her to 
the hospital, back and forth, bring her home, whatever she’s unable to do, help her to do. You 
know what I’m saying? So these are the challenges we’re facing.” 
“I still don’t have any answers.  I look for answers.  I say, ‘Why?  Why are my siblings 
who are under eighteen years locked up for security issues?  Why is my mom’s case on hold?’  
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‘On hold’ means you have security problems!  I mean, I mean, I mean – okay, I can have 
security problems because of the last name I have, and as a youth.  The government can say, 
‘Hey this person could be involving himself in gang issues or terrorist issues,’ but such people—
I don’t think so!  When I hear ‘security issues’ of Homeland Security, my assumption is 
someone who has a bad background. But such kids, they don’t have!  When I ask such questions, 
I get no answers back.  Neither [ORA] nor the government have given me any information.  And 
that leaves us still—someone like me, twenty-five years old, came here when I was twenty-three 
years old, expecting much, expecting a future, expecting to meet my dreams, to get my degree, to 
pursue my education until Masters or PhD—you see what I’m saying?  To help people!  Help the 
youth!  Create opportunities for them!  Advocate for their rights!  And without my family, I 
don’t think I can drive to my dreams.  Because I’m already locked up!  I’m working six days, 
only get Sunday off, and when I come [home on] Sunday I’m already tired.  Wash my clothes, 
look up some things… that’s it.  I drive eleven hours a day, take ten hours rest, give two hours to 
talk to my family.  This is the challenge that we have been receiving from day one up to right 
now.  Working here, making sure you pay your bills.  Cope with your challenges.  Right now, 
what we are lacking – if we had our family with us there’s somewhere I could work part time – 
even work for [ORA] as an interpreter, or work as a case worker – get eight hours a day – work 
three days – go to school!  You know what I’m saying?  Go to school!”59   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 I do not have a large sample size with which to compare Dahir’s situation.  I only know one 
other family that had a “linked” case—a Congolese family that was waiting for their adult son 
and brother to join them.  He followed by only a matter of a few weeks.  But Somali cases, 
according to resettlement staff in the US and Kenya, face more scrutiny.  Somalis waiting for 
family members through the Family Reunification Program would have been able to sympathize 
with Dahir.  Some had been waiting for their family members since before the Program had been 
suspended in 2008.  In 2015 when I conducted my research in Columbus, of everyone who had 
applied for a family member through the Family Reunification Program since it re-opened in 
2012, not one had received their family member or members in Ohio.   
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Listening to Dahir, I am struck by the way threads of family obligation and government 
securitization intermix in his account of his life in the US.  For Dahir, the strain of life in the 
camps is not really alleviated, because his mind is still in Kenya with his mother, worrying about 
her health condition.  Because the family is separated now, his burden is greater, even though he 
is able to make a greater financial contribution to her medical care and his siblings’ needs than 
when he was working for an NGO in Kakuma and making only $55 per month.  But the anxiety 
of waiting for a resettlement process to be resolved is heightened because of his physical 
distance from his mother.  Moreover, his burden is heightened because he now has the option of 
making money in a low-wage, solitary job with demanding hours that stretch him to work as 
much as he can in order to do the most possible for his faraway family.    
*** 
 Following the 9/11 attacks, new security protocols were put in place in the US Refugee 
Admissions Program.  Initially, these caused delays and complications, as people in the final 
stages of the process now had go through a whole new set of screening protocols (Martin 
2005:77).  According to stories told to me by people who worked in the US resettlement system 
during that time, refugees who had boarded airplanes were even removed from their seats when 
the new regulations went into effect.  Since the November 2015 Paris attacks, a newfound public 
scrutiny has been placed on the US refugee program.  While the Paris attacks were perpetrated 
by EU citizens, some of the attackers had likely gone to the Middle East and re-entered Europe 
along the same routes as Syrian refugees.  European and US fears about terrorism have been 
largely directed towards immigrants and refugees, particularly from Muslim majority-
countries—pictured as flows of unknown and unknowable outsiders—criminals and terrorists 
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hiding amongst victims, whose true identities are untraceable, like invisible toxic chemicals or 
cancer cells hiding inside the body.   
Unlike US immigration policy, refugee resettlement as a humanitarian program long 
received bi-partisan support and agreement across the US political divide, born from the Cold 
War period of refugee aid (Espiritu 2006; Loescher et al. 2008; Tang 2015).  Since 9/11, that era 
has come to an end, particularly with the rise of the Islamic State and the large numbers of 
refugees from Muslim-majority countries crossing borders into “the West.”  With the political 
crisis in Syria, nearly 5 million people have left the country (UNHCR 2017).  By 2015, nearly 
400,000 Syrians had sought asylum in Europe (Pew Research Center 2015).  The US has been 
called upon to contribute to resettlement efforts, while the US political right has responded by 
calling for the immigration of all Muslims to be stopped completely—an idea now mainstream 
enough to be first part of the Republican Party platform in the 2016 presidential elections, and 
then translated into Trump’s 2017 Executive Orders on Immigration.  
 Screening for refugees is not a one-size-fits-all operation, as certain demographic groups 
undergo more rigorous screening.  Today, the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of State, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Department of 
Defense all take part in the screening of refugees (Center for American Progress 2015). 
Refugees from countries with troubled relationships with the United States, and which have 
groups recognized as terrorist organizations by the US government, undergo more intense 
security screening.  Dahir is partially baffled by the hold-up of his mother and siblings’ case 
because a sick woman and her children are not supposed to be security concerns, especially since 
he and his brother—the more likely targets of increased scrutiny—passed through without a 
problem.   
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I was told many times by people working in refugee resettlement in Nairobi that Somalis 
tend to get caught in a bureaucratic quagmire on account of their names and the common use of 
January 1st birthdays.  Without birth records, and sometimes without knowledge of actual birth 
dates at the time of refugee registration in camps, a large number of Somali refugees have an 
official birth date of 1/1.  Moreover, similar names and naming conventions in Muslim societies 
(a given name followed by the father’s name and paternal grandfather’s name) means that, for 
example, there may be many more than one Mohamed Ahmed Ali, registered with a birth date of 
1/1/90, in all of the Muslim world—and one of those men may come up on a US government 
security list.  Despite the unlikelihood of a Somali national in Kenya being the same person as 
someone who perpetrated a crime or attack in Baghdad—known to be an Iraqi national—this 
name/documented birth date convergence does not prevent the US government from seeing the 
name and birth date hit in a security check as a reason to mark someone as inadmissible through 
the US Refugee Admissions Program.  Lack of credible documentation, I was told, means that 
there is no reliable or official way to discount the possibility that the Mohamed Ahmed Ali in 
Nairobi is the same as the one who came up in the security check.     
 While staff at UNHCR, NGOs, and in the US government discussed this situation as a 
kind of random misfortune, it is not exactly random.  For example, Len noted that he himself had 
a common name that was the same as a known criminal, and that for a period of time, he was 
always stopped at airport security.  But Len was able to navigate this “misfortune”—it had no 
major impact on his life.  By contrast, the fact that Somalis with the same names and birthdates 
as people who come up in security checks were excluded from the possibility of resettlement is 
tied to what Nicholas De Genova calls “the Homeland Security State” and its particular 
relationship to immigration: 
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[T]he Cold War’s specter of foreign infiltration never afforded migrants as such a 
prominence in the nationalist imagination at all comparable to that which presently 
congeals around Arab and other Muslims living in the United States, and which has 
figured “immigration” in general as an utterly decisive site in the ostensible War on 
Terror (2007:424). 
Somali communities in places such as Minneapolis and Columbus have come under particular 
scrutiny and surveillance after young Somali-American men began traveling to Somalia, 
purportedly to join al-Shabaab, starting in 2007 (Minnesota Public Radio 2013).60  Others have 
been accused and convicted of providing material support to al-Shabaab, events motivating 
anxieties around xawaala international money transfers to Somalia (Anti-defemation League 
2015).  The “Homeland Security State” that was ushered in with the replacement of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by the Department of Homeland Security in 2001 
is oriented around the idea that terrorists are in our midst—infiltrating “the instability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  One Somali-American friend from Minneapolis commented to me that when the majority of 
these young men (reportedly there are 23 of them) went to Somalia in 2007 and 2008, al-
Shabaab (which means, “The Youth”), was just beginning to form as a radical wing of the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Minnesota Public Radio 2013). The ICU, which emerged as a 
unified force vying to form a new Somali government out of more localized, court-based 
governing efforts during the war, had been heralded by many Somalis as the first great hope for 
unity and peace in the country.  However, fearing that the ICU would impose an Islamist 
government, they were toppled by US-backed Ethiopian troops. Ethiopia’s military interference 
was met with outrage by many Somalis, who were especially bitter due to the long history of 
conflict between the two countries over Ethiopia’s Somali-majority Ogaden region.  The young 
Minneapolis men who answered the ICU’s call to oust Ethiopian troops, my friend contended, 
were motivated by a sense of patriotic duty, rather than radical religious ideologies.  Whether or 
not they would have gone had they known the direction al-Shabaab would take over the next 
years is impossible for me to guess.  However, at the time of their departure, the shape of the 
conflict in Somalia was quite different than it is today.  The United States designated al-Shabaab 
a terrorist organization in 2008, and the group announced its relationship with al Qa’ida in 2012.  
The US National Counterterrorism Center notes that, “Most of its [al-Shabaab’s] fighters are 
predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the FGS [Federal Government of 
Somalia] and not supportive of global jihad”	  (National Counterterrorism Center 2016).   
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permeability of nation-state space and borders” (De Genova 2007:423).  Many migrant groups— 
including Mexicans and Central Americans who move back and forth across the US-Mexico 
border (Lugo 2008; Rosas 2012), as well as Somalis whose transgressive mobility takes shape in 
other ways—evoke perceived dangers of border crossing to the American homeland that are 
represented in contemporary US security discourses and practices.   
Susan Bibler Coutin’s writing about Salvadorans’ naturalization strategies, and the 
“disjuncture between transnational migration and nation-based models of membership” 
(2003:514), provides an apt model for understanding Somalis’ orientations towards refugee 
resettlement, and US government surveillance of mobility between the US and Somalia—
including the movement of both people and money.  US “naturalization” relies on an exclusive 
model of citizenship.61  The symbols and discourses of “choice” and “re-birth” that pervade 
naturalization ceremonies seek to eliminate “the potential disruptiveness of diversity” (ibid.:515) 
and to “domesticate the foreign” (ibid.:522).  By contrast, many Somalis, like the Salvadorans 
who Coutin interviewed, rely on an “additive” model of citizenship (ibid.:512).  They desire 
resettlement and naturalization in large part so that they can travel back and forth to Somalia, 
benefit from mobility enabled by a US passport (see also Abdi 2015), and use opportunities 
derived from US residence, including being able to remit income to Somalia.  All of these 
practices made possible “naturalization” strengthen, rather than diminish “their ties with their 
communities of origin” (Coutin 2013:511).  Despite US government attempts to shape a safe and 
suitable (nuclear) family for resettlement (see Chapter 4), transnational families and ties to the 
Somali homeland persist in ways that make Somali-Americans suspect; and subject to continued 
entanglement with national security bureaucracies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The metaphor of “naturalization” to refer to the conferral of a new citizenship itself speaks to 
the inextricable link between nation, kinship, and biology.  
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Blood, Guilt by Association, and Surveillance Anxieties 
 While still in Nairobi, before I arrived in Columbus, I would spend about half the week in 
the lively Somali neighborhood of Eastleigh.  Sitting in a restaurant with Moha one day, where 
we should have been drilling Somali verbs, Moha leaned over his watermelon juice, eyes wide, 
to tell me a story.  Initially we met every other day (later, just twice a week), and this left a day 
or two in between for life to unfold, often making for interesting tidbits to share when we met 
again.  On this day, Moha began telling me that he had run into an old classmate at a cyber café 
earlier in the week.  The young woman was Somali-Canadian but had come to Kenya for high 
school—not an uncommon scenario for some Somalis abroad, whose parents want them to know 
their language and be raised in a more disciplined, Islamic social setting.  If Somalia is too 
unsafe, Eastleigh is the next best thing.  Moha and the young woman had been in school together 
for one year before he graduated, and had known each other fairly well.  They had said “hi” to 
one another when they saw each other at the cyber café, and the young woman told him that she 
had recently gone to Mogadishu to see relatives.   
“You know,” Moha added, “even if you are in another country, you don’t cut your ties to 
your relatives back home.”   
“Of course,” I agreed.   
The young woman had traveled together with an older relative who he described as, “a 
big suspect.” supposedly suspected of financing al-Shabaab.  “When she returned to Kenya, the 
Canadian Embassy had been tracking her,” Moha told me.  “She received a message from them 
telling her to come to the Embassy.  When she came, they cut her passport,” he said, as he 
mimed clipping the precious document. Moha continued, 
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“She’s a suspect now.  She has to apply as if she’s never been to Canada before.  She 
says now they are listening to her phone calls. But how do you see, Sophi, a girl of 
nineteen years, financing al-Shabaab?  I asked her, ‘Is there anything true about that?’  
‘No,’ she said, ‘nothing.’  But that embassy must be very strong, they must know 
something.  But the lady she traveled with is known.  As I was standing there, I was 
thinking, Is there a satellite watching me?  If I’m seen with this girl, will I be denied my 
visa?  I was just shaking.  I was standing back from her, though I was trying to act calm.  
Like as if her blood could just be a grenade.  Yesterday I was walking by the mosque.  I 
saw her and just crossed to the other side.”   
I am interested in this story in the context of this chapter for three primary reasons.  I am 
interested in the young woman’s relation to “a known suspect,” and the way that the Canadian 
and US governments have used anti-terror tactics that have appeared to rely on “guilt by 
association” since 9/11 (Cole 2000-2001; Cole and Dempsey 2006; Roach 2003; Scahill 2006).62  
Although I have no way of knowing on what basis the young woman became a suspect besides 
traveling to Somalia with a relative who had been named a suspect, apparently by the Canadian 
government (and even that is only second hand hearsay), Moha’s, and apparently her own 
articulation of the role of the “known” woman places the concept of guilt by association at the 
forefront of their own understanding of themselves as Somalis and Muslims in an age of the War 
on Terror.  Thus, I am also interested in the way that fear of guilt by association pervades 
Moha’s experience of talking with his old classmate, particularly the metaphor of her body itself 
as dangerous to his wellbeing and safety—“her blood could just be a grenade.”   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cf. Cole and Dempsey (2003) who argue that “guilt by association” was used during the 
McCarthy era, was reignited with the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, and expanded by the post-9/11 
PATRIOT Act.	  	  
	   257	  
In Eastleigh, I heard other people articulate the idea that people’s body parts could turn 
into weapons, but typically in the context of their sense that their own bodies were feared—
conceptualized as dangerous Muslims in a Kenyan imaginary—and not their fear of others’ 
bodies.63  Here, Moha reverses the usual idea that one experiences one’s own body as frightening 
to others, as, in this case, another person’s body (though that of a co-ethnic) was frightening to 
him.  It is notable that Moha imagines her blood as a weapon, rather than another body part, 
given the importance of blood (dhiig) in Somali conceptions of relatedness (Lewis 1994).  It is 
their relatedness as Somalis, and their social association, that he understands as posing a danger.  
But finally, the young woman was only frightening if refracted through the surveillance of 
powerful governments in the global North, which had the power to determine Moha’s fate.  
Thus, I am interested in Moha’s articulation of being a member of a surveilled community—“Is 
there a satellite watching me?”—and that being seen with a suspect could cause his visa in his 
own family sponsorship case to be denied.     
* 
 Although no longer living in Kenya, where Somalis—both Kenyan nationals and 
refugees—have endured surveillance and often brutal security operations by the British colonial 
government and then the post-colonial Kenyan state, Dahir still experiences himself as a person 
under state surveillance (Lochery 2012; Sheik 2007).  In Columbus, sitting at the restaurant on 
Morse Road, he wonders aloud if his mother’s case has been put on hold because of a mistaken 
identity—if one of his siblings shares a name with a 9/11 bomber, or with one of the attackers in 
the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya.  He also wonders if the hold is due to the fact that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For example, someone might say, when they felt they were regarded with particular 
trepidation by non-Somalis, “they acted as if my head was a bomb,” commenting on the fear that 
they perceived they inspired in others.  	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hasn’t fully paid off his loan for his airline ticket that brought him to the US, or if his sending 
money to his family in Kakuma has made the US government perceive them as less deserving of 
resettlement now.   
 In all of these speculations—scenarios that Dahir has clearly turned over in his mind 
again and again, (like Mama Immaculee, in Chapter 3, who, in the absence of access to 
information, imagines many possible reasons that the UNHCR has denied her refugee status)—
Dahir highlights himself as someone whose daily lived experiences, and whose subjectivity as a 
Muslim who came to the United States as a refugee, are in part produced through the 
mechanisms of the post-9/11 War on Terror, and the ways in which refugee resettlement is 
increasingly structured by the current US foreign policy framework, now in the age of the self-
proclaimed Islamic State.  Dahir’s embodied and affective daily life—of driving a truck in the 
American Midwest while his mind is in Nairobi where his mother seeks cancer treatment—as 
well as his structural position as a Muslim “foreigner,” are constructed through his entanglement 
with US Homeland Security, his experiences of unknowing, and the relations of power structured 
in part by Homeland Security’s exclusive purview over information inaccessible to Dahir and 
people like him.  Such withholding of information represents a particular kind of enactment of 
state power that mirrors refugees’ experiences with US, UNHCR and NGO bureaucracies before 
they were legal permanent residents, or citizens, of the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 A year after meeting Dahir, while beginning to write this chapter, I was listening to the 
recording of our interview that took place at the Somali restaurant on Morse Road.  Taking in his 
emotional narration of his family’s situation as it sounded from my laptop, I sent him a text 
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message, hoping to hear good news about his mother’s case.  His WhatsApp profile showed 
Dahir wearing a suit jacket, sitting alone on a bench.  His profile status read, “I love hoyo 
mcn”—short for “hooyo macaan”—“sweet mother.”  Dahir wrote back right away, informing me 
that his mother’s case had been rejected.  When I asked what reason had been given, Dahir 
forwarded me a photo of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) letter.  The 
letter, addressed to his mother, began by explaining the laws under which she had applied for 
resettlement.  It then stated, “For the reason or reasons indicated below, we have determined that 
you are not eligible for resettlement to the United States.”  The remainder of the letter 
enumerated seven reasons for rejection, some of which had multiple sub-reasons listed beneath, 
and all of which had an empty check box next to them, except for the last.  According to the 
letter, Dahir’s mother had not been rejected on account of 1) failing to establish that she is a 
person of special humanitarian concern; 2) failing to establish that she meets the definition of a 
refugee; 3) persecuting others; 4) having been already resettled in a third country; 5) being 
inadmissible based on specified US criteria; or 6) finding her claim for resettlement not credible.   
 Rather, it was the seventh and final reason, next to which the box had been marked with 
an “X.”  Number seven read:  
Other Reasons: After a review of all of the information concerning your case, including 
your testimony, supporting documentation, background checks, country condition and 
other available information, your application for refugee resettlement in the United States 
under Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been denied as a matter of 
discretion for security-related reasons. 
A number of scholars have written about the growing criminalization of immigrants and 
asylum seekers in the US, particularly since 9/11, and the discursive blurring of internal and 
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external threats in the figure of the immigrant (Boyle and Busse 2006; De Genova 2007; Fassin 
2011; Peutz 2006).  Today, law enforcement and intelligence agencies spy on Muslim 
communities by monitoring online content and hiring informants from both within and outside of 
communities to infiltrate them (Durrani 2016).  In 2009, the FBI launched a pilot program that 
used community outreach activities as part of intelligence gathering in the Somali communities 
of Columbus, Minneapolis, Seattle, Denver, and Washington.  The program was eventually 
halted, but not before it led to widespread mistrust of government outreach among the 
communities in question (Buhain 2015; Federal Bureau of Investigations 2009; Kimball 2015).  
Stories such as Dahir’s, in the context of belonging to a community that sees itself as under 
government surveillance—as was dramatically demonstrated by Moha in his recounting of his 
interaction with his old classmate—frame the criminalizing and surveillance of immigrants, and 
Muslim communities of both immigrant and native-born origin, in a particular way.   
 Dahir and thousands of people like him, who are either legal permanent residents or 
citizens and are sponsoring family members through US visa programs, or are waiting for them 
to arrive through the resettlement process, may be members of communities subject to 
surveillance, but they are also enmeshed in the security state on account of their transnational 
families.  Whether or not the US government consciously and actively targets Somali-Americans 
who maintain active and traceable ties to kin abroad is a question worthy of investigation, but not 
one I can currently answer.  What I have argued in this chapter, however, is that through US 
governance of transnational money transfers (through the Department of the Treasury) and 
immigration (through Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services), Somali-
Americans such as Dahir continue to experience themselves as suspects.  Many Somalis’ devoted 
maintenance of close ties across continents—through sponsorship and remittances—contradicts 
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the US government’s notion of exclusive citizenship (Coutin 2003), and the nuclear family 
model it imposes through DNA testing (Chapter 4).  This fact draws our attention to the complex 
relationships between kinship and nation, and helps us to see how transnational social networks 
of kin trouble US national security ideals.  “The fraudulent family,” in other words, evokes wider 
anxieties about fraud—and therefore about rights, ethics, and truth claims—in refugee 
resettlement and other efforts to manage the growing contemporary crisis of forced 
displacement.    
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Conclusion  
Beneath Fraud: Global Inequality, and Claims to Global Mobility 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that discourses of fraud point to countless practices that 
underlie the events and people those discourses name—and that such practices emerge from the 
complex intersections of refugee resettlement policies, and the diverse social worlds of refugees 
themselves.  The term “fraud,” I have argued, should not be taken at face value, and I have 
ventured in the previous pages to demonstrate the logics, motivations, and relations that 
undergird it.  As a discourse, “fraud” also calls attention to the competing claims that structure 
refugee resettlement.  On one hand, it evokes a deep-seated concern with “rescuing” the most 
vulnerable—those deemed to be at the greatest risk of death or future suffering.  On the other 
hand, it evokes long-held anxieties in the United States about certain types of foreigners, and 
especially about terrorists and criminals “passing” as refugees, particularly in the period since 
9/11.   
Drawing on the particular anxiety around “family composition fraud,” kinship, I have 
argued, is central to understanding struggles between people desperate to move across 
continental borders—to seek citizenship, security, and opportunities—and governments and 
NGOs that govern, oversee, and decide who can and cannot move.  Governments’ desire to 
circumscribe the family into a testable unit—one that purportedly cannot be “faked”—is 
integrally tied to governments’ and NGOs’ exclusive power over those decisions.  As David 
Martin writes regarding family composition in the US resettlement program, “Some have urged 
that coresidence or dependency, such that the members all form part of the same economic unit, 
should be sufficient [for resettlement together]…” however, “DHS officials explained that such a 
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rule would be too open to fraud” (Martin 2008: 54).  The specter of the terrorist often lurks in the 
sub-text of such conversations, as when the US refugee coordinator, who initiated the DNA 
testing pilot program in 2008, considered fraud in the Family Reunification Program, reportedly 
commenting, “What happens to my career if I’m the guy who sent a terrorist to the States?”  
 The family, I have argued, like the refugee, is an object of both intense care and 
compassion, and of mistrusting scrutiny.  As an object of care, this social unit is considered the 
appropriate subject for resettlement, for interconnected pragmatic and ideological/cultural 
reasons.  Perceived as a bounded unit with a single story, the nuclear family is an economical 
way of managing resettlement.  Conceptualized in the United States, among other places, as the 
natural unit of human bonding (Haraway 1997; Schneider 1980), the nuclear family is seen as a 
deserving object of humanitarian attention.  “Family unity”—understood first as a nuclear, 
biological family—is central to the US refugee program.  UNHCR, likewise, gives special care 
to single mothers and orphaned children—people unnaturally separated from what are perceived  
as the most fundamental (natural) familial bonds.  By contrast, unmarried adults—perceived as 
being unattached to nuclear families—receive less attention, less humanitarian care.    
The emphasis on the nuclear family in refugee resettlement programs can confirm and 
expand Donna Haraway’s notion that the heterosexual nuclear family has been, in the 20th 
century United States, a potent reference point of imagined species-wide unity.  Imagery of early 
human ancestors, as well as non-human primates, portrayed through the recognizable 
father/mother/child triad, has produced and reproduced understandings of human nature and 
humanity itself as fundamentally linked to this model of social life (Haraway 1997:240-44).  In 
dialogue with recent scholarship on humanitarianism that has highlighted universal suffering and 
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shared humanity (Fassin 2012; Feldman and Ticktin 2011; Ticktin 2014), we see how the family 
is central to understanding not only humanitarianism but also its partner, securitization.   
The “fraudulent family”—the family that has, or is perceived to have been intentionally 
constructed or altered, or to have manipulated itself for the purposes of immigration, whether 
through so-called sham marriages, or secretly including children who are not biologically related 
sons or daughters—disturbs the humanitarian aim of serving those who are deemed “most 
deserving.”  This so-called lie, moreover, raises questions about the kind of citizen a refugee will 
make—imagined by bureaucrats and security officials as either productive and patriotic, or 
disruptive and criminal.  As Fassin puts it, “those at the receiving end of humanitarian attention 
know quite well that they are expected to show the humility of the beholden rather than express 
demands for rights” (Fassin 2012:3-4).  So-called fraud and lies disrupt the requisite “humility of 
the beholden”—even though the refugee may conceptualize such an action as servicing justice 
and moral action.   
Does the fraudulent family, then, also represent a demand for rights?  I have argued that 
the family and the narrative, or oral testimony, represent arenas through which refugees have 
located space to advocate for themselves (and others) in a system that otherwise forecloses much 
possibility for asserting claims.  Taking kinship as central to these issues, I have shown that 
refugees push against the nuclear, biogenetic, testable family, drawing upon both longstanding 
cultural practices (for example, sharing childcare responsibilities and resources across extended 
social networks), and newer conditions demanding great flexibility in patterns and practices of 
social care in the context of civil war, death, and displacement.  Moreover, I have argued that 
refugees themselves have articulated their social networks as constrained and disrupted by the 
nuclear, biogenetic, and (DNA-) testable norm—pointing out the costs of such disruptions.  For 
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example, Jacqueline, an unmarried Munyamulenge woman, described the pain of being rejected 
by UNHCR from joining the case of the family with which she lived.  Abdirhaman, a young 
Somali man, described the shame and sense of betrayal when DNA testing disrupted the 
possibility of being resettled with his uncle’s family with whom he resided at the time (Chapter 
4).   
In their edited volume, Relative Values, Franklin and McKinnon have written, “As much 
as we turn to the role of process, negotiation, and choice, we are also attentive to the restrictions 
that make them possible for some people in some contexts but not for others” (2001:21).  In this 
dissertation, I have brought together questions about kinship with questions about citizenship and 
statelessness in ways that illuminate obstacles to “choice” and negotiation—obstacles that shape 
diasporic communities and social lives.  Studies of humanitarianism have dealt with gender 
(Ticktin 2008) as well as children (Bornstein 2001, 2010; Malkki 2010), yet the family unit and 
all its attendant cultural assumptions also organize humanitarian logics, and specifically the work 
of selecting and relocating refugees from the global South to the global North.  The family, I 
have argued, contributes to our understanding of humanitarianism and the sentiments and objects 
around which it turns, as well as to our understanding of kinship and the multiple political 
processes through which it is imagined and constructed.   
When I first began this project, other anthropologists were encouraging about my 
suggestion that the cultural logics of family, sociality, and human attachment in US policy failed 
to match the cultural logics that animated and organized kinship in refugee communities from 
Somalia and Congo.  Most anthropologists, I believe, feel some level of affirmation when the 
bread-and-butter of our discipline illuminates a policy’s shortcomings, and sheds light on 
possible areas for improvement.  People working in international refugee resettlement work (but 
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not those working at resettlement agencies in the US), by contrast, were distinctly disinterested 
in the critiques I subtly (or so I hoped) raised in conversations.  They had heard it all before—
often, from staff working at resettlement agencies such as the one where I did research in 
Columbus, Ohio—and they were not interested in hearing it again.  Nothing was going to change 
on that front, they assured me, and frankly, while the system was not perfect, it required 
measures such as DNA testing so that the program did not become a free-for-all, with anyone 
going to the United States who could get included in someone else’s case—by hook or by crook.   
While I resisted their dismissal of my concern, I also came to understand there was 
something else, perhaps something bigger, of significance.  This growing sentiment was 
foreshadowed, or perhaps first opened up, early in my fieldwork when I was introduced to a 
woman who told me that her child had been taken to the US by her former husband “by fraud,” 
and that she hoped that DNA testing proving her maternity would be able to reunite her with her 
daughter.  If refugees in Nairobi struggle with differences between the realities of their social 
worlds and “the family” as defined by NGO and government policies, people are also fast to 
learn rules, and to use the language of governments and NGOs to articulate their own claims.  
The preference for widows and single mothers in the resettlement system inspired some women 
to “lose” their husbands.  After the rollout of DNA testing, non-biologically related children 
living with a family were sometimes purposefully hidden from officials so that the rest of the 
family’s case would not be compromised or hindered (perhaps this had happened to Abdirahman, 
whose aunt and her children left for Sweden without him after they learned that they would 
undergo DNA testing, although he didn’t say so explicitly).  Like the woman I met in 2012 who 
articulated her claims in the current discourses of the resettlement regime—“fraud” and 
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“DNA”—people take on the language of rules and policies, sometimes making sacrifices with 
such rules in mind, in order to put forth viable claims. 
In that sense, this dissertation is not just about cultural difference, or differing ways of 
reckoning relatedness, but also about the ways in which “the family” is being differently 
deployed to make claims about refugees’ rights to move and occupy different spaces across the 
globe, and simultaneously about governments’ control over such mobility.  As I wrote in the 
Introduction, I do not want to excise the most instrumental forms of producing a family (for 
resettlement purposes) from under the umbrella of “kinship.”  While it might be less complicated 
to stick to an idea that refugee resettlement programs misunderstand or willfully ignore the social 
realities of refugees’ lives, and that refugees simply cannot grasp the biological, nuclear family 
model that policies privilege (thereby unknowingly presenting non-conforming families), this 
would be a partial analysis at best, and would undermine the sophistication and agency of 
individuals in both groups.   
Given the centrality of the nuclear family within humanitarian sentiments, the family also 
becomes a vehicle through which refugees assert claims that fundamentally oppose the premise 
that resettlement is owed only to those deemed “the most vulnerable” by representatives of the 
global North.  The family and the intrinsic flexibility of social ties—the possibilities for someone 
to become family in so many different ways—also creates a mechanism through which refugees 
reject the hegemonic obstructions to their mobility and the possibility of occupying particular 
spaces on the globe—rejecting what Torpey calls “the state monopolization of the legitimate 
means of movement” (1998).  Just as enforcing boundaries of the family informs the enforcing of 
national borders, the flexibility of the family and social life has also enabled the troubling of 
national borders.  Refugees have asserted their own social obligations against policy definitions, 
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and have extended kinship to fulfill needs in a world of increasing interconnection and 
inequality.   
Discussing a Togolese and West African “single desire” “to go into exile and evacuate 
the space they call home” (2010:168), Charles Piot asks, “Is there not here a nascent post-
national, even global, conception of citizenship?” (169).  The communities in this dissertation 
indeed present possibilities for post-national conceptions of citizenship, in which transnational 
social networks tie people to diasporic belonging across countries and continents.  
Banyamulenge Congolese are deemed doubly displaced—called foreigners by the government of 
their nationality, and then displaced throughout the region by a relentless war largely ignored by 
the rest of the world.  Now, they occupy refugee camps and urban shanties throughout East 
Africa, from Burundi and Rwanda to Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.  Likewise, we may think of 
Somalis as longstanding border crossers—as traditional pastoralists and nomads, they have been 
troubling borders at least since the period of European colonization.  Today, Somalis live as 
refugees and asylum seekers on six continents; within Somalia, citizens have lived without the 
structure of a centralized government for a quarter-century.  Such communities allow us to see 
the world from the cracks, margins, and limits of a global nation-state system.  If, as Jean and 
John Comaroff have suggested, “Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa” (2012) the social 
worlds of such communities may have much to teach many more of us in the coming years—as 
processes such as global climate change and global capitalism increasingly squeeze more people 
outside of the relative protection of citizenship.  The refugees represented in this dissertation, 
who insist on the just-ness of crossing borders, but also insist on maintaining social 
responsibility to many others, may also provide a light to follow. 
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“The fraudulent family” alerts us to the privileging not only of specific kinds of humans 
in humanitarian operations (Ticktin 2011), but also to the privileging of specific kinds of social 
relations—thus contributing to critical studies of humanitarianism.  Haraway writes, “I long for 
models of solidarity and human unity and difference rooted in friendship, work, partially shared 
purposes, intractable collective pain, inescapable mortality, and persistent hope…where 
everything does not stem from the dramas of identity and reproduction” (1997:265).  This 
statement, much loved (cited) by feminist and kinship scholars, has lessons for us, here, too.  
Paradoxically, it contradicts both the isolationist, white nationalist, anti-immigrant discourses of 
the current moment in Europe and the United States, and humanitarian ideals and practices—
now structured by a global War on Terror—that unwittingly (and, perhaps at other times, more 
consciously) value certain kinds of human bonds over others.   
*** 
Since I began this project in 2010, and conducted the majority of the research between 
2013 and 2015, global and national discourses about refugee resettlement have become far more 
public.  During the Cold War period, refugee resettlement, which gained its current structure 
under the 1980 Refugee Act, received widespread bipartisan support.  During this period, refugee 
admission was oriented around specific, Cold War geopolitical interests that made welcoming 
certain kinds of refugees—those fleeing countries with Soviet-backed governments—
symbolically and geopolitically advantageous.  With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
rise of global terrorism, particularly the 9/11 attacks in 2001, new US systems and policies 
increasingly positioned refugees as a security issue (Abdi 2005; Troller 2008).   
Yet, accounting for a small proportion of immigration to the US, even during the post-
9/11 period, refugees largely existed under the radar of partisan debates on immigration that have 
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been central to recent US politics and election cycles.  Those who had supported and been 
invested in refugee resettlement represented diverse standpoints across the US political spectrum.  
For example, advocates for refugees included both secular liberals on the left, and Evangelical 
Christians, who often align with the right on a range of issues.  Refugees were often seen as a 
special category of immigrants—fleeing their countries out of dire, humanitarian need as 
opposed to “economic migrants” who have often been perceived by Americans as unfairly taking 
advantage of hard-earned American prosperity and the sweat of American taxpayers.   
 More recently, particularly since the 2015 Paris attacks—and (as I write) the unfolding of 
President Trump’s 2017 Executive Orders temporarily halting the US refugee resettlement 
program; temporarily halting all travel from first seven and then six, Muslim-majority countries; 
and (in the first initiative) banning Syrian refugees permanently—national and global 
conversations have shifted.  However, if public sentiments are embattled around refugees in a 
new way, are the broader conversations and debates about refugees actually new?  They are, and 
they are not.  Refugees may, for the most part, have been under the radar of wider public 
dialogue about immigration in the United States, or even embraced as exceptional migrants by 
Americans interested in their plight.  Yet, the emerging discourses also mirror the competing 
claims that have structured refugee resettlement at least since September 11, 2001.   
The tremendous public outcry against Trump’s Executive Order among certain segments 
of the US population makes reference to shared humanity, universal suffering, and family 
unity—just as refugee resettlement advocates have done in the past.64  Perhaps the cultural 
discourses of refugee advocates have influenced emerging public ideas, but I think it more likely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See, “Academics against Immigration Executive Order,” https://notoimmigrationban.com/; 
“Obama, Out of Office 10 Days, Speaks Out Against Immigration Ban.” 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/obama-trump-immigration-ban.html?_r=0;  
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that refugee resettlement processes draw upon deeply held American sentiments about aiding the 
imperiled, along with special value placed on the nuclear family bond.65  On the other side, 
Americans’ fear about threats posed by refugees and Islam to national security have animated 
public support for Trump’s Executive Orders.  As this dissertation has shown, these opposing, 
but also often intersecting sentiments are not new, but have actively informed US engagement 
with refugees in these first decades of the twenty-first century.  Deeper US histories show that 
figures of dangerous and undesirable refugees and immigrants—from Catholics, to Asians, 
Mexicans, Jews, and Muslims, among others—abound in the US public imaginary, and in 
immigration policy (Brodkin 1998; Molina 2010; Ng 2002; Ngai 2004).  
***  
On February 10, 2017, I received in my Google alert for “US refugee resettlement” a 
news article about a new book.  The article, published by the far-right, conspiracy theorist 
website, WorldNetDaily.com, is titled, “5 Examples of Lies, Fraud, Corruption in US Refugee 
Program.”  The book is written by a news editor of the same website, and was published by the 
site’s publishing imprint.  Titled Stealth Invasion: Muslim Conquest through Immigration and 
Resettlement Jihad, the book argues that refugee resettlement is part of a conspiracy by the 
Muslim Brotherhood to conquer the United States from within.  The book alleges that at the 
heart of this “conquest” lies the fact that most refugees in the United States are frauds, not 
meeting the 1951 Convention definition of “refugee.” 
In the Introduction to this dissertation, citing Miriam Ticktin’s important and rigorous 
research on asylum in France, I noted my fears about writing about fraud, and the kinds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 These sentiments are ones to which I am also “susceptible,” as Donna Haraway puts it 
(1997:243).  Haraway argues that such sentiments help, rather than harm scholarship, leading us 
away from “straw problems,” in which the scholar is not “also emotionally, epistemologically, 
and politically vulnerable” (243).   	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purposes to which such writing could be put.  It appears that now, more than ever, there are 
many people eager to co-opt information about the US refugee resettlement program in order 
stoke fear about Muslims and refugees.  This fear has been used to encourage not only US retreat 
from engaging with global problems (many of which the United States is complicit in having 
created), but also the increasingly public expression of white nationalism in the United States.  A 
fellow dissertation writer, Emily Metzner, commented to me recently that we were writing 
dissertations of the Obama era.  Arriving in graduate school less than one year after Obama’s 
first election, and developing this project in the first years of his presidency, I, along with others 
arriving around the same time, developed research agendas in the comfort of a climate of 
increasingly progressive rhetoric and policies, relative to the era of George W. Bush—eight 
years that marked the coming-of-age period for those of us born in the 1980s.  What I took my 
colleague (who studies drug courts) to mean was that we had the luxury—an important luxury—
of looking critically at policies and programs that were part of relatively progressive agendas—
that is, relative to changing rhetoric and initiatives that we now see under the Trump 
administration.66 
Indeed, part of this project was animated by the idea that while resettlement is an 
important agenda, I imagined that there were possibilities for bigger and more innovative 
thinking about how statelessness could be addressed; that the bandage of resettling less than a 
mere 1 percent of refugees globally fails to adequately address statelessness on a global scale; 
that while the act of welcoming refugees into our cities, neighborhoods, and homes allows us 
perform an ethical obligation, it may also allow us (even those actively engaging with refugees) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Despite progressive rhetoric and policy in some arenas, it is worth noting that the Obama 
administration also saw more restrictive immigration policies and practices.  For example, the 
administration oversaw more deportations of undocumented immigrants than any other in US 
history (Marshall 2016).	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to think a bit less about the other 99% (for a broader but parallel point, see also Fassin 2012).  In 
thinking cautiously about refugee resettlement, I ventured to hear from refugees themselves 
about their experiences, and how their experiences spoke in specific and human ways to how—
on local and global scales—we might differently approach this seemingly intractable conundrum 
of the modern world.   
I am offering this knowledge in a changing context.  When I began this project, I did not 
imagine that by the time I was concluding my dissertation, the US refugee resettlement program 
would be making national headlines daily, nor that the program would be at the center of two 
succesive presidential Executive Orders, and major public protest and debate.  Prior to the 2016 
presidential elections, most Americans knew little about the US Refugee Admissions Program or 
what it entailed.  This lack of information has enabled misinformation to run rampant now that 
the program is at the center of major controversy.  On a both practical and political level, my 
hope is that this project can show both the hope and the limitations of refugee resettlement.  
Refugee resettlement holds the seeds of an important idea—that people should be free to move 
outside the country of their nationality or the place they ended up after fleeing.  But resettlement 
also calls attention, in so many ways, to inequalities proliferating in an age of North-South 
divisions structured by global capitalism and the long-lasting legacies of colonialism.   
The global refugee resettlement system is a necessary kernel of better possibilities yet to 
come.  Like most humanitarian programs, it cannot escape the relations of power in which it was 
conceived and in which it now exists.  The mistrust of refugees that I have recounted in these 
pages is a symptom of those global relations, not a mark against the good will of many refugee 
resettlement workers.  The “fraud” about which the above-mentioned book and article make 
mention must be understood anthropologically and historically—in the context of these relations.   
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The notion of fraud, I argue, in fact encompasses those very relations.  It points to a refusal of 
people’s lived realities, and a need to dismiss 99% of claims—a refusal and a need that both 
emerge from the very structures of unequal relations between countries and world regions.  
“Fraud” also points to a refusal of that refusal—to refugees’ insistence on the just-ness of their 
claims, and their desires for mobility.  Ultimately, that struggle plays out, among other places, in 
the domain of cultural ideas about the family, and in family life and social obligations to care for 
kin and community.  The borders of our nations are integrally tied—symbolically and 
materially—to the boundaries and contours of kinship.   
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